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Face Value: Physiognomy, Portraiture, And The Making Of Subjectivity In 
Francophone Literature And Visual Culture 
Abstract 
This dissertation examines representations of the human face in Francophone literature and visual 
culture. Of all the discourses that have dominated discussions of France’s colonial subjects, nineteenth-
century physiognomy was among the most popular. Imperial expansion in the 1830’s and the 
development of physical anthropology transformed the “science of faces” into something it was originally 
not: a tool for classifying racial types rather than a study of individual, idiosyncratic features. In the 
following century, Levinas profoundly reshaped how to approach and understand faces. While his ethics 
has often been framed as a critique of physiognomic description, Chapter one produces a reading of the 
two that explores some of their less-discussed commonalities, arguing that both ultimately theorized the 
face apart from its lived experience. The next three chapters examine how current Afro-Caribbean authors 
such as Max Elisée, Révérien Rurangwa, and Assia Djebar have engaged with this intellectual legacy and 
articulated, often as a counterpoint, their own imaginaries of the face. Proceeding through a series of 
case studies centered on portraits of Tutsis, chabins, and (un)veiled Muslims, this dissertation 
interrogates the modalities through which racial and gender differences have been inscribed on and 
performed by the body. It is not a history of Francophone portraiture per se, nor is it a history of the face. 
Rather, it provides a partial inventory of how Francophone artists have positioned themselves within the 
network of Western discourses on the face, and more specifically, how they have borrowed, re-
appropriated, or bent the codes of physiognomic portraiture, using the face as a heuristic device to 
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classifying racial types rather than a study of individual, idiosyncratic features. In the 
following century, Levinas profoundly reshaped how to approach and understand faces. 
While his ethics has often been framed as a critique of physiognomic description, Chapter 
one produces a reading of the two that explores some of their less-discussed 
commonalities, arguing that both ultimately theorized the face apart from its lived 
experience. The next three chapters examine how current Afro-Caribbean authors such as 
Max Elisée, Révérien Rurangwa, and Assia Djebar have engaged with this intellectual 
legacy and articulated, often as a counterpoint, their own imaginaries of the face. 
Proceeding through a series of case studies centered on portraits of Tutsis, chabins, and 
(un)veiled Muslims, this dissertation interrogates the modalities through which racial and 
gender differences have been inscribed on and performed by the body. It is not a history 
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Drawing on a corpus of texts and images that include war photographs, novels, 
popular caricatures, and anthropological essays, this dissertation examines how recent 
Afro-Caribbean artists have positioned themselves within the network of discourses on 
the face that have marked the history of ideas since the rebirth of physiognomy in late 
eighteenth-century France. While Levinas described the face of the other in terms of an 
ethical encounter, Deleuze and Guattari saw in it the expression of something 
fundamentally inhuman, “un conte de terreur.”1 Where this dissertation breaks new 
ground is in its revision of such claims. Focusing on Francophone literature and visual 
culture allows me to reframe the face as a locus where the boundaries of human 
subjectivity are neither taken for granted nor completely dismissed, but endlessly 
negotiated. In doing so, I provide a larger context for the intersection between 
postcolonial humanism and body studies—two disciplines that have respectively 
produced a vast literature but whose commonalities have been understudied.  
This dissertation is not a history of the face per se. Nor is it a history of the way it 
has been represented in French and Francophone portraiture. Rather, it is a study of how 
Francophone artists have borrowed, re-appropriated, or bent the codes of European 
physiognomy to create new imaginaries of the face and, by the same token, to redefine 
what it means to be human. By European physiognomy, I mean the brand of 
physiognomy concerned with the depiction of racial types and popularized by French 
                                                          




anthropologists like Paul Broca in the second half of the nineteenth-century. It is in this 
sense that I use the expression in the rest of this dissertation, unless otherwise indicated.   
Scholarly essays that address the question of the face in literature, visual arts, and 
cultural studies have for the most part done so from an exclusively French perspective. 
Among them are Dominique Baqué’s Visages: Du masque grec à la greffe du visage,2 
André Benhaïm’s Panim: Visages de Proust,3 and Francis Saint-Genez’s Le Visage 
humain remodelé. Constructions symboliques, reconstructions plastiques.4 Even Marie-
Annick Gervais-Zaninger’s two-volume essay Au regard des visages places very little 
emphasis on representations of faces in Francophone literature and visual culture.5 To be 
sure, she does broach the subject of racism and the discursive construction of alterity, but 
the bulk of her analysis focuses on authors such as Proust, Michaud, Simon, Beckett, and 
Artaud for whom these concerns were not particularly central. This dissertation is a first 
step toward filling this gap in scholarship. By no means does it claim to exhaust the topic. 
It is merely an attempt to scratch the surface and pave the way for future discussions and 
investigations. 
I suggest reading it as if strolling through a portrait gallery. Throughout the pages, 
the reader will stumble upon emblematic faces of the Francophone world: Tutsis whose 
semi-Semitic, semi-Caucasian appearance served to justify their extermination; the 
                                                          
2 Baqué, Dominique. Visages, Du masque grec à la greffe du visage. Paris: Éditions du regard, 2007. 
3 Benhaïm, André. Panim. Visages de Proust. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 
2006. 
4 Saint-Genez, Francis, ed. Le Visage humain remodelé. Constructions symboliques, reconstructions 
plastiques. IAC Éditions, 2014. 
5 Gervais-Zaninger, Marie-Annick. Au regard des visages: essai sur la littérature française  
du XXe siècle. Paris: Hermann, 2011, and Au regard des visages II: De Proust à Bonnefoy.  




chabin, a figure of black/white mixing long considered in the Caribbean as a pariah; and 
veiled Muslims whose bodies has recently been the object of heated debates on the 
relationship between Islam and laïcité in French society. Another metaphor to describe 
this dissertation could be that of the transformational mask, which Lévi-Strauss famously 
described as a mask composed of several faces, a mask that opens like two shutters to 
show a second face and, sometimes, a third one behind the second.6 This dissertation is 
divided into four chapters, each opening onto the next one to reveal a new face.  
Chapter one compares and contrasts two discourses on the face that have shaped 
the intellectual landscape of the past two centuries in significant ways: physiognomy (or 
the study of facial features as indicators of character) and Levinas’s ethics. While the 
latter’s description of the face as a transcendental presence has often been pitted against 
physiognomy’s concern with material traits, my reading of the two explores some of their 
less-discussed commonalities. As physiognomy evolved into a tool for producing racial 
types, it dissolved the corporeality of the face and reduced it to an abstract construct. I 
argue that, while Levinas’s ethics was partly meant as a criticism of physiognomic 
discourse, both ended up treating the face as a disembodied entity. Chapters two, three, 
and four address the different ways in which Francophone literature and visual culture 
has engaged with this legacy. Can faces be portrayed in a way that does not succumb to 
the extreme racialization of physiognomy while avoiding the complete erasure of race in 
Levinas’s ethics? To what extent was this racial erasure reinforced by the color-blind 
                                                          




model of French Republicanism?  How have Francophone artists navigated between 
these two poles of representation?  
Chapter two starts by acknowledging the role of European anthropologists in 
creating ethnic divisions between Hutus and Tutsis, and how Hutu propaganda re-
appropriated practices of racial classification to marginalize, denigrate, and ultimately 
justify the killing of Tutsis. The post-genocide literature of Rwanda includes a large 
corpus of testimonies by Tutsi survivors and second-hand witnesses like Yolande 
Mukagasana’s La Mort ne veut pas de moi7and N’aie pas peur de savoir,8 Diop’s 
Murambi, le livre des ossements,9 and Révérien Rurangwa’s Génocidé.10 All three writers 
have reacted differently to the ethnicization of the Rwandan population. Yet they are 
bound by a common goal: to redefine the conditions of visibility of the face, after 
centuries of it being racialized. First, I examine the trope of the ethnic ID card in 
Mukagasana and Diop’s accounts. Its counterfeiting, which was a common practice 
during the genocide, allowed Tutsis to pass as Hutus, thus undermining the physiognomic 
grid on which the latter relied to identify the former. While Mukagasana and Diop insist 
on the face as a site of opacity, Rurangwa seeks to make it more legible, but in his own 
terms. His testimony is a gripping account of how he was disfigured by his Hutu neighbor 
and his attempt to come to terms with his new appearance. I propose to read it as an anti-
iconoclastic, anti-Levinasian manifesto. In inviting his reader to scrutinize his face, 
Rurangwa underscores the redemptive possibilities of representation because it brings to 
                                                          
7 Mukagasana, Yolande. La Mort ne veut pas de moi. Paris: Fixot, 1997. 
8 Mukagasana, Yolande. N’aie pas peur de savoir. Paris: J’ai lu, 1999. 
9 Diop, Boubacar Boris. Murambi, le livre des ossements. Paris: Stock, 2000. 




light the marks of violence inscribed in his flesh. He describes his scars and deformities 
as reminders of what he went through, signs of his personal struggle, thus reversing 
physiognomy’s goal of producing types.  
Chapter three shifts the focus from Rwanda to Martinique and from the Tutsi to 
the chabin—a figure of Caribbean métissage. With his combination of black and white 
features, he has been a source of bewilderment and fascination. I trace how he has been 
perceived in Parisian and Martinican societies. The first chabin ever known in France 
was presumably Alexandre Privat d’Anglemont (1815-1859). Originally from 
Guadeloupe, he spent most of his adult life in Paris where he led a bohemian life as a 
writer and journalist. Descriptions of his face all fetishized his racial difference, 
describing it as the sign of an unbridled sexual energy. I go on to examine how 
Martinican writers Raphaël Confiant and Max Elisée reacted to this exoticization. The 
former’s autobiographical narratives and the latter’s novel Mémoires d’un chabin lay the 
basis for a phenomenology of the face that attempts to rehabilitate his métissage.11  
 Chapter four departs from the exclusively male focus of chapter three to 
concentrate on representations of veiled Muslims both in France and Algeria. It is also a 
move away from physiognomy strictly understood as the practice of determining 
someone’s character based on facial features. In this chapter, I focus on the general 
appearance of Muslim women as they remove their Islamic veils and show their faces in 
public. From its inception, physiognomy emerged as a hermeneutics of revelation, an 
attempt to penetrate beyond surfaces to the very essence of self. It provided reassurance 
                                                          




and comfort by transforming visual observation into a source of knowledge and power. 
To look at people meant to know them. In this respect, physiognomy served as a 
powerful tool of surveillance. Taking as its case study the figure of the veiled Muslim, 
this chapter asks what happens when this regime of visual transparency is disrupted. 
Drawing on a corpus of ID portraits by Marc Garanger,12 Assia Djebar’s autobiographical 
novel Ombre Sultane,13 and the photographic exhibition “Mariannes d’aujoud’hui,”14 I 
examine how France's colonial history was instrumental in creating a culture of “facial 
nudity,” using the threat of the unidentifiable, faceless other—the veiled Muslim—to 
reactivate the discourse of surveillance in which 19th-century physiognomy was 
embedded. I also show how this culture has been used in post-colonial France to relegate 
veiled Muslims to the margins of Republican citizenship. 
 While Francophone postcolonial studies have engaged with literature through the 
prism of the body, they have generally neglected the face as a category of analysis.15 One 
reason for this omission might be that it is often taken for granted as self-evident. After 
all, everybody has a face. Yet this truism is much more problematic than it seems, if only 
because we assign to faces different sets of values. All the artists studied here underscore 
the importance of acknowledging their degree of constructedness. Like gender, race, and 
disability, “face” is to some extent a by-product of socio-cultural norms. This raises 
crucial questions about representation and visibility. Each chapter interrogates the 
                                                          
12 Garanger, Marc. Femmes algériennes 1960. Paris: Contrejour, 1982. 
13 Djebar, Assia. Ombre sultane. Paris: Jean-Claude Lattès, 1987. 
14 “‘Mariannes d'aujourd'hui,’ hommage des femmes des cités à la République.” Assemblée  
nationale-Marche des femmes des quartiers, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/evenements/mariannes.asp. 
15 See for example Ndiaye, El Hadji Malick & Moussa Sow, eds. The Body in Francophone Literature: 




modalities through which “black,” “mixed,” and veiled faces have been made (in)visible 
and, more specifically, the ways in which racial differences have been ascribed and 
performed. We will not only wonder what race does to the face, but also what its 
inscription on the face does to “representation”? Which faces deserve to be seen and 
which do not? Which faces matter? By contrast, which ones are deemed abject? And 
what does this reveal about the institutions, discourses, and/or entities that decide so?  
Framing the face as such implies that it can be “deconstructed” and “refigured” in 
a variety of ways. This speaks in important ways to the title of this dissertation: “Face 
Value.” The expression is commonly used to designate the nominal value shown on a 
coin, a stamp, or a stock certificate, as it differs from its intrinsic or market value. By 
extension, it has come to denote the superficial appearance or significance of something. 
Likewise, the expression “to take at face value” means to accept someone or something 
without considering what they are worth or if they really are what they claim to be. This 
discrepancy between the essence and the appearance, the surface and what lies 
underneath offers striking parallels with Marxian economics and recalls the gap between 
use-value (the utility of an object) and exchange-value (the quantity of other objects it 
will exchange for). In Capital, the act of assigning an exchange-value to a product is one 
of alienation not only because it deprives the worker from the product of his labor, but 
also because it turns his labor into a commodity.16 This brief lexical detour is important 
because it reveals the extent to which not to take anything or anyone at face value is 
fundamentally an act that questions physiognomic correspondences between the outside 
                                                          





and the inside, the visible and the hidden. Going back to our corpus of Afro-Caribbean 
artists, how has their critique of physiognomy been developed through assigning new 
values to the face? What are some of the challenges they have faced in trying to do so? 
For example, to what extent can the process of refiguring the face avoid falling into the 
trap of reification against which Marx warned? In addressing these questions, this 
dissertation ultimately uncovers the ways in which these artists have sought to reclaim 
their own image—their own face—and assert its importance in contributing to the 

























Making Faces: Physiognomy, Race, and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century France 
 
About Face 
Nothing is more ambiguous than a face. Every single one of us may have one, but 
it only comes to life through interaction with others. Indeed, a face does not truly become 
what it is unless it gazes and is gazed at. This is particularly evident in the etymology of 
the word “visage.” From the middle ages to the seventeenth century, the French “vis” 
encompassed a broad range of meanings such as face, sight, and visual field. Its origin 
can be traced back to the Latin “visus,” which not only designated the ability to look, but 
also that which is seen, that is, the general aspect or appearance of something or 
someone. Even the slightest glimpse of a face can yield a trove of information. Gazing at 
someone’s countenance generally provides an easy way to infer their moods and feelings. 
For example, a pouting mouth may indicate a feeling of sadness or disgust, while raised 
eyebrows may be interpreted as surprise, astonishment, or wonder. Faces set the stage for 
the play of human emotions. They serve as indexes of mental and psychological states, as 
mirrors for our inner world. Numerous works have been devoted to the study of the 





The word “face” has been used as a metonym for the whole person. Idiomatic 
expressions such as “to save/lose face,” “to stuff one’s face,” “to have egg on one’s face,” 
or “to get in someone’s face” point toward a conflation between the front of the human 
head and the individual to which it belongs. In French too, the meaning of the word 
extends far beyond its primary definition. Phrases like “le vrai visage de…” or “le visage 
caché de…” which are often found in newspaper and magazine headlines insist on the 
face as a site for the display of truth; as if what it showed were always reliable, obvious, 
plain as the nose on one’s face. As if it never lied. 
Except that it does. And a lot. The face is inherently social and, as such, 
constrained by a range of forces that delineate forms of acceptable behavior. In order to 
navigate society, one must get her/his game face on, that is, conform to specific 
conventions, comply with proper etiquette, or to put it yet another way, adopt the right 
persona—a Latin word that originally referred to an actor’s mask, but that grew to 
designate the character s/he played, like the ancient Greek prosôpon. Self-expression is 
always to a certain extent the result of calculation and domestication. What happens when 
we choose to play the social game is that we obey learned codes of conduct and 
paradoxically hide behind metaphorical masks to express ourselves. The French call it 
“faire bon visage.”18 
                                                          
17 See for example Descartes, René. Les Passions de l'âme. Paris: Henry Le Gras: 1649, and Darwin, 
Charles. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. London: John Murray, 1872. For more 
recent studies on human emotions, see the works of Silvan Tomkins on “affect theory,” including Tomkins, 
Silvan. Affect, Imagery, Consciousness I: The Positive Affects. New York: Springer, 1962; and Affect, 
Imagery, Consciousness II: The Negative Affects. New York: Springer, 1963.  
18 For a thorough analysis of the relationship between face and mask, see Belting, Hans. Face and Mask. A 




 Although they are synonymous, “visage” and “face” have undergone different 
historical transformations. The use of the former was officially recognized by the 
Académie Française in 1694 despite earlier occurrences in the works of Molière, 
Montaigne, and other Renaissance as well as late medieval authors. Still, “la face” 
remained more commonly used. André Benhaïm has noted, however, that “au fil du 
temps, ‘face’ s’est partagé les extrêmes de la langue, du sacré et de l’injure, entre Face de 
Dieu, Sainte Face et face de rat. Ainsi marquée, ‘face’ a dû (contrairement à l’anglais) 
faire place au ‘visage.’”19  
This brief lexical survey demonstrates the degree to which “face” has become a 
catch-all descriptor both in English and in French, by bringing into play notions as 
diverse, and sometimes antithetical, as person and personality, self and society, truth and 
forgery, the religious and the profane. This series of linguistic associations underscores 
another crucial characteristic of the face: it is enigmatic. As Benhaïm has aptly remarked 
in his study of Proust, unlike vis or visus, the Hebrew word panim, is always plural, 
which suggests that the face cannot be reduced to a single aspect, horizon, or unit of 
meaning: “Plus qu’un indénombrable, panim suggère l’incommensurable, 
l’insaisissable.”20 The term should be understood in the sense of a multiplicity that cannot 
be reduced to a whole; it designates a radiating openness that no predicate can 
circumscribe, a constellation of forces, planes, and dimensions that defy easy 
generalization.  
                                                          
19 Benhaïm, André. Panim. Visages de Proust. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 
2006, p. 16. 




This is certainly why the face has long been a source of fascination, especially in 
Western thought, where a number of philosophers have attempted to make sense of it. 
Levinas (1906-1995) remains to date the most essential one.21 One of his major 
intellectual contributions was to rethink the Western moral tradition—one characterized 
by a tendency to use sameness as the basis for ethical relationships. In other words, for 
that tradition, it has been our likeness to one another, our shared capacity for pleasures, 
pains, and feelings—in a word, compassion—that has allowed us to define the scope of 
our responsibility toward one another. According to Levinas, however, ethics should be 
established on the basis of our relationship with the other. That is to say, it is the alterity 
of the other that makes ethical demands on me, not my ability to relate to her/him.  
This issue has been addressed at length in one of his most famous texts, Totalité et 
infini. Essai sur l’extériorité.22 His ethical theory is grounded in a key existential 
moment, the face-to-face encounter. Levinas claimed that “l’accès au visage est d’emblée 
éthique.”23 But why is it so? What, in the face of the other, makes it right away ethical? 
What he means by the face cannot be reduced to perception, to the realm of the seen, of 
the visus. It cannot be seen, known, or represented because it is not a physical, plastic 
object per se, but an appeal, an imperative that forces me to take on a responsibility. The 
face signifies everything that resists categorization and comprehension because it is 
fundamentally other. By “other,” Levinas does not necessarily mean cultural others or 
                                                          
21 Born in Lithuania, he began to study philosophy in 1924 at the University of Strasbourg where he 
befriended Maurice Blanchot, and four years later at the University of Freiburg where he discovered 
phenomenology under the supervision of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, and introduced it into 
France. Much of his work, while being indebted to these two thinkers, departs from earlier frameworks and 
methodologies. 
22 Levinas, Emmanuel. Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité. La Haye: Martinus Nijhof, 1961.  




people who live in different times and places, but an abstract alterity with which I can 
never identify. As such, the face encapsulates the very idea of infinity, of that which, by 
definition, cannot be contained, restricted, or instrumentalized; that which imposes itself 
on me and, in doing so, summons me and demands justice. As the face appears, it 
signifies an absolute commandment that Levinas believes is best summarized as: “Thou 
shalt not kill.” At the core of my relationship with the other is a prohibition to kill it; its 
face limits my powers because it appears in such a way that I cannot appropriate it to my 
own ends and purposes. I cannot but become its hostage.  
Of course, Levinas was aware that the way to encounter faces is always as 
physical objects. Which begs the question: how can a face be at once a material image 
and the notion of an infinite that cannot be represented? How can a face manifest itself to 
me without ever becoming a thing? To address this conundrum, Diane Perpich has argued 
the following: 
The face of the other is the image of an absolute alterity and unrepresentable 
singularity. It represents the inadequacy of every image to the task of representing 
the other and, as such, paradoxically, represents the impossibility of its own 
representational activity. Thus, in the figure of the face, Levinas’s text does what 
must be done by conveying to the reader this notion of the face, and does what it 
explicitly maintains cannot be done, namely it gives a form to that which 
“overflows” or “destroys” every form.24  
 
The face occupies a liminal space at the intersection of the material and the immaterial, of 
physics and metaphysics. It is not a phenomenon per se because it cannot be represented, 
but it is also not a complete abstraction because it needs to manifest itself in order to 
engage me. Yet, in doing so, it points to something that already transcends it, that escapes 
                                                          




my gaze, an otherness so infinitely different that it cannot but oblige me.25  
  The other never coincides with its countenance. In describing its face as a 
withdrawal rather than an appearing, a presence rather than an image, Levinas stripped it 
of its lived experience, thus downplaying, if not completely ignoring, components such as 
age, gender, and race. This understanding of the face inverts physiognomic accounts that 
saw in its features external signs of character and racial/ethnic origin. From Aristotle’s 
ancient treatises, to Charles Le Brun’s comparative drawings of human and animal faces, 
to the current literature on “body language” and “mentalism,” physiognomy has enjoyed 
considerable attention from scholars and popular commentators alike.26 Yet, its history is 
rife with complexity and contradiction. Physiognomy is a slippery notion that has raised 
different sets of questions, taken on different meanings, and achieved different goals with 
virtually every user. 
It reached a popularity peak in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries 
with the publication of Lavater’s essay L’Art de connaître les hommes par la 
                                                          
25 Levinas’s essay made a lasting mark in the philosophical realm. His main opposition came from Deleuze 
and Guattari. In their collaborative essay Mille plateaux, they are less interested in the phenomenological 
dimension of the face as they are in the concept of “faciality” (visagéité), whereby they mean an abstract 
machine that creates faces as it is set in motion by certain assemblages of power or signifying regimes. This 
machine operates on two axes: significance (white wall) and subjectivity (black hole). It is their relationship 
to one another that brings faces into existence. According to them, the face is a universal, but only if we 
understand it to be a universal imposition. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari claim that the process of 
facialization is an imperialistic one, for the facial standard chosen by this machine has been the archetypical 
white European man, Christ. It follows that the first deviances from this facial norm are racial. While it 
remains unclear what Deleuze and Guattari mean exactly by “abstract machine of faciality,” they insist that 
it operates in a tyrannical way because it orders, judges, classifies, and ultimately marginalizes by rejecting 
non-conforming, suspicious-looking faces, meaning faces that depart from the standard of the white 
European male embodied by Christ. Their understanding of the face as a monstrous by-product of ideology 
stands in sharp opposition to Levinas’s face of the other as the locus of an ethical encounter. See Deleuze, 
Gilles et Félix Guattari. op. cit. 
26 See Aristotle. Minor Works: On Colours. On Things Heard. Physiognomics. On Plants. On Marvellous 
Things Heard. Mechanical Problems. On Indivisible Lines. The Situations and Names of Winds. On 




physionomie.27 Born in Zurich in 1741, Gaspard Lavater was a Swiss poet, philosopher, 
and theologian. He officiated as a pastor until his death in 1801. Several reasons explain 
the success of his essay. Once regarded as an occult, speculative practice bordering on 
superstition, physiognomy became more “serious.”  Lavater formalized its use; he created 
a semiotic system that made facial traits into natural signifiers of the self. This 
epistemological shift considerably increased the number of its practitioners who were no 
longer equated with witches or sorcerers. Another reason was Lavater’s marketing skills. 
In addition to being a particularly talented orator, he was an astute businessman. Initially 
published as beautifully ornate and expensive display books coveted by higher society, 
his fragments came out in pocket-sized editions that could be easily carried around. 
Success was immediate; from 1772 to 1810, his work appeared in no less than fifteen 
French editions.  
An important feature of Lavater’s theory was its claim to improve humanity. 
Interestingly enough, his Essays on Physiognomy, which were published between 1781 
and 1803, bear the following subtitle: For the Promotion of the Knowledge and the Love 
of Mankind.28 Lavater believed that every single human being was designed in God’s 
image. Physiognomy was merely a tool to reveal the beauty of creation and instill in men 
a sense of “brotherly love.” It was also meant to advance knowledge of humanity by 
uncovering the self behind the façade. As such, physiognomy inaugurated a new 
conception of subjectivity. According to Richard T. Gray, it “play[ed] a formative role in 
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the ideological self-definition of the emergent civil subject” of the nineteenth-century, 
which he describes as self-same, self-identical, immutable, and autonomous (the same 
facial features connote the same psychological traits) as opposed to the pre-1789 
aristocratic courtly subject who was essentially a manipulative, masquerading, 
inauthentic individual evolving in a world of deceit.29  
However, as the second colonial empire rose in the 1830’s and New Caledonia, 
Senegal, Algeria, and Indochina successively fell under French rule, physiognomy 
transformed into something it was originally not: an instrument of racial classification 
and denigration rather than a study of individual features geared toward pan-humanistic 
love. Theorized by Lavater as a tool for capturing faces in their singularity, it became a 
way of imposing pre-conceived interpretive grids on them. In other words, physiognomy 
was more concerned with the production of facial types than the recognition of what 
made them unique. This shift had profound consequences. In neglected the embodied 
nature of faces; it overlooked their corporeal specificities to frame them in categories to 
which they did not always belong.  
In this chapter, I wonder how physiognomy evolved from a theory of Christian 
love to a system of racial classification at a time when the French empire expanded, and 
colonial subjects began to make their way to Paris. How did Lavater’s humanistic project 
paved the way for a philosophy that ranked ethnic/cultural differences and shifted the 
boundaries of human difference? And more generally, what role did physiognomy play in 
the modern understanding of race? To answer these questions, I will examine three racial 
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caricatures, two of which depict Algerian tirailleurs during their stay in Paris in 1859, 
and a 1895 ad for Savon La Hêve that features the famous clown Chocolat.30 While these 
caricatures were published more than thirty-five years apart, both illustrate the role of 
physiognomic imagery in the creation of typical “black” faces. In examining the way 
physiognomy reified the face into a stock visual, I ultimately want to redefine the way we 
have engaged with discourses on the face. Rather than setting out a schematic opposition 
between physiognomy and Levinas’s ethics of the face, I will highlight their similarities, 
by showing how both ended up treating the face as a disembodied, decontextualized 
entity.  
 
Facing the Turcos: Daumier and Physiognomic Caricature 
The appeal of Lavater’s physiognomy was especially prominent in big cities. In 
the wake of the industrial revolution that swept across Europe, peasants and laborers 
migrated from the countryside to secure better opportunities, and so did immigrants from 
the recent French colonies. Following these waves of population displacement, cities 
such as Paris and London became confusing, chaotic, and altogether illegible. 
Physiognomy became one way to make sense of them. As Sharrona Pearl has argued, 
“pocket physiognomy texts and, more important, instincts, could be referenced when 
people were walking the city and entering relationships, particularly when they needed to 
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make social decisions and distinctions or decide whom to trust.”31 Lavater’s 
physiognomy became a policing tool to monitor the underclass, the criminals, and the 
outcasts that the city harbored, and to eradicate the sense of anonymity provided by the 
dark neighborhoods where they hid.32 While identifying them often required the eye to be 
trained, colonial subjects could easily be noticed due to the color of their skin. So why 
did physiognomists feel so inclined to study and represent them?  
Despite lack of immediate utility (one did not need physiognomy to identify 
members of different races), representations of the colonized were found everywhere in 
the popular press and the scientific media. They were largely influenced by the literary 
genre of physiologies which consisted of short illustrated satiric works in which 
writers/artists classified and reduced the urban population into social types like the 
lorette, the banker, the cuckold, the law student, etc.33 Such stereotyping also played a 
major role in portrayals of non-European bodies. As the second wave of colonization 
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started in the 1830’s, and New Caledonia, Cambodia, Senegal, and Algeria became 
French possessions, the use of racial imagery proliferated and naturalized an imaginary of 
the “other” as backwards and savage in order to justify France’s conquests. In this 
context of imperial expansion, portraits of “black” and “brown” faces served to calm 
popular fears about immigration, miscegenation, and assimilation, especially after the 
Crémieux decree of 1870 created a pathway to French citizenship for the Jewish, and 
Muslim Arab and Berber populations of Algeria. The debasement of non-white races 
ultimately functioned to establish and legitimate the superiority of the white French 
bourgeoisie.  
In this respect, physiognomy proved a powerful tool. It was informed by a 
Eurocentric worldview that celebrated certain members of the white race—especially the 
French, the German, and the British—as the epitome of human evolution while regarding 
others as naturally inferior. Fo rexample, Lavater heavily drew on Pierre Camper’s theory 
of facial angle, and described the black face as having a “nez gros, plat, et épais” and a 
profile that suggested a low intelligence.34 Regarding the Tartare or Kalmouck (Asian) 
face, he wrote:  
Le front bas et ces yeux de singe enfoncés sont, à ce qu’on dit, les indices de la 
poltronnerie et de l’amour du pillage. Accueillez, mes lecteurs, comme une vérité 
sûre et confirmée par mille expériences, que toutes les concavités principales des 
profils, c’est-à-dire les concavités de la forme, indiquent la faiblesse des facultés 
intellectuelles.35 
 
Physiognomy, and more specifically what Lavater called “national physiognomy,” was a 
precursor of racial ethnology because it allowed for the creation of a community 
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grounded in the exclusion of those who did not fit the appropriate standards. As Richard 
Gray put it, the (pseudo-) science of reading faces became “one of the primary tools 
deployed by civil society for this fabrication of the individual according to preordained 
ethical, characterological, national, or racial definitions.”36 The study of racial others 
presented physiognomy with a major conundrum. Lavater intended it as an illustration of 
how human beings were crafted in God’s image. But with the rise of the second French 
colonial empire, a shift occurred; its practitioners started doing the crafting instead. 
Physiognomy went from being descriptive to being prescriptive. In the process, it became 
the negation of what it was originally meant to be. The creation and proliferation of racial 
stereotypes served as an excuse for not evaluating individual features.  
As one would expect, physiognomic caricature was one of the most popular 
genres to describe France’s colonial others at the time. The use of humor provided 
reassurance and consolidated the idea of a France as a white Catholic nation by mocking 
those who departed from such a tradition. Among the body of caricatures published at the 
time, Daumier’s depiction of the Turcos, the Algerian tirailleurs that served in the 
Crimean War (1853-1856), are particularly emblematic. They sought, through the use of 
humor, to neutralize the threat posed by colonial others in France.  
Honoré Daumier (1808-1879) was a French painter, sculptor, and caricaturist born 
of a working-class family in Marseille. He moved to Paris with his parents at the age of 
eight and started taking drawing lessons from Alexandre Lenoir, Director of the Royal 
Museum of French Monuments before learning lithography. He later joined the staff of 
                                                          




La Caricature, a satirical weekly launched by Charles Philippon. His fierce opposition to 
the Second Empire and his Republican convictions are reflected in a number of his 
satirical prints. In 1832, Daumier started drawing for Le Charivari, another illustrated 
paper intended to be a cheaper and more accessible version of La Caricature.37  
 Many of the lithographs he published in both journals take as their subject matter 
the representation of extra-European cultures and individuals. Among such individuals 
were the indigenous Algerian tirailleurs known as “Turcos.” Daumier portrayed them in 
a series of seven prints in the late summer of 1859. At the time, the French army had just 
defeated Austria at the battle of Solferino. As the troops returned to Paris, they were 
greeted in triumphant fanfare. Many Parisians would make their way to the Camp de 
Saint-Maur, near the bois de Vincennes, where the soldiers had settled their bivouac. 
Daumier’s caricatures stage this encounter between the French bourgeoisie and the exotic 
other. The Turcos’ arrival was considered a major event. Most Parisians had never seen 
them before and their temporary stay in the capital provided the perfect opportunity to 
change that. Soon, Saint-Maur became a pilgrimage destination. The camp gradually 
turned into a sort of human zoo, where urban dwellers were completely free to gaze upon 
the soldiers. As Sandrine Lemaire and Pascal Blanchard have remarked, “[l]es Français 
ont exhibé leurs sujets coloniaux davantage que les Anglais et les Américains. […] La 
recette mêlant étranger/étrangèreté et caractère animal ou primitif a parfaitement 
fonctionné auprès des différents publics qui se rendaient en masse voir les ‘sauvages,’ 
qu’ils n’avaient jusqu’ici appréhendés que par le biais de la presse populaire ou des cartes 
                                                          




postales.”38 The visit at Saint-Maur was a form of bourgeois entertainment. As such. it 
anticipated a tradition of showing the colonial other that found further concretization in 
the recreation of “negro villages” and “ethnological expositions” from the 1870’s 
onward. 
 A caricature published in Le Charivari on August 15th, 1859 shows a bourgeois 
Parisian couple strolling through the camp. As they come across two tall Algerians, the 
woman, who is in awe of their beauty, wants to stay around longer, much to her 
husband’s disapproval. The cultural clash provoked by the encounter is enhanced by the 
symmetrical composition of the print: the Parisian couple stands on the right while the 
Turcos are on the left. It is worth noting that the woman is pregnant, which explains her 
husband’s reluctance to let her admire the tirailleurs. Indeed, according to an old 
superstition, when a pregnant woman looked at an unpleasant or ugly animal, her baby 
would take on the likeness of that animal. A small caption that appears below the 
lithograph confirms this interpretation:  
La Dame: Oh! mon ami… quel beau turco!... quel beau turco!!... laisse-
moi le contempler encore un peu! 
Le Mari: Non… allons nous-en… tu oublies, bichette, que tu es dans une 
situation intéressante… je crains que tu n’attrapes un regard… et que tu 
n’accouches d’un petit nègre.   
 
The woman’s fascination is evidenced in the repetition of exclamative sentences. She 
sees Turcos as both courageous heroes and attractive men. The sexual charge of this 
encounter is further hinted at by the phallic shape of the tent in front of which she stands. 
                                                          
38 Blanchard, Pascal & Sandrine Lemaire. “Montrer, mesurer, distraire. Du zoo humain aux expositions 
coloniales (1870-1931).” Moussa, Sarga, ed. L’Idée de “race” dans les sciences humaines et la littérature 




The husband experiences her physical attraction to the black soldier as a direct threat to 
his masculinity. Indeed, the sophistication and refinement of the male bourgeois stands in 
sharp contrast to the Turcos’ height, rugged physique, and vitality. His discomfort also 
stems from a fear of adultery and métissage. The fact that the soldier’s mere presence is 
enough to turn his newborn into a “petit nègre” triggers anxiety about miscegenation. 
Daumier’s caricature reignited concerns about racial degeneracy and the downfall of 
civilization by showing a potential consequence of the Turcos’ stay in Paris: the birth of a 
black child from a white mother, the risk of tainted bloodlines, and the potential 
dissolution of the most bourgeois institution of all—marriage.  
 According to Elizabeth Childs, “the flirtatious encounter of the white woman and 
the Algerian soldier was a common motif in the commentary and caricatures surrounding 
the arrival of the Turcos in Paris.”39 One could see in the Parisians’ fascination with black 
bodies a prefiguration of the 1920’s vogue for Negrophilia. Daumier used this motif in at 
least one other caricature, where a soldier is seated in a public omnibus, surrounded by a 
crowd of Parisians.40 While the previous caricature showed the Parisians visiting the 
Turcos, the situation is reversed here: one of the soldiers has ventured outside of the 
camp to come meet the Parisians. Below the print, the caption shows a conversation 
between him and M. and Mme Potard: “N’est-il pas vrai, brave Turco, que vous préférez 
les Françaises aux Africaines?” she asks. To which her husband jokingly replies: 
“Chut!... ma bonne… tu vois bien que tu vas le faire rougir!...” Here again, the women’s 
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fascination for the soldier is made quite obvious. Their curiosity is reinforced by the 
composition and perspective. At the center of the drawing is the Turco and he is directly 
facing us. The limits of the image coincide with the contours of the omnibus window 
through which we are observing the scene. The visual mechanism deployed by Daumier 
is an intricate one. The Parisians’ gaze mirrors not just our gaze as we look at the Turco 
as if through a window, but that of the nineteenth-century readers of Le Charivari, many 
of whom craved portraits of exotic others and displayed the same curiosity as the women 
in the caricature. The framing of the image puts us in the Parisians’ shoes and compels us 
to interrogate our own desire to look at the Turco.   
 The husband’s reference to blushing is an interesting one because it revives old 
debates about blackness and subjectivity. As colonial expansion accelerated and fears of 
miscegenation rose, blushing stopped being a mere marker of beauty and virtue to 
become a racial marker.41 When Daumier published his caricature, the idea that black 
people were devoid of emotions and feelings, and therefore closer to animals than human 
beings simply because they were incapable of blushing, was very popular. While M. 
Potard makes fun of the Turco for being unable to turn red, he seems to forget that the 
only person who should be blushing here—his wife—is not. Indeed, bourgeois etiquette 
demanded that omnibus passengers kept to themselves, that they did not make eye 
contact with anyone, let alone engage in conversation. Mme Potard’s question is 
therefore shocking on at least two accounts: first because it is directed to a complete 
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stranger, and second, because she asks the Turco about his sexual preferences while her 
husband is standing right next to her. The Turco’s supposed inability to blush only 
underscores the fact that the Parisian women should but do not. This allows Daumier to 
criticize the codes of bourgeois morality and women’s hypocrisy and false sense of 
modesty.  
 In both caricatures, Daumier uses the figure of the Turco as a heuristic device to 
mock the ethnocentric attitudes of Parisians. As Elizabeth Childs has argued, “[his] 
satires in the Au Camp de St. Maur expose the racism and naiveté of those who seek in 
the Turcos evidence to reconfirm their stereotypes of the inherently violent, sexual and 
‘barbaric’ nature of North African man.”42 She has also claimed that Daumier’s 
“sympathy usually lay with the victims of colonization, expansion, and international 
conflict.”43 He satirized the French by staging situations in which the parochialism of 
bourgeois society was revealed. In this respect, his caricatures revealed more about 
nineteenth-century Paris than non-European, colonial individuals and cultures.  
 This is not to say, however, that Daumier’s portrayal of the Turcos was not racist. 
In other words, just because Daumier sought to make fun of the ethnocentric attitudes he 
observed in the Parisian bourgeoisie does not mean that he did not give in to racist 
denigration himself. To be sure, Childs has argued that Daumier’s caricature of the 
omnibus “rejects the racist generalization applied to the Turco: the Algerian is as shocked 
as the surrounding crowd at the pronouncement made by the Parisian.”44 She contends 
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that his racism is problematic because he does not use stereotypes to support the idea of 
European superiority but to criticize French society. This was a common motif at the 
time. Many French writers and artists used the technique of the “ethnographic detour,” 
portraying strangers in Paris, to mock their own mores. Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes 
remains the most emblematic example. The Au camp de Saint-Maur series belong to the 
same tradition. Daumier particularly enjoyed mocking the bourgeois for their 
“unexamined racism,”45 but in the process, he failed to examine his own racist views. 
 Unlike Childs, I do not think that Daumier’s racism is problematic. His depiction 
of the Turcos taps into a catalog of physiognomic signs that worked as evidence of black 
inferiority. He consciously adopted, emphasized, and manipulated them to produce his 
drawings. In figure one, the soldiers are characterized by their exaggerated prognathous 
profiles and projecting jaws while in figure two, the Turco is portrayed with full lips, 
very dark skin, and a flat nose. These facial traits were not chosen at random. Daumier 
hardly ever travelled outside of Paris and never left France; his vision of foreigners was 
therefore based on a combination of orientalist clichés and ethnographic accounts. His 
caricatures are embedded in a network of naturalist discourses that shaped the Western 
imaginary of the “Negro.”  
Among them is Buffon’s monumental, thirty-six-volume Histoire naturelle, 
générale et particulière. The French biologist argued that in black Africans, “thick lips, 
broad and flat noses appear formed as gifts of nature”46 and not acquired traits. Similar 
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observations are found in Dutch anatomist Pierre Camper’s Dissertation physique sur les 
différences réelles que présentent les traits du visage chez les hommes de différents pays 
et de différents âges. Of Africans in general, he wrote:  
[C]hez les Nègres la mâcheoire supérieure s’avance considérablement, & […] par 
suite la Ligne Faciale MG s’incline en arrière, jusques là il en résulte un angle de 
70 degrés. On peut donc regarder comme une conséquence Physique également 
certaine que les dents doivent être placées obliquement en avant & non pas en 
direction perpendiculaire; de plus, […] en vertu de cette même disposition, les 
lèvres & surtout la supérieure, qui doit pouvoir les couvrir, sera de toute nécessité 
plus longue, plus grosse, & plus grande.47 
 
One of Camper’s major contributions to the field of anatomy was the notion of “facial 
angle.” Many used it in his wake to give their work the scientific credibility that earlier 
accounts of human races, such as Buffon’s, lacked. Among them was French 
anthropologist Julien-Joseph Virey (1775-1846), who described black features as “un 
teint de couleur marron ou tout noir,” “des cheveux noirs plus ou moins laineux, toujours 
très crépus ou courts,” “des lèvres gonflées,” and “un angle facial ouvert de soixante-
quinze à quatre-vingt degrés.”48 Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) portrayed Africans in very 
much the same light, arguing that “[l]a race nègre est confinée au midi de l’Atlas, son 
teint est noir, ses cheveux crépus, son crâne comprimée et son nez écrasé; son museau 
saillant et ses grosses lèvres la rapprochent manifestement des singes.”49 Similar 
descriptions can be found in the works of Carl Vogt (1917-1895), Gobineau (1816-1882), 
Quatrefages de Bréau (1810-1892), Bory de Saint-Vincent (1778-1846), and Paul Broca 
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(1824-1880), to name a few.  
Many ideological differences separated them. For example, Gobineau’s racial 
thought revealed a pessimistic view of History as a process of degeneration. Le Bon’s 
outlook was more in line with Darwin’s theories of evolution, while Vacher de Lapouge’s 
work paved the way for modern eugenics. But their main point of contention concerned 
the origins of mankind. Some like Buffon and Cuvier believed in universal monogenesis, 
that is, the hypothesis that all human races share a common descent. By contrast, Broca 
and Carl Vogt speculated that races might be descended from distinct ancestors. Others 
like Gobineau switched from the former to the latter during their lifetime. As a 
consequence, not all believed in the applicability of the civilizing mission and the idea 
that some races could be improved or “tainted” through contact with other races. And 
even more problematic, not all agreed on what “race” actually meant. Yet, they 
unanimously subscribed to the physiognomic premise that facial features signal moral 
and intellectual qualities. According to them, the prognathous jaws, broad noses, and 
plump lips commonly observed in black Africans were clear indicators of a lazy, savage, 
instinctive nature that placed them at the bottom of the evolution ladder. At the top stood 
the white European subject whose facial angle is the closest to the ideal ninety-five 
degrees of human perfection.  
 Such ideas became so pervasive and taken for granted throughout the nineteenth-
century that Daumier was no doubt familiar with them. According to Childs, his use of 
racial stereotypes is partly redeemed by the fact that they were not meant to vilify black 
Africans, but to satirize French attitudes toward them. I do believe, however, that 




the physiognomic discourses that created this difference in the first place. Daumier, it 
seems, only engaged in the former. In other words, he denounced reactions to blackness, 
but not the representations of blackness that caused such reactions. The reason may be 
that, in order to do the latter, he would have had to question his own practice as a 
caricaturist which was his main source of income at the time.  
 One could also argue that Daumier was not a racist because of his Republican 
engagement in the fight to end slavery. This is unconvincing on two accounts. First, 
many white abolitionists believed that black peoples were naturally inferior. Second, 
basing the definition of racism on personal intentions and opinions ignores the nature of 
what it was or was becoming at the time: a systemic phenomenon.50 Just because 
Daumier did not intend to denigrate black Africans does not mean he was not racist. In 
other words, racism is not what one believes it to be or says it is, but an objective reality 
that operates through social, epistemic, normative mechanisms. It was not always so, 
however. The solidification of race and racial hierarchies in society and their 
institutionalization precisely occurred throughout the nineteenth-century, during 
Daumier’s lifetime. This transformation owes to a combination of factors, including, as 
mentioned, the rise of the second colonial empire and the popularity of physiognomic 
ideas, but also technological progress, especially in the field of statistics and physical 
anthropology.  
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Physiognomy After Physiognomy: Chocolat and the Staging of Race in Fin-de-Siècle 
France 
A common attack on physiognomy was that its empirical, embodied nature made 
it too unreliable. For example, Swiss naturalist Carl Vogt resented in his Leçons sur 
l’homme that:  
[l]a plupart des figures de races qui ont été publiées jusqu’à ces derniers temps, 
qu’elles aient été exécutées d’après le vivant ou d’après des crânes, n’ont que peu 
ou point de valeur. Un grand nombre de figures faites d’après le vivant sont, à 
l’insu de leurs auteurs, de véritables caricatures, parce que, même le peintre 
exercé, habitué par les exigences de sa profession, à faire ressortir la ressemblance 
individuelle, exagère les traits qui appartiennent en propre au sujet qu’il veut 
représenter. Il est certain que souvent ces traits ne sont point ceux qui 
appartiennent à la race, et la font considérer comme telle; souvent aussi, 
précisement les traits qui appartiennent à la race, frappant surtout le peintre, il les 
exagère trop; souvent enfin, les particularités de la race seront un peu amoindries, 
pour faire ressortir plus complètement la ressemblance de l’individu, que le 
dessinateur est habitué à rechercher avant tout.51 
 
In Vogt’s words, physiognomic portraiture is fundamentally an art of caricature—one 
that falls short of the mimetic ideal of transparency in representation because the observer 
may either exaggerate racial features (hyperbole), diminish their presence (euphemism), 
or consider personal, idiosyncratic features as emblematic of a whole race (metonymy). 
In all three cases, the human gaze is to blame because of its fickle, selective, biased, and 
impressionistic nature. It is never purely neutral, for there is always a risk of projecting 
one’s own desires or anxieties, in a word, one’s subjectivity, onto the observed 
individual.  
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Lavater himself partly agreed and hoped that, one day, physiognomy become 
“definable in mathematical terms.”52 This process was facilitated by the development of 
statistics in the first half of the nineteenth century. Belgian astronomer and sociologist 
Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874) was the first to introduce the discipline into France. He 
came up with the idea of applying the Gaussian “law of error,” which astronomers had 
been using to locate stars, to calculate the distribution of human features, including height 
and weight. This allowed him to formulate the concept of “l’homme moyen”, an abstract 
construct that represented the average of all human characteristics in a specific country, a 
combination of what he called, in almost physiognomic terms, “l’homme moyen 
physique” and “l’homme moyen moral.”53 His work helped popularize the ideas of 
“norm” and “normalcy” which were quite new at the time.  
  Interestingly enough, many statisticians were also anthropologists and/or 
eugenicists. Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911) and Karl Pearson (1857-1936) in Great 
Britain, and Paul Broca and Georges Vacher de Lapouge in France were among the most 
notable ones. Their use of statistical methods was not only meant to advance the 
knowledge of human races, but also to improve the inferior ones such that they would fit 
the norm (of European whiteness). In doing so, they gave scientific sanction to prejudice 
and presented a major justification for the “civilizing mission” of colonialism.  
However, as it transitioned from metaphysical speculation to positivist 
investigation, from interpretation to explanation, the science of faces turned into the 
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science of skulls: phrenology. Mental faculties were no longer inferred from facial 
features, but from their corresponding bumps, enlargements and indentations on human 
crania. In France, its main proponent was physician Paul Broca. Although he is best 
known for his research on brain development and speech production, Broca also devoted 
part of his career to anthropological research. He founded the Société d’Anthropologie de 
Paris in 1859, the Revue d’Anthropologie in 1872, and the School of Anthropology in 
1876. Throughout his lifetime, Broca measured a wide variety of heads, weighted them, 
carefully observed their shapes, their curvatures and anfractuosities, and compiled his 
findings to rank races in a scale of intellectual abilities. This comparative anatomy of 
skulls was judged groundbreaking because it used quantitative analysis to delineate 
specific human groups and determine their relative worth. If Broca was among the first to 
use scientific data in the service of evolution and biological determinism, his 
methodology was nonetheless deeply flawed. Instead of letting his own data speak for 
itself, he used it selectively to prove prior prejudice. This is not to say that this data was 
not reliable, but Broca exploited it in a way that allowed him to corroborate his own 
theories.54 
This shift of interest toward skulls was a sign that physiognomy was literally and 
figuratively losing face. Indeed, the use of statistical methods was meant to recast it in a 
scientific framework, but in privileging the examination of skulls over faces, it did just 
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the opposite: it dismissed its object. It is generally admitted that physiognomy died out in 
the second half of the nineteenth-century after being replaced with phrenology, yet I 
would like to qualify this grand narrative. While it certainly fell out of favor around that 
time, a certain physiognomic “imagination” persisted in the minds of the French. 
Through close examination of an 1895 ad that portrays the famous Afro-Cuban clown 
Chocolat, I want to show how popular representations of race underscored the enduring 
power of the facial imaginaries that underpinned physiognomy in its heyday. The 
pictorial conventions of physiognomy became firmly established as the dominant 
aesthetic lens for envisaging other races, and have continued to operate long after the 
discipline fell into discredit. 
 Mass advertising was an important platform to convey or reinforce ideas about 
blackness in fin-de-siècle France. Commercial images often portrayed Africans to 
promote dark-colored or “exotic” products such as tea, coffee, cocoa, and cleaning 
supplies such as shoe polish, laundry detergent, toothpaste, bleach, and soap. In most 
cases, black subjects were represented as field laborers, domestic servants, buffoons, or 
childlike adults. These images were a clear indication of how the general public 
perceived race and which roles they wanted Africans to fulfill in French society.55 One 
such image, which was released around 1895, was for a brand called “Savon La Hêve.” 
To advertise the cleaning power of their new soap, the company chose to feature one of 
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the then most popular couples in Paris—a duet of clown-stars known as Foottit and 
Chocolat. Together, they performed at the “Nouveau Cirque” from 1895 to 1905. While 
Foottit was the authoritarian white clown or “clown blanc,” Chocolat represented the 
clumsy “auguste.” Their slapstick routines played a major role in the development of 
European clowning. Chocolat, whose real name was Rafael, immediately rose to fame.  
 Very little is known about his early life. He was most likely born a slave in Cuba 
sometime between 1865 and 1869 before being sold, as a young boy, to a Spanish trader 
who took him to the village of Sopuerta in Northern Spain. After enduring years of ill 
treatment, Rafael fled for Bilbao. He worked several menial jobs, as a porter, a servant, a 
dockworker, before turning to clown comedy. His physical strength and dancing skills 
quickly vowed the public who could not get enough of his performances. In 1887, Rafael 
was chosen as the hero of a comic pantomime entitled La Noce de Chocolat. He became, 
as a result, the first black clown to play a lead role and one of the first black entertainers 
in Paris, before Josephine Baker took the capital by storm. His life trajectory has been a 
source of fascination and inspiration for many artists. The Lumière brothers featured him 
in their short film Chaise en bascule (1899),56 and so did Colette, almost a half a century 
later, in her novella Gigi (1944).57 More recently Chocolat was briefly portrayed in 
Moulin Rouge, a 2001 movie directed by Baz Luhrmann, and in 2016, Roschdy Zem 
made him the central character of his movie Chocolat.58  
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This renewed interest in Rafael also manifested in the field of academia, with the 
publication in 2012 of Gérard Noiriel’s monograph on Rafael, followed by a second 
study in 2016.59 In both works, the French historian has argued against critics’ tendency 
to use what he considers anachronistic tools of analysis to denounce the “racism” of the 
French toward Chocolat. He warns against the danger of interpreting the Foottit-Chocolat 
duet as a reflection of colonial relations; suggesting, instead, that this view only became 
prevalent when the duet’s reputation faded. I want to nuance Noiriel’s argument and 
show how the “Savon La Hêve” ad, which came out circa 1895, that is, at a time when 
the duet’s popularity reached its peak, is concerned at its core with colonial politics. This 
ad underscores an interesting tension: while Chocolat was celebrated as a star, he was 
also made into a racial caricature. In fact, his celebrity stemmed from his ability to fulfill 
the stereotype of the childish, silly “Negro.” 
 
                                                          





Fig. 3. “Savon La Hêve Extra,” circa 1895. 
 
The ad portrays Rafael in a similar light. Foottit can be seen in his traditional 
clown outfit, holding a bar of “La Hêve” soap in his right hand and using it to wash 
Chocolat’s face, which is turning white as a result. Interestingly enough, the bottom of 
the ad indicates that the soap is meant for wool and flannel fabrics, but the reason it is 
used on Chocolat is likely to insist on its scouring power. What “La Hêve” wanted their 
customers to believe was that their soap was so efficient it could even turn a “Negro” 
white. The ad relies on an easy symbolism, in which whiteness becomes a symbol of 




point. It displays all the features traditionally associated with black physiognomy at the 
time: a flat nose, full lips, and a broad forehead. But in scrubbing Chocolat so hard, it is 
as if Foottit tried to erase them. In this respect, the ad could be said to offer an example of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s process of “facialization.”  The soap acts as a sort of catalyst to 
make the black other into the image of the white European man.60  
 References to the circus are obvious. In addition to Foottit’s costume, the two 
characters appear in exaggerated, pantomimic postures. Foottit’s high, graceful stature 
and smiling expression contrast with his partner’s awkward stance, his air of discomfort, 
and his ill-fitting suit which makes him look grotesque. This comic element is central. 
The ad is not just about selling soap, it is also a justification of France’s “civilizing 
mission.” Unlike Daumier’s caricatures of the Turcos which were published during a 
period of colonial expansion, by 1895 the limits of the Empire were circumscribed. It was 
now time to civilize France’s colonial subjects. Preparing them to become French citizens 
and to function in society required a number of iterative steps: receiving an education, 
speaking French, becoming a Christian, having a good personal hygiene, and adopting 
new cultural codes, including for example, wearing appropriate clothing, which usually 
meant trading the African pagne for the European suit. The ad legitimates this process, 
but it does so in an ambiguous way. While it celebrates the civilizing mission, it also 
implies that this mission is doomed to failure because its ideal of whiteness is 
unattainable. Indeed, customers were not so gullible as to believe that the soap would 
wash off black skin, although there was something quite reassuring about that possibility. 
                                                          




Chocolat’s whitening would dissipate the threat of intermixing and allow for the 
continuation of untainted bloodlines. Laughing at him was, therefore, a way to exorcize 
the threat that his blackness would always be there, visible forever. Ultimately, the ad 
stages a fantasy of erasing racial difference to preserve the purity of whiteness following 
the arrival of France’s colonial subjects in the mainland.  
 Hygiene was a major concern at the time.61 Epidemics of smallpox, tuberculosis, 
and cholera were recurrent. To contain their spread, piping was gradually installed to 
bring water directly to homes. This effort was further promoted during the Paris world’s 
fair of 1889 where colonial pavilions praised the benefits of public health. As Lynn E. 
Palermo has argued, “[t]he Republic’s plan for colonial development paralleled the plan 
for national development already under way; progress and its benefits for the French 
working class were demonstrated in the pavilions of […] hygiene in the social economy 
exhibit across from the colonial section.”62 The “civilizing mission” did not simply apply 
to colonial subjects, but also to French laborers and workers, most of whom lived in the 
countryside where they did not have access to the modern amenities of city living. Going 
back to the “La Hêve” ad, one could see in Chocolat a figure of the French provincial 
whose condition also needed to be improved. The parallel between non-urbanites and 
savages was pretty common at the time. Parisians and other city dwellers often regarded 
peasants and members of the working class as uncivilized, thus blurring the distinction 
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between the “province” and the colonies.63  
 Although Daumier’s caricatures of the Turcos and the “La Hêve” soap ad were 
published more than thirty-five years apart, they tap into the same repertoire of visual 
symbols to represent their subjects and accentuate their exotic qualities. The use of 
specific physiognomic signs (flat nose, full lips, etc.) did not just participate in the 
production of the “negro” as a figure of otherness, they also attested to its enduring 
appeal, even at a time (1895) when physiognomy was being discredited. All three 
caricatures participate in a “visuality of Empire”64 that played a crucial role in emerging 
nationalistic ideas about what it meant to be French, especially as the Dreyfus affair was 
heating up. However, such portrayals of the Turcos and Chocolat fulfilled different 
functions. While Daumier sought to reform the Parisians by exposing their ethnocentric 
views (albeit in a racist way), the soap ad was meant to civilize the French provincials 
who were often equated with colonial subjects at the time.  
 
Conclusion: Subjectivity Without a Subject  
 As this chapter demonstrated, physiognomy is a slippery discipline because it 
encompasses an ever-evolving set of practices. Lavater described it as a Christian 
endeavor to promote love and understanding of mankind. With the advent of the 
industrial revolution and rural exodus, it became a tool of surveillance that helped 
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urbanites negotiate the chaos of city life by allowing them to identify who to trust. 
Finally, as the colonial empire grew again in the 1830’s, it turned into a technology of 
racial classification that served to alleviate fears about immigration and miscegenation. In 
all cases, physiognomists were bound by a mutual objective: how to make sense of a 
rapidly changing world, whether at the scale of the city, the nation, or the empire.  
The migration of colonial subjects to hexagonal France, coupled with progress in 
statistics and physical anthropology, profoundly redefined what it meant to be human. As 
the territorial boundaries of the Empire expanded, so did the epistemological boundaries 
of physiognomy. Initially a study of idiosyncratic facial features, it evolved into a way to 
define groups. In other words, it shifted from a discussion of individuals to a discussion 
of communities and became a way to draw general assumptions about certain categories 
of people.65  
Through the study of three racial caricatures, we considered how physiognomy 
served to assign racial difference and to create typical “black” or “brown” faces. It was 
no longer a way to get information about how to perceive people; rather, it produced 
information about how it wanted certain people to be perceived. In developing into a 
diagnostic for group traits, it started shaping ideas about human types and communities. 
In other words, instead of uncovering the self behind the face, it contributed to the 
production of this very self. To do so, physiognomists developed a repertoire of 
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metonymical signs that reduced the complexity of human faces to their component parts, 
thereby reifying their subjects. According to Sharrona Pearl, these new signs 
paradoxically came to “stand for and even replace physiognomy.”66 Indeed, physiognomy 
transformed into the opposite of what it was originally. In denying the lived experience of 
the face, it removed the individual from the equation, it took the subject out of 
“subjectivity.” Physiognomy was no longer the science of reading faces; it was now the 
science of making faces. But, as I argued, this making was paradoxically an act of 
caricature, if not disfigurement. In mapping (racial) types onto the face instead of letting 
it speak for itself, physiognomy ignored the complex nature of embodiment and gave an 
excuse for not evaluating idiosyncratic features.  
The face has been an object of various and sometimes contradictory discourses. 
The extreme racialization to which it was subjected in physiognomic thought seems to 
contrast with the way Levinas stripped it of its biological/racial component.67 And yet, 
these discourses have more in common than we think. In both cases, the face is ultimately 
treated as a disembodied entity. Indeed, Levinas considered it strictly out of context, 
describing it not as a thing or an object but a radiating presence that resists formal 
representation because it is always bigger than the sum of its parts. In physiognomy, the 
face was gradually reduced to a group type; it became a sort of blueprint or metonym, an 
emblem of racial affiliation theorized apart from its lived reality. The overall impression 
is that these discourses, in wanting to talk about the face, end up somewhat missing their 
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The following chapters examine how Afro-Caribbean writers have engaged with 
this double legacy. Each one of them sets out to explore the “afterlife” of European 
physiognomy. The use of quotation marks is important here, for focusing on 
representations of race will precisely allow me to qualify the idea that physiognomy died 
out in late nineteenth-century—something I already suggested in my analysis of the 
Savon La Hêve ad. The next chapter will focus on descriptions of Tutsis in Rwanda and 
analyze their racialization as enemies of the nation by Hutu propaganda as an example of 
physiognomy being applied to a different, extra-European context. What are some of the 
discursive/narratological strategies developed by Rwandan writers to disrupt this process 


















“Comment distinguer le cancrelat du Hutu?”68: Reframing Physiognomy in the Post-
Genocide Literature of Rwanda 
 
The post-genocide literature of Rwanda is filled with mentions of dead bodies. 
From her first visit to the country in 1998, Véronique Tadjo remembers “[l]es crânes de 
couleur noire […] trouvés dans les latrines ou enfouis dans le sol,” and “[c]eux qui sont 
blancs […] trouvés dans la nature, entre les hautes herbes.”69 Likewise, Diop’s novel 
Murambi, le livre des ossements includes a description of “un crâne isolé [...]. La 
victime—sans doute un colosse de son vivant—avait eu le nez tranché avant d’être 
décapitée. […] On aurait dit un masque mortuaire oublié au milieu des autres corps.”70 In 
his account of the genocide, Abdourahman Waberi went as far as equating what 
happened in 1994 with “une moisson de crânes.”71 Skulls are a recurring motif. In their 
silent immobility, they act as reminders of past atrocities, as haunting sites of 
postcolonial memory. There is simply no avoiding them. In the previous chapter, I 
showed how physiognomy became a tool of classification that gradually stripped the face 
of its lived expression and gave rise to phrenology, the study of skulls. In this chapter, I 
will flesh out these “mortuary masks,” to borrow Diop’s expression, and, in doing so, I 
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will reverse the physiognomic process of disembodiment and depersonalization that 
justified the extermination of Tutsi.  
The Rwandan genocide, which came to be known as the last genocide of the 
twentieth century is particularly well-documented. Narratives of all kinds have been 
published in the wake of the killings, including testimonies by Tutsi survivors and works 
of fiction by secondary witnesses.72 Various films have also been produced in English, 
French, and Kinyarwanda.73 Finally, documentaries have been released and aired on 
international television networks.74 Images and representations of the genocide are not 
only numerous, but also diverse in genre and country of origin (Rwanda, Ivory Coast, 
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Djibouti, Senegal, Belgium, France, Canada, and U.S.A.). Moreover, they fulfill a variety 
of purposes. While some seek to memorialize the past, bring therapeutic relief, raise 
awareness, and educate the general public, others are more concerned with making 
political claims, that is, denouncing the role of French authorities in arming and training 
Hutu militias, and seeking reparations. Such images and representations can be easily 
accessed by twenty-first-century audiences, and just as easily shared, reproduced, or 
circulated. With the rise of modern technology, they have pervaded our screens and 
infiltrated our lives, making it difficult to escape them.  
Yet, their ubiquitous presence betrays a false sense of visibility. In Le Monde 
diplomatique, Edgar Roskis described what happened in Rwanda as “a genocide without 
images.”75 To be sure, a great many journalists were stationed in the country when the 
first fights broke out in April 1994, but most of them were evacuated within one week of 
Habyarimana’s death to ensure their protection. The few who chose to stay, such as 
Patrick Robert and Luc Delahaye, were met with a number of challenges that made their 
work risky and trying. For one, they could not get too close to the barricades and 
checkpoints where most of the massacres occurred for fear of putting their own lives in 
danger. Second, the lack of digital technology available at the time made it difficult for 
them to send their clichés abroad. And finally, French political censorship played a 
significant role in blocking the dissemination of pictures and footage that showed the 
atrocities of a Hutu-led government backed up by the Elysée. As Roskis noted: 
Not until 18 May did a photograph of the Rwandan atrocities make it onto the 
front page of a French newspaper, the Quotidien de Paris. And even this image, 
                                                          





of a dozen decapitated bodies in Rukara, mangled and partly eaten by animals, 
was just a snapshot taken by a doctor, Eric Girard, not by a photojournalist. That 
same day, another Paris daily, Libération, was headlined “Rwanda: France’s 
guilty friendships,” but except for another photo by Eric Girard, the 
accompanying photos showed only some Rwandan refugees in Tanzania.76  
 
Also drawing attention to this relative lack of coverage, Alexandre Dauge-Roth has 
lamented that the Tutsi genocide “remained culturally off-screen in the Western world 
until 2004 when Terry George’s Hotel Rwanda forbade to reproduce any longer this 
denial.”77   
 The events of 1994 shed light on a range of complex issues regarding the 
production, uses, circulation, and reception of “genocide images” in popular culture. The 
scarcity of live footage and press photographs to reach mainstream media during the 
killings created a representational void that was filled years later by writers, filmmakers, 
and survivors. Their work has raised crucial methodological and theoretical questions: 
What does it mean to bear witness to the past? How do testimonial literature and film 
retrospectively contribute to deciphering the experience of genocide? How does one 
forge forms of social recognition and appeal to a Western audience that generally feels 
foreign to the events?  
A number of scholars have recently engaged with these issues. In his essay 
Filming and Writing the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and 
Remembering Traumatic History, Alexandre Dauge-Roth focuses on the multitude of 
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conflicting discourses that claim to speak the truth about the Tutsi genocide. Operating on 
the assumption that to remember is also, in some way, to forget, he describes the 
Rwandan government’s recent call to “turn the page,” “move on,” and “unite” as a form 
of institutional violence that silences survivor’s voices. The situation of post-genocide 
Rwanda is one in which the moral “duty to remember” must compete with efforts to 
impose an official narrative of the past in which Tutsi experiences are often marginalized 
in the name of national reconciliation and cohesion. Drawing on a corpus of filmic and 
literary works that circumvent this form of censorship, Dauge-Roth wonders what it 
means for us, Westerners, to read/watch such accounts. He ultimately shows how writers 
and directors seek to enlist our participation and “position us as heirs of this genocide”78 
by making us aware that no other country is immune to the kind of violence that Rwanda 
faced at the time. 
A different set of questions is raised by Zakaria Soumaré’s Le Génocide 
Rwandais dans la littérature africaine francophone.79 Drawing on six novels from the 
literary project “Rwanda: Écrire par devoir de mémoire,” this essay addresses the role of 
literature in creating an archive of the Tutsi genocide. Soumaré starts off by locating this 
project within a tradition of anti-colonial “littérature engagée” that originated in 1920’s 
France and Francophone Africa. He then proceeds to an analysis of the rhetorical 
strategies used to express the unspeakable violence that swept through Rwanda in 1994. 
How did these six authors manage to describe incidents that they did not witness first-
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hand? What devices did they use to account for the inexpressible nature of what 
happened? How can literature produce and communicate knowledge of the genocide? 
And how to testify in the name of the dead?  
A thorough analysis of what happened in Rwanda demands that these questions 
be asked, but should not be limited to them. Just as problematic as the “images” that were 
captured during the 1994 massacres or produced in their wake are the ones that paved the 
way for the genocide. As French historian Jean-Pierre Chrétien repeatedly pointed out, 
conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis only started in the late nineteenth century, with the 
colonization of Rwanda by Germany, then Belgium.80 The first ethnographers to make 
their way to the “land of a thousand hills” noticed, much to their surprise, that some 
locals did not conform to the caricature of the “Negro,” so popular in Europe at the time. 
To explain this racial variation, they started to collect anthropometric data (height, 
weight, skin color, facial features), using Campus’s facial angle as well as the 
craniometric instruments pioneered by Paul Broca. Based on their findings, they created a 
scale of differential worth with the goal of establishing where these locals would rank. 
The result was a topography of black bodies that drew on and allegedly nuanced the 
descriptions of Buffon, Vogt, and Cuvier discussed in Chapter one.  
In his study of the Rwandan population, historian Louis de Lacger described 
Tutsis as unmistakably different and questioned whether they were “real” Africans:  
Quand on arrive de la Haute-Egypte ou des plateaux d’Abyssinie au Ruanda, on 
les reconnaît tout de suite. On les a déjà vus ces hommes de haute taille, 
atteignant la moyenne de 1, 79m. et dépassant deux mètres chez quelques géants, 
minces de corps, aux membres longs et grêles, réguliers de traits, de port noble, 
                                                          





graves et hautains […]. Ils ont le type caucasique et tiennent du sémite de l’Asie 
antérieure. Mais ils sont noirs de teint, parfois cuivrés ou olivâtres; leurs cheveux 
sont crépus…81  
 
His description echoes that of German geographer Hans Meyer who, in 1916, had already 
portrayed Tutsis as “des personnages fiers, élancés, dépassant les deux mètres, au profil 
de médaille et d’un maintien aristocratique: au premier abord ils en imposent à 
l’Européen qui a beaucoup voyagé.” Other distinctive features include their nose “au 
profil fin et au bout mince, aux narines fines” and their “bouche relativement petite et des 
lèvres minces.”82 Because of their appearance, Tutsis were believed to be a “higher” 
nomadic people from Ancient Egypt or Ethiopia—the Hamites, a lost branch of the 
“Caucasian race” that blended black and white. This hypothesis, known as the Hamitic 
hypothesis or the myth of the Hamite, was proposed without real evidence by British 
explorer John Hanning Speke after he visited Rwanda while trying to identify the source 
of the Nile.83 It was revitalized during the genocide and certainly played a role in framing 
Tutsis as foreign invaders in their own country.  
Hutus, on the other hand, looked more “typical.” Their appearance was allegedly 
in line with the European stereotype of the African. According to Lacger, “Le type 
physique du muhutu est le type le plus commun et le plus général du noir, […]: taille 
moyenne de 1,67 m., coloration très foncée de la peau et frisure des cheveux, 
brachycéphalie et prognathisme, nez écrasé et lèvres épaisses, belles proportion des 
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membres.”84 According to Hans Meyer, some of their features include a “silhouette 
trapue,” a “stature ramassée et musculeuse,” a “crâne prognathe authentiquement nègre, 
and “jambes courtes.”85 Similarly, Belgian doctor Joseph Sasserath saw in them “des 
nègres qui en possèdent toutes les caractéristiques: nez épaté, lèvres épaisses, front bas, 
crâne brachycéphale. Ils conservent un caractère d’enfant, à la fois timide et paresseux, et 
le plus souvent sont d’une saleté invétérée. C’est là la classe des serfs. La race des chefs 
exige d’eux multiples corvées.”86 Interestingly enough, Sasserath’s description does not 
just rehash tropes of colonial portraiture (infantilization, idleness, etc.), it also draws on 
the physiognomic premise that human identity can be gleaned through observation and 
interpretation of the face by moving from an examination of physical traits to a 
consideration of psychological features before concluding with a series of remarks on 
social status, as if the three were naturally connected. 
Colonialism acted as an agent of ethnic division and segregation by grouping 
Hutus and Tutsis into categories established solely on the basis of phenotype. According 
to Meyer, Lacger, and Sasserath, the formers’ low intelligence and stocky physiques 
naturally predisposed them to field work while Tutsis’ noble stature and “Caucasian” 
appearance, which earned them various epithets such as “’faux nègres”87 or “Européen[s] 
sous une peau noire,”88 made them more fit to lead. Historians have thoroughly 
documented how this ethnic polarization resulted in the establishment of an unfair 
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political system.89 For example, Jean-Pierre Chrétien has noted that numerous discourses 
served to legitimize the idea of ethnicity in Rwanda, including, of course, racial theories, 
but also a number of “politiques jouant tantôt de l’élitisme, tantôt de la démocratie; 
légitimation des fratricides par une lutte des classes.” He has argued that in all those 
discourses, “[l]’élément permanent se trouve dans la structure du regard posé sur la 
société, dans une cristallisation du visage de “l’autre” en termes de marginalité, 
d’infériorité ou d’exclusion. […] Le piège d’un racisme interne s’est ainsi refermé sur des 
populations entières.”90 The Rwandan genocide illustrated the dangers inherent in 
institutionalizing the discourse of physiognomy that was imported by European explorers 
during the early stages of colonization. Descriptions of local populations showed how 
facial appearance was used as the basis for assigning ethnic labels. As Hutus rose to 
power after Rwanda became independent, political leaders took up and reversed the 
colonial rhetoric that identified Tutsis as bearers of a higher order of humanity by 
describing them as inkoza (snakes), inyenzi, (roaches), or cannibals. 
The arrival of European ethnographers in Rwanda inaugurated a “crisis of the 
face.” From the colonial invention of race/ethnicity in the late 1890’s to the hateful pro-
Hutu propaganda campaigns that caricatured Tutsis as aliens, the modern history of 
Rwanda set the stage for what Chrétien aptly called a “crystallization” of the other’s 
appearance into an abstract type (the long-nosed, clear-skinned, fine-featured Tutsi). This 
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chapter will explore the many ways in which African writers have responded to this 
“crystallization” by drawing on a corpus of literary testimonies by Tutsi survivors and 
novels by second-hand witnesses. Those include Yolande Mukagasana’s La Mort ne veut 
pas de moi (1997) and N’aie pas peur de savoir (1999), Boubacar Boris Diop’s Murambi, 
le livre des ossements (2000), and Révérien Rurangwa’s Génocidé (2006). The past two 
decades witnessed a proliferation of genocide stories. My choice of these three authors is 
not fortuitous. While they address the 1994 events from a range of different perspectives 
(as witness, survivor or victim, as mother and wife, orphan or as “tourist”), they have in 
common a commitment to depoliticizing ethnic boundaries or to destroying them 
altogether. How did these authors engage with this history of physiognomic profiling? 
How did they redefine the modalities of Tutsi embodiment and what rhetorical/narrative 
strategies did they use to do so?  
In the first section of this chapter, I want to focus on one of the most emblematic 
instruments of the genocide introduced by the Belgian administration in 1933, the ethnic 
identity card. I analyze the modalities of its circulation, uses, and manipulation in 
Mukagasana’s La Mort ne veut pas de moi and N’aie pas peur de savoir, as well as 
Diop’s Murambi, le livre des ossements. The counterfeiting and theft of ID cards that 
allowed Tutsis to pass as Hutus reveal a deep anxiety about identity and collapse the 
border between self and other. The manipulations to which these IDs were subjected 
ultimately undermine and reframe the discourse of physiognomy that racialized Tutsis as 
enemies of the nation.   
In the second part of this chapter, I turn my attention to Rurangwa’s Génocidé —a 




neighbor in April 1994 before taking refuge in Switzerland where he currently lives. 
Rurangwa’s account constitutes an attempt to reclaim his own image. Indeed, Génocidé is 
a manner of response to both the naïve iconography which dominated late nineteenth-
century European ethnography and the Hutu propaganda that saw in him a “white negro.” 
A recurring device in his testimony is the use of circumlocution to describe his disfigured 
appearance. The long developments that this figure allows for constitute an invitation to 
scrutinize what is left of Rurangwa’s face—an invitation reiterated on the cover of his 
testimony where his picture appears. With its inclusion of both photographic and literary 
portraits, Génocidé ultimately offers an alternative take on the ethnic identity card.  
 
“Mon visage appartient aux autres”91: Identity Trafficking in Murambi, le livre des 
ossements, La Mort ne veut pas de moi, and N’aie pas peur de savoir. 
While Belgian colonization of Rwanda started in 1922, the first administrative 
structure to officially discriminate between Hutus and Tutsis was created in 1930. The 
following year, King Musinga was removed and replaced with the Belgian-approved 
King Rudahigwa who was forced to cooperate with the colonial system in place. In the 
wake of this reshuffling, Tutsis were appointed to head all chieftancies. The final step in 
reshaping the political landscape of Rwanda at the expense of Hutus occurred in 1933 
when the colonial administration implemented a discriminatory system of identity cards 
that listed the bearer’s gender, clan, date of birth, and most importantly, her/his 
ethnicity—“Tutsi,” “Hutu,” or “Twa.” The consequences were profoundly disturbing: 
                                                          




tribal identity became hereditary and patrilineal, thus creating irreparable divisions in 
Rwandan society.  
In her first testimony La Mort ne veut pas de moi, Tutsi survivor Yolande 
Mukagasana dismissed the ethnic identity card as “[u]ne invention des Belges, qui n’ont 
rien compris à notre société en perpétuelle mutation,”92 a stance she reiterated almost 
verbatim in her second book N’aie pas peur de savoir: “Une belle invention des Belges, 
ça, la carte d’identité ethnique! La maladie de classer, comme d’autres ont la maladie 
d’aimer.”93 Born in 1954, she worked as a nurse and anesthetist in Kigali until she fled to 
Belgium a few weeks after the genocide broke out. Both of her accounts describe her 
journey to survive as well as her attempt to mourn the death of her husband and children 
who died at the hands of Hutu extremists in 1994.  
Other writers were just as adamant in condemning ethnic IDs, among them 
Senegalese novelist and journalist Boubacar Boris Diop. His fictional account of the 
genocide Murambi, le livre des ossements was published as part of the literary project 
“Rwanda: Écrire par devoir de mémoire.” In 1998, two African artists—Nocky 
Djedanoum from Chad and Maïmouna Coulibaly from the Ivory Cast—and RFI 
journalist Théogène Karabayinga invited him to take up residence in Kigali along with 
nine other African writers, including Véronique Tadjo and Abdourahman Waberi. From 
this trip, Diop wrote a polyphonic novel in which the atrocities of the genocide are 
approached through the perspectives of both victims and perpetrators.  
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Much has been written about this project. Essays like Catherine Coquio’s 
Rwanda. Le Réel et les récits and Josias Semujanga’s Origins of Rwandan Genocide 
frame the “Ecrire par devoir de mémoire” texts as commemorative works of fiction that 
develop a “multidirectional,” pan-African memory of the genocide and, in doing so, 
contest the grand narrative that has been imposed by the post-1994 Rwandan 
government.94 In her recent book Rwandan Genocide Stories: Fiction After 1994, Nicki 
Hitchcott resents the way these fictional accounts have monopolized critics’ attention, 
often at the expense of other equally important works by Rwandan writers such as 
Benjamin Sehene and Gilbert Gatore.95 She underscores how problematic it has been to 
let “tourists with typewriters” who based their accounts on their experiences as visitors in 
a country they did not know before suggest how to memorialize trauma.96 What does it 
mean that writers who did not experience the genocide first-hand played such a major 
role in its remembrance? To a certain extent, however, Nicki Hitchcott also participated 
in the academic “overemphasis” on the “Ecrire par devoir de mémoire” project.97 Several 
of her articles focus on Véronique Tadjo and the relationship between trauma and 
memory in Boubacar Boris Diop’s Murambi.98 My reading of his novel, while 
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reproducing this monopoly, is partly redeemed by the fact that it addresses a new 
thematic: the ethnic ID. 
Although such IDs appear in the majority of genocide testimonies, from 
Kayimahe’s France-Rwanda, les coulisses du génocide to Mukasonga’s Inyenzi ou les 
cafards, their importance has been overlooked by literary critics. One reason is that they 
are generally alluded to, mentioned in passing, in other words, relegated to the 
“episodic,” the “anecdotal,” confined to the margins of narrative discourse. Even so, their 
significance should not be underestimated. In Mukagasana’s testimonies and Diop’s 
novel, the ID card functions as a site where traditional notions of identity, personal and 
national, are questioned and the discourse of physiognomy that played such a strong part 
in dividing Rwandans along ethnic lines exposed for what it is: a fabricated lie.  
Originally meant as a means of identification, personal information collection, 
and discrimination by the Belgians, the ethnic ID became a powerful tool in the unfolding 
of the genocide. Following Habyarimana’s death, Hutu militias erected makeshift 
barricades along the main traffic arteries and screened local populations for suspicious 
individuals. Hutus were generally safe, but the Tutsis who dared show up ran the risk of 
being injured or killed. This monitoring of public space is described in the first pages of 
La Mort ne veut pas de moi. Mukagasana’s testimony opens with a particularly troubling 
scene in which a Tutsi named Makuza is being tended to after his leg was slashed open 
by a member of the presidential guard on duty: “Un militaire me demande mes papiers, le 
milicien me dévisage d’un air soupçonneux. ‘Tutsi! Tutsi!’ qu’il crie brusquement. Je 




vois le militaire essuyer sa machette dans l’herbe.”99 The use of the narrative present 
enhances the dramatic tension and involves the reader as a direct witness and potential 
collaborator by giving the impression that the events are happening as they are being 
recounted.  
Similar scenes abound in her testimony. At least four others describe the 
deleterious use of ethnic IDs in the context of the genocide. For example, Mukagasana 
remembers the stream of insults spewed continuously by pro-Hutu radio stations such as 
RTLM and Radio Rwanda and the step-by-step instructions given on how to dispose of 
Tutsis: “Chaque barrière a son chef, lui sait le travail à faire et il mettra les hommes au 
courant de leur devoir. […] Toute personne qui ne sera pas connue à la barrière, 
demandez-lui sa carte d’identité. Si c’est un cancrelat, attrapez-le. Le chef de la barrière 
vous expliquera ce qu’il faut en faire.”100 This passage exemplifies what might be called 
a rhetoric of restraint. The use of an animalistic metaphor to describe Tutsis (“cancrelat”) 
and the final euphemism “ce qu’il faut en faire” downplay what is essentially a call to 
murder. Many died at the barricades, including Mukagasana’s husband. Remembering 
this particular moment, she wrote: “Je distingue Joseph, il se tient droit et regarde les 
militaires dans les yeux. On examine les cartes d’identité. […] Une rafale de mitraillette 
déchire l’air.”101 Not everyone showed the same stoic resignation. Moments later, 
Mukagasana’s cousins appeared “comme folle à la barrière. ‘Je ne suis pas une Tutsi, je 
suis une Hutu,’ disait-elle en larmes aux miliciens qui examinaient sa pièce d’identité. 
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‘Pourquoi est-il indiqué que tu es tutsi, alors?—C’est une erreur. Je suis hutu.’ Un coup 
de machette achève l’entretien.”102 ID cards were used as a policing tool to strengthen 
and crystallize ethnic allegiances because they allowed for the identification of Rwandans 
in a direct and unambiguous manner. According to Mukagasana, Hutu militias showed 
such blind faith in them that “ils ne regardent même plus ni les photos ni les visages des 
gens. Ils sont obnubilés par deux traits de plume sur la carte d’identité, il faut que l’un au 
moins de ces traits biffe la mention ‘Tutsi’ imprimée à côté des mentions ‘Hutu’ et 
‘Twa,’ dans trois petits rectangles.”103   
Like La Mort ne veut pas de moi, it is with a scene of ID check that Diop’s novel 
opens. As Michel Serunmundo, the owner of a video rental shop in Kigali, makes his way 
home after getting off from work in the evening, he is called out by a presidential guard: 
“Un des trois soldats en tenue de combat m’a demandé poliment ma carte d’identité. 
Pendant qu’il se penchait pour la lire, j’ai suivi son regard. Ça n’a pas loupé: la première 
chose qui les intéresse, c’est de savoir si vous êtes censé être hutu, tutsi ou twa.”104 
Serunmundo later finds out that Habyarimana’s plane crashed that evening, causing 
tensions to soar between Hutus and Tutsis. This event added to a climate of suspicion and 
distrust that culminated in the 1994 genocide, marking the end of a peaceful, quiet era, a 
“monde serein” echoed in Michel’s last name, Serunmundo.  
Identity cards are a recurring motif in both works. Their ubiquitous presence in 
other works makes them, I would argue, a topos of recent Rwandan literature and a 
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recurring trope of francophone African literature. They play a central role both in Jean-
Marie Adiaffi’s novel La Carte d’identité and Lucio Mad’s Les Trafiqueurs where they 
serve as springboards for rethinking the identity of the African subject in the wake of 
négritude.105 Diop and Mukagasana describe them in a variety of ways, as means of ID 
verification, of course, but also of “passing.” La Mort ne veut pas de moi and Murambi 
are filled with scenes in which ethnic IDs are stolen or falsified in order to help Tutsis go 
through checkpoints and flee the country for safer havens. While taking refuge in the 
Nyamirambo church, Mukagasana is given a new ID in the hope of escaping her 
persecutors:  
Le père Vanoverschelden m’a donné une carte d’identité récupérée sur un 
cadavre. Je m’appelle désormais Nyiramana Xaverina. Je porte le nom d’une 
femme morte. Je suis peut-être morte sans le savoir. Je me sens comme ces âmes 
des défunts que les Antillais appellent zombies et qui, selon les traditions 
païennes, sont réveillées par des sorciers qui les mettent à leur service. Je suis un 
zombie. Ma tête est rasée, quelques touffes hirsutes s’émancipent encore. J’ai l’air 
d’une vieille femme de soixante ans.106   
 
This passage is structured around a series of syntactic “slippages.” Mukagasana goes 
from bearing the name of a dead woman to thinking that she might actually be dead. She 
also goes from feeling like a zombie (“Je me sens comme ces âmes des défunts…”) to 
believing that she is one (“Je suis un zombie.”). In doing so, she identifies with figures 
who are either defined by ontological lack or lack of free will (“ces âmes […] réveillées 
par des sorciers qui les mettent à leur service”). This new identity manifests in her 
appearance and physical bearing. She looks like a sixty-year old woman but she is only 
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forty. In resenting her decrepit image, Mukagasana expresses nostalgia for her “visage de 
référence.”107 According to David Le Breton, “chaque homme porte en lui un visage de 
référence à l’aune duquel il mesure son visage d’aujourd’hui. Le premier étant le seul 
envisageable. Un visage intérieur que ne reproduit plus la réalité actuelle des traits.”108 
The loss of Mukagasana’s former, younger-looking appearance is experienced as a form 
of dispossession. Her new face is a distant memory of what it used to look like, that is, a 
remnant of her former self, and a face in which she fails to recognize her new identity, a 
face from which she feels completely alienated. Interestingly enough, this sense of 
alienation is described by Le Breton as a form of death: “L’Autre a perçé sous les traits. 
Le lent travail de la mort est devenu sensible à la conscience et l’individu se refuse à le 
reconnaître.”109 Ultimately the interest of this passage lies in its description of identity as 
“passing” in both senses of the term, meaning as the act of pretending to be someone else 
and as a form of death, a dangerous slipping into non-existence, echoed by the series of 
syntactic slippages mentioned above. 
 A few pages later, Mukagasana is given yet another ID: “Encore un nom. 
Emmanuelle me tend une carte d’identité hutu. ‘Désormais, tu t’appeleras Nyiraminani 
Alphonsine. Et tu seras notre tante, à moi et à ma soeur.’”110 This assumed name allows 
her to stay under the protection of colonel Rucibigango, a FAR pro-Hutu extremist who 
offers her shelter and food in exchange for sexual favors. But as his advances become 
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more and more pressing, Mukagasana comes up with a plan to run away. She blackmails 
Rucibigango into driving her to the Saint Paul church. If he refuses to comply, 
Mukagasana threatens to call the Military Chief of Staff and denounce him as Tutsi: “‘Je 
ne suis pas tutsi. Je le prouverai. J’ai une carte d’identité,” Rucibigango tells her. To 
which Mukagasana replies: “Pensez-vous, colonel, que j’aurais oublié de signaler au chef 
d’état-major que votre carte d’identité est falsifiée?’”111  
 The counterfeiting of ethnic IDs is also a recurring theme in Murambi. Diop’s 
novel offers another example of the illegal use of ethnic IDs during the genocide. One of 
his characters, Jessica Kamanzi, maintains a somewhat ambiguous identity but as her 
story unfolds, the reader finds out that she is a member of the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) infiltrated among the Hutu government forces in Kigali. This double life as a 
secret agent is made possible by her fake ID: “Les rares gens qui osent encore sortir de 
chez eux, ce sont les étrangers ou, bien sûr, les Hutu. Ou ceux que leur carte d’identité 
présente comme tels. C’est mon cas. Tous les autres se cachent où ils peuvent.”112 The 
chapter in which she is introduced to the reader (“Jessica”) ends with a scene in which 
she goes through one of the countless checkpoints that were erected in the wake of 
Habyarimana’s death. There, she is approached by a helpless Tutsi woman who has just 
been injured by a guard on duty:  
Elle jure qu’elle n’est pas tutsi et me supplie de l’expliquer au responsable de la 
barrière. Je m’écarte très vite d’elle. Elle insiste. Je lui dis sèchement de me 
laisser tranquille. Voyant cela, le milicien Interahamwe est convaincu que je suis 
de son camp. Il me lance un joyeux éclat de rire […]. Puis il repousse sans 
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ménagement la femme vers les égorgeurs avant de reprendre le contrôle des 
pièces d’identité.113 
 
As we saw, Mukagasana pretends to be a Hutu in Rucibigango’s company. In this 
excerpt, Jessica takes on a similar role in front of the Interahamwe soldier. Her “Hutu-
ness” is not portrayed as something she is, but as something she does, an act to be 
rehearsed, a script to be enacted, or to put it yet another way, a verb rather than a noun, a 
doing rather than a being. This “Hutu-ness” is brought to life through her discourse and 
attitude, one of cold distance and lack of empathy for the sake of her Tutsi interlocutor. 
This performative aspect is key. The ethnic ID allows her to create new life stories, to 
embody fictional identities without which she would have ended up like her Tutsi 
counterpart, dead at a checkpoint. In this respect, one could describe Murambi as a 
narrative about alternative narratives and fictional experiments (what if Jessica were 
Hutu?). The falsification of ethnic IDs allows for more than a mere refashioning of 
identities. In enabling Jessica to pass as Hutu at a time when being Tutsi was enough to 
be killed, it underscores the redemptive power of fiction. This is hardly surprising from 
Diop. Like the other writers who participated in the “Rwanda: écrire par devoir de 
mémoire” project (with the exception of Vénuste Kayimahe), he never directly 
experienced what happened in Rwanda. Murambi is a fictional account of the genocide—
but one in which fiction is described as essential, retributive, and salutary. It is a book 
that justifies its own raison d’être and legitimates itself to speak critically about what it 
                                                          




attempts to do: bearing witness to a past event that its author did not directly 
experience.114  
 In Murambi, ethnic IDs are used as means of negotiation and transaction; they are 
typically produced in exchange for one’s life. They also appear as a privileged site for 
deploying the imaginative, transformative possibilities of fiction. If Diop stresses their 
redeeming power, Mukagasana is more skeptical. While her testimony initially casts IDs 
in a similar light, she gradually insists on their irrelevance. Indeed, counterfeiting ethnic 
cards became such a widespread practice that Rwandan authorities were caught short. To 
address this situation, RTLM would launch calls to encourage increased scrutiny: 
“Souvenez-vous tous que nous n’avons qu’un seul ennemi, le Tutsi. Parmi eux, certains 
ont changé leurs cartes d’identité. Ne soyez pas dupes des papiers. Regardez leur 
constitution.”115 Instructions were clear. Since IDs became increasingly unreliable, failing 
as indexical markers of race/ethnicity, the only text to be trusted was that of the face.  
Two scenes are worth mentioning in this respect. The first one occurs as a Hutu 
soldier tells his colleague how he killed a fugitive: “Je lui ai demandé ses papiers. J’ai vu 
qu’elle était Hutu. Mais j’ai eu un doute. Tu sais c’est une fille assez grande. Alors je l’ai 
interrogée. Je voyais qu’elle avait peur. Elle m’a finalement avoué que son père était 
tutsi. Tu vois la suite…”116  The soldier’s suspicion upon checking the woman’s papers 
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Rwanda.” Lendemains 112 (2003): 73-81. 
115 Mukagasana 1997, op. cit., p. 170. 




ultimately led him to guess her real ancestry based on the stereotype that Tutsis are tall. 
Doing so required him to tap into racial fantasies produced within and by the discourse of 
colonial anthropology (cf. Lacger, Sasserath, etc.)—a discourse that paradoxically gave 
rise to the very ethnic ID that he fails to trust in this passage. The creeping doubt Hutus 
experienced upon checking IDs turned into complete mistrust as the genocide progressed. 
Mukagasana remembers the situation clearly: “L’armée rwandaise est en déroute,” she 
wrote after the RPF attempted to take over Kigali. “Les soldats sont de plus en plus 
nerveux. Et les miliciens ne demandent même plus les pièces d’identité avant d’abattre 
les gens. Un rapide coup d’oeil suffit pour identifier le Tutsi.”117   
What the ID hid, the body supposedly revealed. The human face—with its shape, 
contours, features, complex architecture, and shifting landscape of wrinkles, craters, 
crevices, and shadows—was considered a depository of truth that no falsification, no 
counterfeiting could possibly alter. A man can lie but his face will always tell the truth. A 
good look at it can capture more meaning than a mere piece of paper. Under the mask of 
expressions, faked emotions, and subterfuges, biology always prevails. Or so thought the 
parme-Hutu ideologues. In the context of the genocide, the rampant suspicion of ethnic 
IDs reactivated and magnified the colonial imaginary of race/ethnicity that portrayed 
Tutsis as tall, light-skinned, and fine-featured. As Cornélius summarizes in Murambi: 
“Dans le passé, les étrangers avaient dit aux Tutsi: ‘vous êtes si merveilleux, votre nez est 
long et votre peau claire, vous êtes de grande taille et vos lèvres sont minces, vous ne 
pouvez pas être des Noirs, seul un mauvais hasard vous a conduits parmi ces 
                                                          




sauvages.’”118 A similar description is found in La Mort ne veut pas de moi as 
Mukagasana recalls some of the hate messages spread on the radio:  
Comment distinguer le cancrelat du Hutu? Plusieurs moyens sont à votre 
disposition: 
  Le cancrelat a les incisives écartées.  
  Le cancrelat a le talon étroit. 
  Le cancrelat a huit paires de côtes.  
  La femme cancrelat a des vergetures sur les cuisses, près des fesses. 
  Le cancrelat a le nez fin. 
  Le cancrelat a le cheveu moins crépu. 
  Le crâne du cancrelat est long derrière, et son front est incliné.  
  Le cancrelat est grand et il y a de la morgue dans son regard.  
  L’homme Tutsi a une pomme d’Adam prononcée.119  
 
This description combines popular beliefs, myth, and pseudo-scientific knowledge, 
including a watered-down version of phrenology (“Le crâne du cancrelat est long 
derrière, et son front est incliné”). The anaphoric repetition of “cancrelat” hammers home 
the message that Tutsis were merely animals, non-human creatures with eight pairs of 
ribs as opposed to twelve in normally constituted individuals. In addition, the use of 
metonymies to describe them conveys an impression of dismembering. It is as if their 
bodies were being scrutinized by the dissecting gaze of Hutus. This imaginary portrait 
gained such momentum during the genocide that it gradually supplemented ethnic IDs, 
rendering them obsolete. What Diop and Mukagasana describe is a situation of suspicion 
and crisis in which some people ran the risk of being killed for bearing some degree of 
resemblance to a racial caricature created a century earlier by European explorers and 
taken up by extremist Hutu authorities.  
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Tracing the circulation of ethnic IDs in La Mort ne veut pas de moi showed their 
irrelevance. One could go even further and argue that ethnic IDs were worthless by virtue 
of their very existence. Indeed, if ethnic divisions between Hutus and Tutsis were so 
obvious, easily decipherable, and directly inscribed on faces, in other words so self-
explanatory, there would not be any need for ethnic IDs to begin with. As we saw, one 
way in which Diop and Mukagasana discredit them is by showing how easily falsifiable 
they are. Another way is by turning the body that such IDs are meant to identify into a 
site of illegibility. In her testimonies, Mukagasana breaks down the ethnic categories 
produced by colonial discourse and, by describing Hutus and Tutsis as bodies that cannot 
be read, interrogates in meta-critical fashion our own practice as readers and the way we 
should approach her testimonies. 
La Mort ne veut pas de moi and N’aie pas peur de savoir are filled with 
descriptions of bodies that call into question the racial fantasies of Hutu propaganda, 
bodies that defy traditional expectations of what they should look like. Among them is 
the Hutu soldier who chased Mukagasana in the wild shortly after she left her house. He 
had red eyes but most importantly, “comme celui des Tutsi, son nez est fin.”120 She also 
recalls Paddy, a dwarf that everyone believed to be a Tutsi despite the long-standing 
belief that Tutsis are tall:  
Côme s’étonne de voir Paddy, un nain, du côté des Hutu. J’enregistre des bribes 
de dialogue. 
“Mais Paddy, tu es tutsi! 
—Mais non, fait le nain, je suis hutu. 
—Mais tu as toujours dit que tu étais tutsi! 
                                                          




—C’était pour faire croire que je grandirais un jour, répond malignement le 
nain.”121  
 
Much to her surprise, Mukagasana also finds out that the famous Rwandan singer 
Masabo Nyangezi was a Hutu.122 Similarly, she mistakenly assumes one of her 
neighbors, Pauline, to be a Hutu because her husband was one as well. But the most 
striking instance has to do with Mukagasana’s appearance itself. As she makes her way 
back to Rwanda several years after the genocide, she comes across what she believes to 
be her daughter’s shoe in the ruins of her former house: “Je hume encore. Je cherche cette 
odeur que je leur connaissais à chacun. […] Mon nez plat s’aplatit encore contre le cuir 
craquelé de cette godasse desséchée.”123 Strangely enough, Mukagasana’s nose is flat—a 
characteristic most commonly associated with Hutus. In describing bodies that undermine 
the physiognomic beliefs of the time, bodies onto which ethnic/racial markers cannot be 
mapped accurately, Mukagasana’s testimonies articulate a politics of representation that 
redefines the modalities of Tutsi embodiment.  
 Placing Diop and Mukagasana’s works in dialogue raises a series of meta-critical 
questions about textuality, reception, and authority. On the one hand, Murambi lays out 
the principles of what one could call an ethics of fiction. By “ethics of fiction,” I do not 
mean how Diop’s narrative acts on the readers in good or bad ways or what reading 
commands them to do, but how Murambi produces a discourse of legitimation, meaning, 
a discourse that justifies its own logic. In other words, by “ethics of fiction” I do not so 
                                                          
121 Ibid., p. 81. The same scene appears in N’aie pas peur de savoir on page 48. 
122 “Le cuisinier accourt. Il aime Masabo autant que moi […]. ‘Si un seul Tutsi doit être épargné, petit, que 
ce Tutsi soit Masabo! —Masabo? Mais Masabo est un Hutu. On dit même qu’il fait bien son travail’!” 
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much mean an ethics of reception as one of genre and mode. In Diop’s novel, the 
counterfeiting of ethnic IDs makes it possible to take on fictional (Hutu) identities that 
allowed Tutsis to stay alive. The ethnic ID becomes a site of openness and re-
signifiability where fiction (and the range of personas it enables) is celebrated. Murambi 
is perhaps best described as an exercise in self-justification; the way it portrays fiction as 
good and redemptive serves to legitimate what the novel itself attempts to do: to talk 
about the real-life events of 1994 through the fictional accounts of Cornelius, Jessica, 
Serunmundo, etc.  
 Mukagasana’s treatment of ethnic IDs slightly differs from Diop’s. To be sure, 
both describe them as a form of currency traded in an underground economy. But while 
Diop emphasizes the redemptive possibilities that such IDs enable, Mukagasana insists 
on their precarious status due to the range of abuses, manipulations, and violations to 
which they were liable. In her testimonies, IDs fail to fulfil their original purpose; they 
are discredited because they cannot testify to the “richesse du visage noir”124 or account 
for the complexity of black embodiment. In other words, Mukagasana describes ethnic 
IDs as simulacra, that is as copies of things, objects, or realities—someone’s body or 
face—that are deprived of originals (in this case, the fantasized caricature of the tall, 
long-nosed, fine-featured Tutsi). La Mort ne veut pas de moi and N’aie pas peur de 
savoir seek to demystify the set of discourses that caricatured Tutsis. While Diop uses the 
ethnic ID as a site for articulating an ethics of fiction, Mukagasana uses it for establishing 
a new politics of representation. Her testimonies attempt to correct such IDs.  
                                                          




Yet they also share a number of commonalities. To a certain extent, the ethnic ID 
functions as a metafictional device that draws attention to the status of the testimony in 
which it appears. Just as IDs were not trusted and therefore lacked power and convincing 
force, in a word, authority, her work lacked authorial confidence and control. On several 
occasions, Mukagasana contrasts the shortcomings of her writing skills (and of writing in 
general) with the spectacular, traumatic dimension of the events she attempts to recount. 
The fact that she wrote two testimonies signals her difficulties in articulating what she 
went through. La Mort ne veut pas de moi and N’aie pas peur de savoir are a series of 
trials and errors in which Mukagasana attempts to process, make sense of, and bring 
order to the chaos of her experience as a survivor. Murambi is similar in many respects. 
Diop originally wanted his novel to be a short travelogue first because, as a Senegalese 
writer, he did not think he had much to say about what happened in Rwanda, and because 
he was concerned that the “réalité proprement innommable” to which he was exposed 
upon visiting the country in 1998 would deprive him of the desire to write.  
 
“Un visage qu’on n’aime pas devant un miroir qu’on redoute”125: Profiling 
Révérien Rurangwa. 
The inability to communicate trauma is a recurring trope of genocide literature. It 
is no surprise to see it re-emerge in Révérien Rurangwa’s testimony. Like Mukagasana, 
Rurangwa was born in Rwanda to a Tutsi family. Like her, he also directly witnessed the 
events of 1994. Published almost a decade after Murambi, Génocidé (2006) recounts his 
                                                          




encounter with violence, the experience of loss—he is the only survivor in a family of 
forty-four—, and his attempt to start over in Switzerland where he took refuge after being 
disfigured by his Hutu neighbor. Finally like Mukagasana, Rurangwa did not initially 
commit himself to a literary career. What happened in Rwanda compelled him to write 
and share his story—a process he repeatedly describes as daunting if not impossible: 
“Cette tragédie avec laquelle il me faut cohabiter […], je veux la retracer sans trembler, 
même si je ne pourrai jamais la décrire dans toute son horreur.”126  
Nevertheless, Génocidé stands out from the majority of Tutsi testimonies in the 
way it treats the injured body as a key narrative theme. While scenes of torture, murder, 
and rape are commonplace in the literature of the Rwandan genocide, they are almost 
always tangential or anecdotal, their main purpose being to convey the violence of the 
atrocities committed at the time. Rurangwa’s approach is different. His testimony 
primarily concentrates on the experience of disfigurement and the sense of alienation that 
he suffered as a result. This is evident in the cover where a black and white portrait shows 
him scarred, in a three-quarter profile with the right side of his face off the frame. This 
partial “amputation” is an echo to the title itself—Génocidé—, an adjective cut off from 
the noun it is supposed to modify.  
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Emphasized in the paratext, this “thematic body” will be the focus of my 
analysis.127 Génocidé can be read as a series of what the French call “délit de faciès,” that 
is, broadly speaking, a form of discrimination based on an individual’s facial appearance. 
While in Rwanda, Rurangwa’s Tutsi features made him an easy prey, the wounds and 
scars he was left with in the wake of the genocide have earned him wary glances in his 
new home in Switzerland. Twenty years after he was disfigured, in 2014, Rurangwa 
became the subject of a photo essay entitled “Rwanda: Life After Genocide” where he 
appears in a series of postures ranging from traditional portraits to more complex 
poses.128 Displayed in London, Berlin, New York, and Hong Kong, these photographs 
were an opportunity for Rurangwa to finally reclaim his body and re-gain control of his 
own image—one taken away by colonial and pro-Hutu ideologies.  
To be sure, Génocidé rehashes many of the tropes found in the testimonial 
literature of Rwanda. Like Mukagasana’s accounts, it opens with a critique of colonial 
discourse and the establishment of ethnic boundaries. Rurangwa remembers leafing 
through one of his history textbooks and coming across the following illustration: “Il y a 
le Tutsi, fin et de haute taille, surplombant les deux autres, avec une coiffure travaillée en 
forme de ‘banane.’ […] A côté du Tutsi, sur l’illustration, voici le Hutu (dont le nom 
signifie ‘cultivateur’), plus foncé de peau, trapu, le visage négroïde, nez épaté et traits 
plus épais. Enfin, le Batwa—le pygmée—, plus petit, vif et nerveux, d’un noir très 
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noir.”129 Rurrangwa’s description echoes Sasserath’s account of the Rwandan population 
almost verbatim and underscores the role of institutions (here the school) in perpetuating 
a discourse of racial disparity. Other examples include the way he was targeted during the 
genocide for having a long nose: “les Tutsi n’ont pas le nez épaté et négroïde des Hutu—
motif supplémentaire de jalousie? Lors du génocide, ces derniers ont mis un soin spécial 
à réparer cette inégalité naturelle.”130 Finally, as Rurangwa looks at his reflection in a 
mirror after Sibomana attacked him, he cannot help but notice this “balafre boursouflée 
[qui] part de l’oreille droite […] va jusqu’au nez, épaté et tranché car c’était un nez fin de 
Tutsi.”131   
Like Diop’s and Mukagasana’s testimonies, Génocidé denounces the ethnic 
propaganda that was instrumental in caricaturing Tutsi. Unlike them, however, it does not 
do so by make the body illegible. Rurangwa critiques the notion of reparation, asking 
what it means to repair one’s body and whether it should be done if it entails erasing the 
physical traces of genocide. His refusal to undergo cosmetic surgery after he was injured 
and the way he has repeatedly exposed his face—on book and magazine covers, in photo 
essays and documentaries—stems from a desire to be recognized as a victim of the 
genocide, or rather as a survivor. His testimony can therefore be considered as a sort of 
meta-discourse or meta-commentary on how to read the marks of violence on his face. 
Génocidé is both a text that describes his face as a text to be read and that tells us how to 
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read it. In this respect, it breaks away from a third type of discourse: Levinas’s 
conceptualization of the face as that which escapes representation.  
Rurangwa was disfigured by his Hutu neighbor Simon Sibomana on April 20th, 
1994 because he was a Tutsi. The memory of this event permeates his account in both 
direct and indirect ways, altering for example his perception of the places and landscapes 
around him. Rwanda appears to him as “la curieuse forme d’un crâne,”132 but not any 
skull, “un crâne fendu par une machette,”133 while the Swiss Alps where he took exile 
remind him of “une énorme mâchoire de squale, ornée d’incisives.”134 These examples 
are part of an affective topography that reveals the emotional trauma of disfigurement. 
Rurangwa’s appearance is the object of many descriptions, including a five-page long 
portrait symbolically situated halfway through the testimony, in a chapter simply titled 
“Oser me regarder en face.” As noted, this chapter is mainly descriptive and stands out 
from the others because it momentarily disrupts the narrative flow. As the course of the 
story is suspended, the reader is invited to scrutinize the author’s face. 
In this chapter, Rurangwa mentions his difficulty confronting external gazes, the 
insults to which he is continuously subjected, and his inability to accept his new 
appearance as his own. This representational crisis finds an echo in the use of 
circumlocution, which I argue is one of Rurangwa’s stylistic signatures. To be sure, other 
figures of speech can be found in his account, including metonymies—let us remember 
Rurangwa’s emphasis on his Tutsi nose—and oxymoron. On multiple occasions, 
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Rurangwa portrays himself as a “cadavre vivant,”135 a “mort vivant,”136 and a “zombie 
solitaire”137 deprived of his characteristic horde. Despite such occurrences, 
circumlocution remains Rurangwa’s preferred option to describe his face.  
 As Christine Noille has argued, circumlocution occupies a singular position in the 
hierarchy of tropes in the sense that it straddles the line between what she calls “les deux 
grands pôles définitionnels des figures,” namely “l’écart” and “la substitution.”138  
Indeed, circumlocution generally designates the use of a large number of words to 
express an idea where fewer would do. For example, the phrase “conseiller des grâces” is 
just another, longer (and more affected) way of designating a “miroir.” The former both 
replaces and differs from the latter. The rhetorical effects produced by circumlocution are 
numerous. It can be a figure of suspension in the sense that it stretches the sentence to 
greater lengths. It can also be a figure of mitigation or understatement because it conceals 
the original designation by replacing it with more words than necessary. Finally, it can be 
a figure of emphasis or exaggeration that privileges the circumstantial, the incidental, and 
the literal over the direct denomination. As such, it became popular with the advent of 
préciosité in seventeenth-century France. According to Noille, circumlocution “sert à 
éviter et à souligner, à dire et à ne pas dire. Elle vise autant à l’amplificatio qu’à 
l’attenuatio, à une herméneutique de l’interdit qu’à une herméneutique de la 
suggestion.”139  
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 Both functions—hyperbolic and euphemistic—are found in Génocidé. I first 
propose to interpret the use of circumlocution as symptomatic of a crisis of subjectivity. 
In describing himself as “un épouvantail mutilé et cramoisi,”140 “un gamin sans 
visage,”141 “un être difforme et défiguré,”142 and “un visage qu’on n’aime pas devant un 
miroir qu’on redoute,”143 Rurangwa denigrates his appearance in such a way that he hides 
behind his words and refuses to identify with his own image. In every single instance, the 
use of the indefinite article “un” creates a grammatical split between the speaker 
(Rurangwa) and what he says about himself (the predicate), ultimately disconnecting the 
representation from its object. The most striking example is perhaps to be found in the 
title itself—Génocidé. The adjective clearly designates Rurangwa’s condition although 
no formal linguistic marker such as a noun or a personal pronoun makes it clear. These 
circumlocutions are marked by a series of tensions. While they allow Rurangwa to define 
himself as a survivor, they only do so in a way that prevents him from fully embracing 
this condition.   
In Génocidé, circumlocutions also take the form of what Noille calls 
“interpolations encyclopédiques,” whereby she means circumlocutions that require the 
reader to tap into a repertoire of cultural references to be fully understood.144 For 
example, chapter eight opens with the following biblical epigraph from Isaiah 52:14: 
“Des multitudes avaient été saisies d’épouvante à sa vue car il n’avait plus figure 
                                                          
140 Rurangwa, op. cit., p. 79. 
141 Ibid., p. 99. 
142 Ibid., p. 112. 
143 Ibid., p. 126. 




humaine, et son apparence n’était plus celle d’un homme.”145 Taken to describe Jesus as 
he was scourged prior to his crucifixion, this excerpt invites the reader to see in 
Rurangwa a figure of martyrdom. A similar comparison is made in the last chapter, but 
this time using two circumlocutions: “ce crucifié de la chapelle de La Vue des Alpes, 
avec sa gueule défigurée, son corps coupé et son cri de silence qui envahit la vallée des 
mille montagnes, ressemble à quelqu’un que je connais.”146 Rurangwa also compares 
himself to Joseph Merrick also known as “Elephant man.”147 While Jesus is certainly a 
more popular figure, the reference to Merrick is arguably more efficient because it makes 
it easier for Western readers to visualize the author’s appearance. Finally, he describes 
himself as “un Tutsi de Mugina qui effraie les petits enfants blancs avec sa gueule 
tranchée (en d’autres temps, on aurait été le voir dans un cirque pour se faire peur) et qui 
ne peut pas leur dire la vérité sous peine de se faire traiter de fou.”148 Made up of two 
relative clauses, an adverbial phrase introduced by the preposition “sous peine de,” and a 
parenthetical clause or “incise,” this circumlocution provides a variety of information that 
makes it easy to identify Rurangwa. What matters therefore is not so much what it fails to 
mention explicitly (the author’s identity) as what it literally designates. The reference to 
the circus is particularly telling. In conjuring up a dark chapter of France’s history—a 
history of colonial freak shows and human zoos in which the black body was treated as a 
mere object of curiosity—, it affiliates Rurangwa with the likes of William Henry 
Johnson, Saartjie Baartman, Ota Benga, and Joïce Heth, and in doing so, questions our 
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desire to look at his face. After all, is the reason we are reading his testimony not to 
satisfy the same voyeuristic, sensationalist urge that led Parisians to attend freak shows in 
the last century? While this might certainly be the case for some, Génocidé avoids 
feeding into colonial stereotyping by providing an alternative way to show Rurangwa’s 
body. His testimony reverses the dialectic of gaze and power by orchestrating the display 
of his own image. Rurangwa is the one who ultimately decides how to frame his face.   
Finally, circumlocutions are also used as figures of emphasis. In some instances, 
Rurangwa invites us not to translate them directly, that is, not to guess the original 
designation at which they hint, but to embrace the rhythm, the phrasing, the movement 
that they create in the sentence. Indeed, it is often in what appears as secondary, 
circumstantial, a mere detour in form and expression, that the main idea, the “message” 
so to speak, lies. It is as such that I propose to read Rurangwa’s following self-portrait: 
Un visage qui n’est plus mon visage. Une tête de “nègre” qui semble avoir été 
découpée sur toute sa circonférence avec de mauvais ciseaux, en son milieu. Une 
balafre boursouflée part de l’oreille droite (l’une des consignes des génocidaires 
précisait de porter le coup à hauteur de l’oreille) et va jusqu’au nez, épaté et 
tranché car c’était un nez de Tutsi. Une seconde cicatrice, à partir de l’oreille 
gauche, essaie de la rejoindre mais s’égare sur le front en une boucle qui 
ressemble à un accroche-coeur (mais quel coeur accrocher avec cette gueule?), ou 
au point d’interrogation que j’ai dans la tête en permanence: pourquoi?149  
 
Rurangwa’s face becomes a site in which he is made aware of his own irreducible 
otherness. This sense of alienation finds once again an echo in the use of impersonal, 
indefinite articles. The phrase “tête de ‘nègre’” is also particularly notable. On the one 
hand, the genericity of “nègre” underscores Rurangwa’s loss of individuality; on the 
other hand, “tête de ‘nègre’” can be read as another example of “interpolation 
                                                          




encyclopédique,” that is, as a reference to the infamous pastry, usually a chocolate-coated 
marshmallow or cream treat shaped like a ball and known for its racist undertones. In this 
excerpt, the anaphoric repetition of indefinite articles at the beginning of each sentence 
seems to create a semblance of structure, only to be undermined by the alternation of 
verbal and nominal sentences, interpolated clauses, direct interrogative subordinate 
clauses, and a colon. This broken syntax disrupts the flow of the sentence and reproduces, 
within the figural space of the text, the striations on Rurangwa’s face. It is as though the 
use of circumlocutions established some sort of mimetic relationship between the detours 
in expression that they allow for and the long, winding scars that mar Rurangwa’s flesh.  
 Génocidé shares with La Mort ne veut pas de moi and Murambi a common 
purpose, namely re-imagining the stakes of Tutsi embodiment. But while Mukagasana 
and Diop are concerned with preserving the enigma of the face to undermine long-
standing physiognomic assumptions, Rurangwa is more preoccupied with explaining it 
away. His self-portrait still relies on a physiognomic logic. For example, he sees a direct 
parallel between the question mark-shaped scar on his forehead and the sea of questions 
(and the existential angst) that overflow his mind. Unlike Diop and Mukagasana, 
Rurangwa does not seek to undermine this logic, but simply to reverse its terms and 
ultimately make his face legible on his own terms. Rather than portraying his deformities 
in ways that would evoke a post-colonial freak show, he describes them as reminders—as 
testimonies—of his painful past. In other words, bearing witness means exposing his 
body, albeit in a way that avoids reducing it to a fetish or an object of curiosity for the 




Tutsi resilience. In that sense, Génocidé appears as a “copy” of another text, that of his 
disfigured face.  
To put this face into words, Rurangwa primarily resorted to circumlocution. Its 
use may at first seem symptomatic of a difficulty to represent because it hides more than 
it shows. Yet I argued, against Rurangwa’s claim that language always fails,150 that a 
rhetoric of detour is arguably the most apt way to portray his disfigured appearance. As 
Noille has noted, circumlocution is a device of both amplification and euphemism, of 
“écart” and “substitution” that constantly straddles the line between essential and 
incidental. This oscillation makes it a protean,151 shape-shifting, and blurry figure—an 
attribute that it shares with the very theme of the testimony: Rurangwa’s face.  
 His attempt to make his “gueule esquintée”152 legible provides a radical 
counterpoint to Levinas’s ethics.153 Rurangwa’s face is vulnerable in the traditional sense 
of the word. It denotes a state in which damage is inflicted, or likely to be inflicted, by 
individuals and/or institutions—a state that can be remedied through activism and the 
exercise of political agency. In other words, vulnerability is both the experience of 
exposure to danger and a mode of resistance to it. Both aspects define Rurangwa’s 
condition of “génocidé.” Exposing his wounds is an act of political protest that has 
allowed him to be taken seriously in formulating a series of claims and demands. Those 
include asking for his attackers to be punished, for the Rwandan government of the time 
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to be held accountable, and for France to acknowledge its involvement in arming Hutu 
militias.  
 According to Levinas, however, vulnerability is not a political concept but an 
ethical one. What he describes as “the face of the other” is not so much one’s actual, 
physical countenance as it is precisely what in her/him escapes our gaze and cannot be 
reduced to a mere picture, an image, or a representation. It is therefore more of a 
withdrawal than an apparition or a phenomenon. There is always more in one’s face than 
what is immediately visible to the eye, something irreducible and enigmatic that exceeds 
human perception, something best described as an epiphany. For Levinas, a face is 
vulnerable because of the possibility to reduce it to its plasticity. Attempting to grasp the 
other in an image is a negation of what makes her/his face what it really is: the 
manifestation of an alterity so radically different that it reaches beyond my capacity to 
control or possess it. This type of vulnerability serves as the cornerstone of Levinas’s 
ethical system. While the face of the other always appears to me in its nakedness, I must 
resist the urge to reduce her/him to that appearance. Rurangwa’s invitation to look at his 
face stands in sharp contrast with Levinas’s famous argument that “[c]’est lorsque vous 
voyez un nez, des yeux, un front, un menton, et que vous pouvez les décrire, que vous 
vous tournez vers autrui comme vers un objet.”154 The latter viewed reducing the face to 
its plastic form as a kind of murder that it is my ethical duty not to commit: “Thou shalt 
not kill.” On the contrary, Rurangwa sees in this gesture a form of empowerment that has 
                                                          




allowed him to testify. In his view, representation is redemptive because it brings to light 
the traces of violence inscribed in his very flesh.  
 
Conclusion 
 Through close examination of four texts—three personal testimonies and one 
novel—that centrally feature Tutsi characters, this chapter has underscored the various 
ways in which contemporary African authors have begun to react to the genocide that 
swept through Rwanda in 1994 and to the culture of hatred promoted by Hutu authorities 
at the time. Since the early 2000’s, literary exploration of Tutsi experiences has 
burgeoned and grown increasingly varied, despite a series of calls from the Rwandan 
government to put the past behind. Writers are not merely sharing survival stories; 
instead they are experimenting with novel ways to write, expose, and re-claim the Tutsi 
body after more than a century of it being racialized, tortured, and killed. In this chapter, I 
showed how the most dramatic expression of this violence targeted the face. Not only did 
Hutu extremists endorse the discourse of European physiognomy that caricatured Tutsis 
in colonial times, they went a step further and disfigured them, cutting off their noses, 
among other things, during the 1994 massacres. Mukagasana, Diop, and Rurangwa’s 
response to this (post-)colonial legacy is nuanced. While the first two offer portraits that 
subvert traditional physiognomic reading grids, thus rendering Tutsi faces illegible; the 
latter took an opposite approach. Génocidé provides a template for making sense of 
Rurangwa’s disfigured appearance. I proposed to read this testimony as an invitation to 




not stage a voyeuristic fantasy of otherness. On the contrary, looking at Rurangwa reveals 
the trauma and pain of genocide violence.  
His faith in the meaningfulness of the face’s appearance inverts the deep mistrust 
with which faces are consistently regarded in Diop’s and especially Mukagasana’s works. 
Regardless of the myriad ways in which they write (or write off) the face, these three 
authors are bound by a common vision. In each of the texts studied above, the face 
appears as the symbol for a new politics of memory that seeks to rehabilitate the 
complexity of Tutsi identities, experiences, and bodies. The next chapter will focus on a 
popular figure of the Caribbean—the chabin—with a similar goal of looking through the 
veil of stereotypes that was cast over him. His face has been described as a dramatic 
juxtaposition of black and white features—a supposed sign of his angry personality. This 
parallel between facial appearance and psychological trait offers another example of 
physiognomy being exported beyond the boundaries of Europe, to a different location. 
Keeping in mind the specificity of this location, I examine how physiognomic 
imaginaries of the chabin have been used to interrogate what it means to be Martinican in 










“[N]ous autres, un peuple bâtard au visage 




Métissage and its Metaphors: From Local Rootedness to Global Branding 
 The question of what counts as métissage has prompted significant debate within 
academia, producing a body of scholarship that ranges from Glissant's seminal work on 
antillanité in the 1970’s to our current “Age of Critique” in which mixed race studies 
scholars “continue to grapple with unresolved tensions between identification and 
categorization and structure and agency.”156 While many disciplines have contributed to 
the discussion, métissage remains a poorly defined, and perhaps inherently undefinable, 
notion that straddles the line between biology, culture and politics.157  
And yet, or precisely for this reason, it has never been talked about as much as 
nowadays. Passed into everyday speech in French, the word has become a catch-all 
buzzword for just about “tous les phénomènes de mélange ou de fusion affectant la réalité 
sociale.”158 Some critics have even suggested that it is a constitutive part of everyone’s 
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identity. Indeed, in his essay La Découverte du monde, political journalist Edwy Plenel 
argues that “nous sommes tous tissés de cultures et d'identités, quoi que nous en ayons ou 
pensions. Tous mêlés. Tous issus de contaminations et d'influences, sans racine unique ni 
repère invariable,”159 a sentiment echoed by Tzvetan Todorov who remarked in a recent 
interview for Quebecois magazine “L'Actualité” that 
[n]ous sommes tous des métis, si on veut bien accorder au mot culture ce sens 
large qui est un ensemble de comportements, de règles que nous partageons avec 
d'autres et qui nous permettent de communiquer avec eux. Tout le monde 
participe de plusieurs règles de comportement, donc de plusieurs cultures, et nous 
apprenons à passer de l'une à l'autre avec la dextérité d'un jongleur.160  
 
Michel Serres adopts a similar stance in his essay on pedagogy, Le Tiers-Instruit (1991), 
which describes learning both in the classroom and beyond as a process of 
“crossbreeding,” whereby the self is reshaped and enriched through inter-subjective 
exchanges with others.161 The quest for knowledge and experience is a transformational 
journey, an invitation to venture beyond one's familiar horizons into unknown territory 
and to welcome difference, to embrace it in its variegated forms. Using the figure of 
Harlequin whose multicolored outfit points to the patchwork of experiences that 
fashioned him into a hybrid or “tiers-instruit,” Serres offers a new understanding of 
pedagogy as métissage.   
Yet one might wonder, if anyone is a métis simply by virtue of being in the world 
(Plenel/Todorov), or susceptible to become one over the course of their upbringing 
(Serres), does it still make sense to talk about métissage at all?  The astonishing ubiquity 
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with which the term has wound through our culture owes much to the combined effects 
of globalization and postmodernism. With the dissemination of technology, commodities, 
people and ideas across national borders, métissage has become the dominant paradigm 
of identity formation. Likewise, because it brings into play notions of deconstruction, 
“bricolage,” and hyphenation, it has found in today's academic discourse a critical 
breeding ground. 
The current popularity of the term should not overshadow its past significance. 
Indeed, the mantra of “we are all métis” is far from new. In 1289, someone like 
Jacquemars Giélée had already made clear that “Li mondes est […] mestis.”162 In the 
early seventeenth century, philosopher Pierre Charon worried that “[t]outes choses en ce 
monde sont mixtionnées et destrempées avec leurs contraires […]; tout est meslé, rien de 
pur entre nos mains”163 and in 1885 anthropologist Paul Topinard acknowledged that 
“[n]ous sommes tous des métis.”164 Over the course of the twentieth century, however, 
métissage took on a new meaning. Originally synonymous with racial miscegenation and 
degeneracy, it became a metaphor for our postmodern condition. This semantic 
transformation was part of a larger celebratory discourse privileging conceptual 
approaches that construe racial/ethnic identities as “baroque,” dynamic, and protean 
rather than atavistic and stable.  
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Postcolonial studies have actively participated in this process. Homi Bhabha's 
work has been instrumental in bringing the notion of hybridity to the forefront of 
scholarly attention. His essay The Location of Culture interrogates the relationship 
between identity and national belonging within the context of (post)colonial power 
relations.165 Against the idea of multiculturalism—one that endorses diversity while 
positing a normative, essentialist understanding of culture as a specific set of values and 
attitudes to which a given group would invariably identify—Bhabha proposes the idea of 
a “third space” in which colonizer and colonized come together to compound a shared 
culture. This interstitial space is not to be mistaken for a third term, a dialectical way of 
reconciling antagonistic attitudes. Rather, it is as a space of negotiation in which 
authority is challenged and subaltern agency reinscribed in a way that allows it to 
participate in the elaboration of “a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an 
assumed or imposed hierarchy.”166 Bhabha's reflection assumes that representations of 
cultural identity are best analyzed contextually—a view that Caribbean critic Roger 
Toumson also endorses in his essay Mythologie du métissage: “Résultant d’un mélange, 
le métis serait soumis à l’influence de plusieurs agents, ressentirait d’une façon qui lui est 
propre l’influence de ces divers agents. L’étymologie tendrait à le prouver 
(‘idiosyncrasie’: de ‘idio’ (particulier), ‘syncrasie’ (mélange), de ‘syn’ (avec) et ‘cratos’ 
(crase)).”167 Toumson's definition of métissage as idiosyncratic mixing challenges recent 
discourses that have described it as a universally shared trait of our condition. Moving 
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away from such discourses, this chapter will reframe métissage within the specific 
context of Caribbean history. 
In her essay Les Enfants de la colonie: Les métis de l'Empire français entre 
sujétion et citoyenneté,  Emmanuelle Saada contends that the status of métis children was 
largely debated in the colonies where the “code de l'indigénat”—a set of institutional 
laws distinguishing between French citizens and “indigenous” natives—was enforced 
(Indochina, New Caledonia, Algeria, Madagascar).168 In the old colonies (Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, Guyane), however, what she calls “la question métisse” never took on a 
political or social dimension because of a 1833 law that granted civic equality to free 
people of color, banning any mention of race or origins from official state-issued 
documents—a freedom that became even more prevalent after the abolition of slavery in 
1848. This does not mean that métissage was never an issue, but it was never a legal one. 
Instead, métissage was primarily experienced as a cultural predicament. 
In 1989, a group of three then-budding Martinican writers—Patrick Chamoiseau, 
Raphaël Confiant and Jean Bernabé—collaborated on a manifesto entitled Éloge de la 
créolité.169  According to them, “[l]e monde va en état de créolité,”170 meaning that 
processes of cultural intermixing have been reworking the parameters of collective and 
individual identities in ways that fully acknowledge what they call the “Divers.”171 
Following in Glissant's footsteps, Confiant, Chamoiseau and Bernabé construe the 
Caribbean as a laboratory in which the sudden confluence of people, cultures and ideas 
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that resulted for the most part from European colonization have given rise not just to new 
identities but new ways of thinking about identity. Their notion of créolité serves as a 
corrective to négritude's obsession with African rootedness. It also offers a counterpoint 
to antillanité, which they define as “le seul processus d'américanisation d'Européens, 
d'Africains et d'Asiatiques à travers l'archipel antillais.”172 While antillanité designates 
the degree to which a given culture adapts to a Carribean milieu, créolité refers to the 
circumstances under which this culture is not only assimilated by, but coexists with and 
even reshapes surrounding cultures. The notion offers striking parallels to Glissant's 
créolisation—a form of métissage characterized by unpredictable outcomes.  
A number of criticisms have been leveled against Eloge.173 To say that “[l]e 
monde va en état de créolité” is problematic in many ways. If indeed the world is 
becoming creolized, then créolité carries with it the possibility of being expanded to other 
non-Antillean areas. As Bernabé, Confiant and Chamoiseau observed, “[i]l existe donc 
une créolité antillaise, une créolité guyanaise, une créolité brésilienne, une créolité 
africaine, une créolité asiatique et une créolité polynésienne, assez dissemblables entre 
elles mais issues de la matrice du même maelström historique.”174 Mapping créolité 
across a variety of contexts might be a problematic gesture. What relationship does the 
expanded notion have with the original? What is cast aside, overlooked and forgotten in 
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the process? Bonniol raised a similar criticism when he resented that the word métissage 
lost its primary force and became a cliché as a result of its metaphorical extension. How 
does one negotiate between the necessity of contextual analysis that notions like créolité 
and métissage seem to require, and their new ubiquitous applicability, without 
jeopardizing their conceptual relevance?—a question that Bernabé, Confiant and 
Chamoiseau left unanswered. 
 In response to this conundrum, French anthropologist Jean-Loup Amselle has 
suggested to replace the notion of métissage, “trop marquée par la biologie,” with one 
borrowed from the field of electrical and computer engineering, that of “branchement,” 
by which he means “une dérivation de signifiés particularistes par rapport à un réseau de 
signifiants planétaires.”175 This notion allows him to bridge the gap between the local and 
the global that has been the object of interpretive controversy. Amselle challenges 
discourses that view our current globalized world as a catalyst for cultural mixings. 
According to him, the phenomenon of globalization is far older than we take it to be, 
which means that créolisation is not the by-product of “pure” influences that suddenly 
came together, but of already diverse ones. Operating on the assumption that cultures 
have always been open to the incursion of difference, he blames créolisation for 
reinforcing the essentialist logic that it paradoxically makes a point of denouncing.  
This perusal of scholarship on métissage seems to confirm our initial remark that 
there is something inherently undefinable about the notion. It has spawned a variegated 
vocabulary. Notions like hybridity, tiers-instruit, créolité, créolisation, branchement have 
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been used to designate a phenomenon that seems to elude the grasp of critics. It has 
served as an umbrella term that has allowed virtually anyone to identify as métis. It has 
been called “une des bannières du post-modernisme et d’un monde globalisé.”176 It has 
also been described as idiosyncratic mixing. This chain of signifiers suggests that any 
attempt to approximate métissage is partly doomed to miss its object, and can at best only 
mimic it. Indeed, metaphors and definitions of the notion are numerous, diverse, caught 
in a web of discourses where they are constantly reshaped. They are themselves métis. As 
I have started to suggest, this lexical inflation points to deeper epistemological and 
methodological issues. In reaction to the reified, mainstream use of the word, a number of 
scholars have called for a reappraisal of the notion, which they claim should be 
investigated in its context of formation. Against current discourses that have turned it into 
a cliché, closer attention needs to be paid to its local understandings as well as to the 
specificity of the lived experiences it has produced. 
This contextual approach is found in Chantal Maignan-Claverie’s essay Le 
Métissage dans la littérature des Antilles françaises: Le Complexe d’Ariel.177 In an 
attempt to counter our postmodern “mythology” of métissage, she engages in a 
topological and diachronic analysis of the term, delineating the successive stages in the 
evolution of how mixed-race Antilleans have been portrayed in literature. Such stages 
include the advent in seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries ethnographic accounts of the 
métis as a “homo duplex”; his portrayal in romantic literature as an avatar of “satan 
révolté”; how in the context of négritude, he became a figure of the assimilationist 
                                                          
176 Bonniol 2001, op. cit., p. 7. 




bourgeois; or more recently the way créolité has served as an aesthetic response to the 
existential crisis he faced in the wake of WWII and the departmentalization of 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Guyane. In this chapter, I intend to elaborate on Maignan-
Claverie’s analysis by investigating a specifically Caribbean form of métissage known as 
chabinité. In doing so, I seek to produce a narrative that circumvents postmodern, 
mythologizing discourses on intermixing and to reinstate the significance of contextual 
analysis. 
The notion of chabinité has received little critical attention so far. It has often 
been mistaken for a form of mulâtrisme. Indeed, the two words are often used 
interchangeably in everyday speech—a confusion that arises from the conceptual 
slipperiness of racial/phenotypical categories. For example, the Ti Diksyonné Kreyòl-
Franse: Dictionnaire élémentaire Créole Haïtien-Français defines the chabin as an 
“individu au teint clair et aux cheveux crépus” —a physical description that fails to 
differentiate him from the mulâtre, an individual of mixed black and white ancestry.178 
This is hardly surprising given the way the category of mulâtre has generally served as a 
synecdoche for a variety of other ethnonyms. In the sixteenth century, the word used to 
designate any “métis (en général).”179 While in the early stages of colonization, métis 
referred to the offspring of Europeans and Amerindians, it became synonymous with 
mulâtre, quadroons and octoroons when more and more métis assimilated into the white 
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majority. Due to these semantic overlaps, few scholarly works have been devoted to the 
chabin proper—a lack this chapter seeks to address.  
Another reason that chabinité has yielded so few studies has to do with the 
notion’s lack of applicability and resonance beyond the Caribbean.180 Raphaël Confiant 
(1951-), a prolific Martinican writer known for his efforts to rehabilitate Creole language 
and culture, the author of over thirty-seven novels, one of the forefathers of the créolité 
movement, and a self-proclaimed chabin, explained in an interview with scholar Lucien 
Taylor that “[i]t’s almost impossible for a non-Antillean to grasp the social significance 
of chabinité. […] I remember being interviewed several times in the U.S. by Charles 
Rowell for a journal called Callaloo, and he was completely unable to grasp what I was 
going on about. The very concept of chabinité seems out of bound in the black-white 
discourse of the States.” So what exactly is chabinité? And what is a chabin? 
 
“C'est quoi, un chabin?”181  
The emergence and evolution of ethnonyms have been thoroughly documented by 
scholars. While the majority of these terms are borrowed from Spanish and Portuguese, 
like métis, créole, and mulâtre; chabin is not. According to Edouard Le Héricher, its 
etymology can be traced back to the latin caper, meaning “bouc.”182 Chabin would be the 
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hissed form of cabre or cabe which is found in some Norman dialects, not to be mistaken 
with the Middle French cabre, derived from the latin “capra,” “chèvre,” and which 
eventually became câpre. In 1884, Littré defined chabin as “nom vulgaire des hybrides 
du bouc et de la brebis,”183  insisting that the term had become obsolete, although by 
1903 it was still used in the patois of Gaye, in Marne, to refer to a “peau de mouton teinte 
en bleu dont on garnit les colliers des chevaux de trait ou de labour.”184 In Unité de 
l’espèce humaine, Armand de Quatrefages suggests that chabins, to which he also refers 
as ovicâpres, originate from a “croisement des espèces chèvre et mouton.”  He goes on to 
add that this specific breed is difficult to obtain: “l’hybridation du mouton et de la chèvre 
est loin d’être aussi commune qu’on l’a prétendu, et […] elle est fort incertaine,”185 and 
that its fleece is of too poor quality to be used in any industrial way. Interestingly enough, 
while Quatrefages’s definition presents the chabin as the hybrid offspring of a chèvre and 
a mouton, Littré describes it as the progeny of a brebis and a bouc. Christian Meyer, in 
his Dictionnaire des sciences animales conflates the two definitions. According to him, 
the chabin is a “[h]ybride bouc x brebis ou bélier x chèvre. Il est très rarement obtenu.”186 
The 1965 edition of Le Larousse offers a fourth variation, defining it as a “race de 
moutons au poil grossier […]. Considérée à tort comme un hybride de la chèvre et du 
mouton.”187  This brief lexicographic inquiry yields interesting results. First, just like 
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câpre, mulâtre and métis, chabin was originally an agricultural/zoological term. Second, 
this series of ambiguous, if not conflictual, definitions raise the question of which breeds 
are necessary in the production of a chabin. No clear biological formula seems to account 
for its existence. This last characteristic also applies to chabin as an ethnonym. As 
Confiant remarked:  
[u]nlike the mulâtres (mixture of black and white) and câpres (mixture of mulâtre 
and black) there’s no racial grouping of chabins, discrete or otherwise. You can 
find chabins in any family: two very black parents could have a chabin, mulâtres 
can give birth to chabins, and so on—just like chabins can have a mulâtre baby. 
[…] Chabins are an accident of history, apparently something to do with the 
chromosomes of some of the early white settlers and the Africans. In the chabin, 
you see both elements, white and black. We have light skin and clear eyes—often 
they’re green—but we have an African physiognomy. We’re clear with nègre 
features. Our hair is light or red, but it’s always kinky. So when you look at a 
chabin, you immediately see the two races, each setting the other off in relief.188   
 
Confiant decribes the chabin as a living embodiment of métissage both by virtue of his 
mixed origins and the unpredictable circumstances of his birth. In doing so, he invalidates 
certain definitions that have excluded chabinité from the various degrees of métissage 
that constitute the racial make-up of the Caribbean. Such definitions claim that only those 
born to parents of different “racial” backgrounds qualify as métis.189 Yet, as Confiant 
indicates, racial determinism plays little role in accounting for the chabin’s birth. 
While the word shares an animalistic origin with other ethnonyms like mulâtre 
and câpre, it is, unlike them, nowhere to be found in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
racial taxonomies, whether it be Cornelius de Pauw’s or Hilliard d’Auberteuil’s. Even 
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Moreau de Saint-Méry’s monumental Description topographique, physique, civile, 
politique et historique de la partie française de l'isle Saint-Domingue makes no mention 
of him whatsoever.190 A Creole colonist, historian and slave owner born in Martinique, 
Moreau de Saint-Méry studied law in Paris and became a jurist before travelling to Haïti 
in 1776. In 1797, he published what is considered his most notable essay, a throughly 
detailed account of his stay there, only years before the slave revolt broke out. Although 
wide in scope, Saint-Méry's Description is mostly known for the 20-page typology of 
skin color it comprises. Elaborating on De Pauw and Hilliard d’Auberteuil’s research, 
Description starts off listing eleven racial categories: “blancs,” “nègres,” “mulâtres,” 
“quarterons,” “métifs,” “mameloucs,” “quateronnés,” “sang-mêlés,” “sacatras,” “griffes,” 
and “marabous.” Traced back over seven generations, these eleven categories ultimately 
turn into 128 phenotypes, the underlying assumption being that skin color and facial 
features both function as indicators of race. Examples are legion and range from the 
mulâtre's “caractère laineux dans les cheveux,”191 the quarteron's freckles, the griffe's 
“figure désagréable,” the caraïbes' face, “triste et moins agréable que celle des 
mulâtres,”192 to the Indiens Orientaux's “nez [...] élevé, et leurs cheveux […] très 
longs.”193 And yet, despite the exhaustive nature of his work, despite the 128 phenotypes 
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he referenced, despite the sea of publications on race and color that flooded Europe at the 
time, the chabin was nowhere to be found. 
De Pauw, Hilliard d’Auberteuil, and Saint-Méry failed to acknowledge his 
presence because their works posit an understanding of race that his very appearance 
undermines. As the only brand of métissage in which heredity does not produce the 
physical traits one would expect to encounter, chabinité challenges the colorist ideology 
that informed eighteenth-century anthropological discourse. The chabin’s traits do not 
fall within any of the conventional categories used at the time, but are randomly 
distributed across them. As such, they call into question the biological shortcuts that gave 
rise to colonial descriptions of the métis’s body.  
While scholars have singled out Saint-Méry Description for its exhaustive 
taxonomy of color variation, relatively few have remarked upon its methodological flaws. 
Doris Garraway has shown how “at every turn, the tabulations seem only to suggest the 
absurdity of dividing humanity by degrees of skin color, for even Moreau cannot quite 
decide to what extent heredity drives physical appearance.”194 On multiple occasions, he 
admits that inconsistencies between skin color and the corresponding racial category are 
likely to arise. A mulâtre may, for example, be of a darker complexion than a câpre 
although câpres are technically 3/4 black and mulâtres 1/2. Aware these inconsistencies, 
Saint-Méry devised a “mathematical coefficient as a surer way to delimit genetically 
determined color categories.”195 Under this new measurement, mulâtres range from 49 to 
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70 parts white and quarterons from 71 to 100. As for the eighth generation of sang-
mêlés, it is described as one-part black to 8,191 parts white. In such extreme cases where 
the trace of blackness is hardly detectable, Saint-Méry contends that “si ce n’est pas dans 
la couleur que l’indice [du mélange Africain] se rencontre, il est dans l’assemblage des 
traits, dans un nez épaté, dans des lèvres épaisses, qui ne montrent que trop l’origine,” 
thus formulating what I believe to be a proto-description of the chabin.196  
 
Chabinité and the Phenomenological Gaze 
Saint-Méry’s Description suggests that at stake in the question of métissage is that 
of sense perception. Recognition of the métis’s mixed background is generally 
determined by the capacity to detect, on the surface of her/his body, visible traits that are 
interpreted as the emanation of hereditary characters. Yet the reason he and other 
explorers/anthropologists failed to incorporate chabinité into racial taxonomies owes to 
the ways in which it complicates the relationship between phenotype and heredity.  
 Definitions and descriptions of chabins unequivocally testify to this. They all 
sanction his face as a locus where his difference manifests in the most direct, yet 
perplexing way—a locus where his features are dramatically offered to perception, but 
cannot be read because their combination defies traditional expectations. As Raphaël 
Confiant wrote, “[le chabin] porte sur son visage […], et cela de manière spectaculaire, 
les marques des deux races qui lui ont donné naissance: peau généralement claire + traits 
généralement négroïdes; cheveux généralement clairs, voire parfois roux + grain de 
                                                          




cheveu généralement crépu; yeux souvent clairs parfois bleus ou verts.”197 In an 
investigation he conducted on behalf of UNESCO to examine dynamics of ethnic/racial 
integration in France, Michel Leiris similarly referred to the chabin's face not as a 
harmonious blend of black and white features—a characteristic more commonly observed 
in mulâtres—but “une combinaison paradoxale de traits des races noire et blanche.”198 
Valérie Loichot described him as the embodiment of “l’écriture même des lacs et 
entrelacs des cultures qui le forment et qui se disputent en lui. Leur dialogue n’a 
cependant ni la douceur du chant, ni la logique du débat, mais est plutôt cri violent, érayé, 
tout comme le visage est rayé de la difference,”199 echoing Chantal Maignan-Claverie for 
whom the chabin's face is a visual enigma that undermines patterns of racial 
classification, a symbol of the “déconstruction analytique des codes et des classifications 
qui fondent la civilisation.”200  
In what follows, I examine how, by resisting the classificatory impulse of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries anthropology, the chabin has interrogated the 
process through which facial difference is assigned. In the absence of a clear racial 
category to describe him, how has he been perceived? My first part focuses on 
representations of chabinité in a metropolitan French context and analyzes descriptions of 
Alexandre Privat d’Anglemont (1815-1859), a Guadeloupean writer and journalist who 
spent most of his adult life in Paris as a bohemian. Portraits of him appeared in 
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newspapers, novels, essays, and diaries. Despite their variety, they all appealed to 
physiognomy by equating his appearance with a form of exoticism. My second part 
provides a counterpoint to the first one in its examination of two contemporary 
Martinican authors: Raphaël Confiant, both a theoretician of and writer on chabinité, and 
Max Élisée (1947-), who first started his artistic career in film as an assistant director (he 
collaborated on Jacques Deray’s Borsalino) before becoming a scriptwriter and a 
novelist. Drawing on a corpus that includes Eau de café,201 Ravines du devant-jour,202 
Mémoires d’un chabin,203 and Le Cahier de romances,204 I argue that Confiant and Élisée 
attempt to reframe our perception of métissage and counter nineteenth-century discourses 
of exoticism by laying out the principles for a phenomenology of chabinité—one that 
simultaneously draws on, confronts, and rewrites Fanon’s phenomenology of blackness. 
One might object that the scope of this chapter leaves aside female chabins, 
otherwise known as chabines. While chabins have clearly been differentiated from other 
“racial” groups, literary and iconographic representations of chabines tend to offer very 
little variation from other female métisses like câpresses or mulâtresses in the sense that 
they are usually portrayed as sensual, if not sexual.205 This difference in treatment is 
certainly worth investigating. This chapter will, however, limit discussion to the chabin. 
In doing so, it is my hope to continue recent attempts to decolonize our global, 
mythologized imaginary of métissage. 
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Chabinité Through the Prism of Nineteenth-Century Paris: The Example of 
Alexandre Privat d’Anglemont 
      
 “Quel drôle de corps qu’un dandy!”206 
 —Denon 
  
 It was not until the first half of the nineteenth century and Alexandre Privat 
d’Anglemont’s introduction into the artistic circles of Paris that the first portrayals of 
chabinité appeared. Little is known about his life and the bits of information that have 
been collected over time should be looked at with great caution. Indeed, whenever he 
shared personal details, Privat would always take pleasure in confusing his interlocutors, 
which caused his close friend Théodore de Banville to call him a “menteur infatigable, 
inouï, d’une invention prodigieuse. Pour menteur, il le fut, au moins autant que le 
Dorante de Corneille.”207 Despite repeated attempts to inquire about his friend’s past, 
Banville was never able to find out much: “Vingt fois, dans ses moments d’effusion, il 
m’a dit qu’il obéissait à un besoin impérieux en me racontant son histoire, et il me la 
racontait, en effet, avec les détails les plus précis, ayant le caractère d’une évidente 
réalité; seulement, elle était chaque fois différente!”208 Any attempt to draw up his 
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biography is likely to fail, at least in part, given the difficulty to separate fact from 
fiction, reality from fantasy when it comes to his life. 
Although Privat’s date of birth remained unclear for a long time, we do know that 
he was born on August 21st, 1815, in the town of Sainte-Rose, Guadeloupe (and not in 
Martinique as journalist Charles Monselet claimed) from a well-off family.209 After the 
early death of his parents, he fell under the supervision of his older brother, Élie, and was 
sent to Paris to receive his education, first at the lycée Henri IV where he befriended 
Louis-Philippe’s son, the duke of Montpensier, then at the School of Medicine. However, 
he quickly gave up to embrace the bohemian lifestyle for which he became famous. A 
regular at the Procope café, the Grande-Chaumière and the Hôtel Corneille, he earned a 
sulfurous reputation among women who particularly enjoyed his elegance and atypical 
good looks. Privat gravitated toward different artistic milieus. As Jack Corzani wrote, “il 
s’en prit […] à tous les tenants du néo-classicisme, à toutes les ‘perruques,’ à tout ce qui 
touchait de près ou de loin à l’Académie. Il fréquenta la Bohème, se lia avec Murger, 
Vitre, Delvau, Schaune, Champfleury, se mêla aux artistes du quartier Notre-Dame de 
Lorette, fit un temps parti des jeunes romantiques de la rue Lepelletier.”210 Élie regularly 
sent him a pension that he would squander in no time.211 To survive, Privat published 
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articles in Le Corsaire, L’Artiste, Le Figaro, Alexandre Dumas’s Le Mousquetaire, and 
Le Siècle. In 1843, he met Baudelaire with whom he formed a lasting friendship. The 
“Lion roux,” as he was called, also befriended Balzac, Musset, Méry and Sue of whom he 
was believed to be the ghost writer.212 While his two major works, Paris anecdote (1854) 
and Paris inconnu (1861), offer valuable insight into pre-Second Empire Paris, they 
never propelled him into the literary spotlight that his friends enjoyed. Yet Privat did 
have talent. In La Lorgnette littéraire, Monselet recounts how one evening, as he was 
playing whist at the British embassy, he impressed the Princess of Bogdanoff and the 
Duchess of B*** with his verses.213  While one of his contemporaries, Georges 
Dairnvaell, resented that he was too “lazy”214—an impression shared by Firmin Maillard 
who described Privat as “mou, nonchalant”215—this alone, if ever it was true, does not 
account for his lack of notoriety. On many occasions, Privat was denied authorship of his 
works and he never bothered to reclaim it.216 Perhaps more than his supposed laziness, 
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the degree of detachment with which he considered his own work is a greater indication 
of his partial “failure” as a writer.  
If Privat’s literary production remained scarce, a lot has been written about him, 
especially upon his death in 1859, including eulogies, newspapers articles, bibliographies, 
literary testimonies, and more recently, a few scholarly publications that have insisted on 
his affiliation with Parisian bohemia, often comparing him with Henry Murger (1822-
1861) and other “Water Drinkers.” My objective is not to dismiss the relevance of such 
comparisons, but to suggest an alternate designation for Privat, one that will shed new 
light on his life, his work, and the way his métissage has been viewed—that of dandy. 
Although dandyism originated in England in the late eighteenth century, it only 
gained momentum in France toward the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. What first 
characterized the movement was its sartorial dimension. French Aristocrats would don 
sophisticated outfits in order to stand out from the masses and reassert a sense of 
individuality. Doing so was also a way to deny the egalitarian values celebrated by the 
revolution of 1789. But as the Bourbon restoration came to an end, dandyism underwent 
a radical transformation. Nobility slowly eroded. Mundane careers were no longer limited 
to the aristocracy, but could be pursued by anyone who tried their luck—artists, 
politicians, journalists, etc.—and a new conception of sociality emerged as the “café” and 
the club began to replace the salon. As a consequence, dandyism began to make its way 
into bohemian circles. The aristocratic model that had prevailed had to make room for a 
literary dandyism that primarily drew members from Parisian bohemia where Privat had 
made a name for himself. This new model substituted a culture of materialism for one of 




and ability to manipulate language. This dandyism endowed the movement with a degree 
of recognition and legitimacy that aristocrats, in their celebration of the futile, were never 
able to achieve. More than a taste for material elegance, it became a moral philosophy, a 
metaphysical quest for meaning in a world dominated by bourgeois consumerism, and an 
aesthetic response to the “mal du siècle” that plagued the Romantics.217  
 In many respects, Privat fit the profile of the literary dandy. A regular at many 
Parisian “cafés” where he would meet his friends, some of the most famous dandies of 
the time like Eugène Sue and Théodore de Banville, Privat developed an aversion for any 
type of work, because he viewed labor as yet another avatar of bourgeois rationalism. 
Only when he was compelled by life circumstances and lack of money did he write. His 
articles and short novels, whose fate he completely disregarded, exhibit some of the most 
salient characteristics of “dandy prose”: a concern for the ephemeral, the circumstantial, 
and a propensity to aestheticize everyday life. Privat was also famous for his repartee as 
well as his tendency to distort the truth. Many stories and rumors have been circulated 
about him, most of them told by him; very few have been verified.  
 Although a literary dandy, he still maintained the elegance and grace that 
characterized aristocratic dandies. Practically every single allusion to Privat includes 
some sort of commentary on his physical appearance, almost as a passage obligé. If few 
were familiar with his work, many had an idea of what he looked like. In Les Poètes de la 
Guadeloupe, Dupland describes him as a “magnifique ‘chabin,’ au visage parsemé de 
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taches de rousseur, […] aux yeux gris brillants d’intelligence, aux épais cheveux roux 
crépus, […] connu de tous les étudiants et admiré de nombreuses étudiantes ou 
lorettes.”218 His description echoes that of Victor Cochinat who wrote in a eulogy that 
was published the week after Privat’s death: 
[D]es yeux gris et pleins de feu rayonnant sur son visage que des taches de 
rousseur ne déparaient même pas, attiraient sur lui l’attention même des 
indifférents; enfin, pour couronner cet ensemble peu commun, surmontez-le d’une 
chevelure plantureuse, crépue et tirant sur le roux, et vous n’aurez pas de peine à 
vous figurer quelle figure originale et fantasque avaient sous les yeux, en l’an de 
grace mil huit cent trente-quatre, les dames qui s’épanouissaient à la Chaumière et 
les jeunes hommes qui campaient au café Procope. Aussi Privat d’Anglemont 
était-il à cette époque le lion roux de ces deux établissements 
presqu’universitaires.219  
 
Privat displayed all the features typically attributed to chabins, from his light skin and 
eyes to his kinky red hair which earned him the famous nickname “lion roux.” His 
appearance made him an object of public attention and helped him win the favors of 
young ladies. The seductive power of his chabinité is also evoked in Martinican writer 
Cabort-Masson’s historical novel La Mangrove mulâtre. Privat is referred to as “le sacré 
Chabin,”220 “le Lion Roux,” and, perhaps more revealing, “[l]e plus grand baiseur de 
Paris.”221  
Other portraits insist on his uncanny resemblance to Alexandre Dumas. For 
example, Charles Monselet claimed that “[c]’était un grand diable de créole, la tête 
couverte d’une chevelure épaisse et laineuse à la façon d’Alexandre Dumas, avec lequel 
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les gens du peuple lui trouvaient une sorte de resemblance.”222 Similarly, Jean-Léo 
remarked that “[b]ien qu’il eut du sang mêlé dans les veines, sa peau était blanche, mais 
sa chevelure était noire et laineuse comme celle d’Alexandre Dumas, […] il faisait figure 
de lion.”223 Another example is found in Jules Renoult’s 1859 Bulletin littéraire de la 
revue de Toulouse. One day, during lunch with Balzac at the École de natation, Renoult 
recalls that Privat suddenly appeared in a bathrobe. Despite being very close to Privat, 
Balzac failed to recognize him, “trompé par le blanc linceul qui grandissait ce mulâtre et 
donnait une expression inusitée à cette tête bronzée et couronnée d’une laine noire, 
épaisse et crépue.”224 He mistook Privat for Alexandre Dumas. Renoult reports that in a 
spirit of mischief, Privat never bothered to clear up this misunderstanding, preferring to 
go along with it.  
Portraits of Privat are ambiguous, to say the least. On the one hand, most of them 
appeared in newspapers’ eulogies and posthumous literary tributes. The context in which 
such portraits were published testifies to Privat’s successful integration into Parisian 
society—only a Frenchman could be given such honors at the time. On the other hand, 
these descriptions tend to fetishize his appearance. The fascination for Privat’s métissage 
finds a stylistic echo in the metonymic focus on his face, which isolates it in a “close-up” 
and turns it into an object of curiosity to be examined and dissected. While the 
publication context of these descriptions suggests that Privat integrated into Parisian 
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society, their content points to the irreducible distance that separated him from his 
friends.  
Interestingly enough, the way Privat was compared to Dumas—a quadroon if one 
is to abide by eighteenth-century racial categories, although he has often been referred to 
as a mulâtre—reveals an incapacity to envision chabinité in and of itself. As mentioned 
earlier, the categories of mulâtre and chabin have often been confused with one another. 
It is very possible that the word chabin was unknown to Monselet, Cochinat, and perhaps 
Jean-Léo. It has only been applied to Privat retrospectively, by Dupland in 1978 and 
Cabort-Masson in 1986, but never in his lifetime. His closest friend, Banville, portrayed 
him thus: “Il avait du sang mêlé dans les veines; cependant ses mains et son visage, sur 
lequel courait une barbe légère, étaient extrêmement blancs, et ses yeux couleur d’or 
contrastaient bizarrement avec sa longue chevelure crépue, épaisse et noire. On a pris 
souvent Privat pour Alexandre Dumas père, auquel il ne ressemblait pas du tout.”225 
Traces of chabinité can be found in the adverb of degree “extrêmement” which denotes 
the violence of his métissage and in the “bizarre” contrast of his hair and eye color. While 
Banville did not believe that Privat looked like Dumas, one cannot help but see in his 
“yeux couleur d’or”—a topos of exotic portraiture—a resemblance with another literary 
figure: Paquita Valdes, the heroin of Balzac’s novella La Fille aux yeux d’or.226 
Privat never wrote about himself or his origins. This disinterest in anything 
remotely related to his native Caribbean is best exemplified by what Cochinat describes 
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as “une des plus grandes excentricités de [sa] vie.”227 Compelled by his brother to return 
to Guadeloupe and sort out his family finances, Privat crossed the Atlantic, visited a 
clerk, signed a guardian’s account and, word has it, left the island the next morning after 
spending a total of twenty-three hours there. Another episode which testifies to his strong 
attachment to Paris and disregard for Guadeloupe occurred in the days preceding his 
death. Hospitalized for a bad case of tuberculosis, Privat was advised by his doctors to go 
back to Sainte-Rose in the hope that his health would improve. According to Jean-Léo, 
“un retour à son île natale l’aurait peut-être sauvé, mais Privat aimait mieux mourir à 
Paris que de vivre ailleurs.”228   
How are we, then, to understand Privat’s rejection of his Guadeloupean origins? 
The notion of dandyism, which I have suggested as an alternate category to that of 
“bohemian,” provides part of the answer. When the movement reached Paris in the early 
nineteenth-century, it merged with Romanticism and became a pursuit of individuality or 
as Walter Benjamin put it, “[a] burning desire to create a personal form of originality.”229 
French dandies had a political agenda. In cultivating their artistic superiority, they sought 
to reject the kind of bourgeois utilitarianism and rationality brought about by the 
Revolution of 1830. Dandyism was a form of escapism, an aesthetic refuge from the 
alienation of industrial society, an antidote to “mal du siècle.” But, perhaps more than 
“mal du siècle,” what Privat sought to avoid was another evil, one that ran deep within 
Caribbean society: “le préjugé de couleur,” or the use of skin tone as the organizing 
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principle of social, political and economic life.230 Dandyism allowed Privat to reinvent 
himself as a Parisian. By settling there, he was not only able to escape the fate his status 
of métis would have laid out for him overseas, but he worked his way into the most 
prestigious artistic circles of the capital. While he was able to turn his body—his face—
into a badge of individuality, that same body would have exposed him to persecution in 
Guadeloupe where racial prejudice was commonplace. Although the role of dandy that he 
took on still confined him to a marginal position, it is a marginality that he chose, not one 
that was forced upon him. Privat’s story is that of an Antillean who transfigured his 
métissage into a mark of distinction to become a nineteenth-century dandy. Ironically, 
while he sought to escape the consequences to which his chabinité would have subjected 
him in Guadeloupe, it is the same chabinité that propelled him to recognition in Paris. 
This recognition was, however, problematic. It is as an exotic other that Privat became 
famous. Most descriptions of the young man insist on his Creole charm and unusual 
features. They offer a significant number of variations (sometimes comparing him to 
Dumas, sometimes denying their resemblance; sometimes describing him as dark-haired, 
sometimes as red-haired) that ultimately sabotage their mimetic purpose. The chabin’s 
face resists the codes of literary portraiture. Portraits of Privat paradoxically do not show 
much, except perhaps their own difficulty in conveying what he looked like. Malraux’s 
famous assertion that “[p]lus Balzac décrit un visage, moins je vois le visage qu’il décrit” 
could very well apply here.231 Despite, or precisely because of the numerous portraits it 
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inspired, Privat’s face is difficult to “picture.” All the more so as it is caught in the lens of 
exoticism—a reading grid that obfuscates more than it reveals, that de-faces more than it 
represents. 
 
White Skin, Black Mask: Raphaël Confiant’s “Phenomenology of Chabinité” 
 Few literary mentions of chabins are found in the century following Privat’s 
death. Published in 1918, Apollinaire’s “Les Fenêtres” is one notable exception. This 
poem can be read as a quick succession of tableaux respectively set in “Paris Vancouver 
Hyères Maintenon New-York et les Antilles.”232 This last location conjures up a 
reference to “[l]es Chabins [qui] chantent des airs à mourir/Aux Chabines maronnes,” 
thereby allowing Apollinaire to offer a window onto the Caribbean, and giving his French 
readership an opportunity to catch a glimpse of what continues to remain an overlooked 
figure of métissage despite the level of attention Privat had garnered in the previous 
century.233 Even in French Caribbean literature, chabins remained very sporadic. Jean-
Louis Baghio’o (1910-1994) was one of few authors to feature them as characters in his 
novels although they often occupied marginal positions. In Issandre le mulâtre (1949), all 
they do is stride across the Fort-de-France savane or dance the Caleinde.234 Their lack of 
psychological development underscores their basic narrative function, which is to provide 
“couleur locale.”   
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In its mission to celebrate the racial make-up of Caribbean societies, créolité 
brought chabins to the forefront of attention. Over the past three decades, French 
Caribbean literature has portrayed them in a variety of ways. For example, in his novel 
Chemin de la mangrove (1999), Martinican writer José Le Moigne (1944-) describes the 
character of Sonson as 
un petit homme sans âge, sec et ridé comme un maracudja. Son teint très clair, 
brûlé par le sel marin, ses yeux virant du gris au bleu au gré de la lumière, 
témoignaient, à tout jamais, de l’ordre ancien du viol colonial. [...] “Je suis 
chabin, mon bougre! Les chabins sont des êtres à part. Ils ont reçu en héritage la 
peau blanche, semée de son des anciens maîtres, toute leur violence, mais rien de 
leur puissance.”235  
 
The violent contrasts in his face act as a metaphor for the brutality of the colonial rape 
that engendered him. Such contrasts are a recurrent trope of chabin portraiture. In Solibo 
magnifique, Chamoiseau evokes a “chabin rouge”236 and in Texaco, he insists on the 
“couleur pistache”237 of his skin. Gisèle Pineau’s novel L’Espérance-Macadam features a 
“chabin à tics,”238 and Paul Grasselli’s poem “Ba moin en tit l’argent” portrays an 
“étrange chabin, à barbe rousse et drue”239—physical traits that also characterize Derek 
Walcott’s narrator and main protagonist of “The Schooner Flight”:   
I know these islands from Monos to Nassau, 
a rusty head sailor with sea-green eyes 
that they nickname Shabine, the patois for 
any red nigger, and I, Shabine, saw 
when these slums of empire was paradise. 
I’m just a red nigger who love the sea, 
I had a sound colonial education, 
I have Dutch, nigger, and English in me, 
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and either I’m nobody, or I’m a nation,240  
 
Shabine’s mixed origins and appearance produce in him a sense of inadequacy 
dramatized by the syntactic hesitation (“either… or…”) in the last line. The violence of 
his métissage leads to a crisis of subjectivity. His chabinité is construed in absolute terms, 
both as a lack of being (denoted by the use of restrictive structures: “I’m just a red 
nigger,” and the word “nobody”) and an excess in which the self loses its autonomy (“a 
nation,” “these islands from Monos to Nassau”).  
Not only did créolité contribute to the literary fame of chabins, but it also 
foregrounded new ways of looking at them. In their essay, Eloge de la créolité, Bernabé, 
Chamoiseau, and Confiant state the need for a literature that should renounce Western 
regimes of representation, shatter the exotic frameworks that have informed portrayals of 
(post)colonial others, and account for the mechanisms of oppression that have impacted 
their lives. Éloge's approach may be best described as an archeology of the Caribbean 
subject, one geared toward recovering what has been buried under layers of 
“frenchification” to create the conditions for an authentic reassessment of “ce qu’est 
l’Antillais.”241 Doing so entails a perspectival shift. In reaction to the fact that Antilleans 
have always been fundamentally “frappés d'extériorité,” Bernabé, Confiant, and 
Chamoiseau advocate the development of an interior vision, whereby they mean a new, 
unmediated gaze, “[u]n regard neuf qui enlèverait notre naturel du secondaire ou de la 
périphérie afin de le replacer au centre de nous-mêmes. Un peu de ce regard d'enfance, 
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questionneur de tout, qui n'a pas encore ses postulats et qui interroge même les 
évidences.”242 As such, créolité belongs to a tradition of Pan-African thought that 
stretches back to W.E.B. Du Bois, the first to outline what critics have called 
“postcolonial phenomenology.”243 One could very well argue that all phenomenology is 
postcolonial in the sense that it begins with a bracketing of the natural attitude, that is, a 
suspension of judgement, whereby one momentarily puts aside her/his repertoires of 
knowledge, beliefs, and experiences, and casts on the world a questioning eye, one akin 
to Éloge's “regard neuf,” in order to strip phenomena of any symbolic meaning until they 
appear to consciousness in their “pure” form, ready for analysis. 
Phenomenology can be postcolonial in a different way, not simply by virtue of its 
methodology but as a discipline based on “the self-reflective descriptions of the 
constituting activities of the consciousness of Africana peoples.”244 In this sense, a major 
contributor to the discipline was Frantz Fanon, whose work engages, among other things, 
with issues of subject formation under colonialism and what it means to live as a 
“Negro.” The experience of blackness is one he explored at length in his 1952 essay Peau 
noire, masques blancs.245 Building on the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, 
Fanon described the role of the European white gaze in the construction of racialized 
identities and the ways in which such identities produce a psycho-existential trauma or 
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inferiority complex that precludes black men from the possibility of achieving true self-
consciousness. 
“L'Antillais est avant tout un Noir,” Fanon wrote.246 His work was largely based 
on the assumption that processes of racialization systematically mark the “Africana 
subject” as black and that black skin constitutes a metonymic quality of her/his body. 
What I ask in response is: where does one position the chabin, for whom blackness is not 
always perceived as a given, within this economy of racial representation? And how far 
do the conceptual tools forged by Fanon account for the range of experiences to which 
his white skin has subjected him? I will now focus on the chabin's physiognomy as a 
starting point to show how Confiant and Élisée sketch the contours of a phenomenology 
that breaks away from a double tradition. Not only does it address the shortcomings of 
eighteenth-century discourses on métissage, but it also rewrites Fanon's account of racial 
embodiment in a way that foregrounds the lived experience of chabinité. 
To be sure, Confiant's experience of chabinité offers a number of parallels to 
Fanon's account of black embodiment. The scrutiny and abuses to which the former's 
body has been subjected recalls the latter's confrontation with the colonial gaze. In one of 
Peau noire's most emblematic scenes, Fanon describes his entrance into “the white 
world” in terms of an encounter with a child who repeatedly calls him a “nègre.” The 
violence of the word leads Fanon to rethink the constitution of his “corporeal schema”: 
“Ce jour-là, désorienté, incapable d’être dehors avec l’autre, le Blanc, qui, impitoyable, 
m’emprisonnait, je me portai loin de mon être-là, très loin, me constituant objet. Qu’était-
                                                          




ce pour moi, sinon un décollement, un arrachement, une hémorragie qui caillait du sang 
noir sur tout mon corps?”247 The way he becomes aware of his body as that of another is 
described as a violent form of dispossession, “un décollement, un arrachement, une 
hémorragie” that I propose to read as an act of bracketing. Indeed, the stripping of black 
skin recalls phenomenology's modus operandi, which consists in peeling away the layers 
of meaning accreted onto phenomena to analyze them in an indiscriminate fashion. Fanon 
achieves a form of “double consciousness.” For the first time, he views himself through 
the eyes of his observer—as a cannibal, a slave, a savage—and in doing so, complies 
with the demand of having to exist not just for himself but for the white other. The 
imposition of this “epidermal racial schema” sheds light on the extent to which racialized 
subjects appear limited in their freedom by the conditions of their embodiment. 
In Ravines du devant-jour, the young chabin becomes aware of his physical 
difference under similar circumstances, after his neighbor Man Cia hurls a series of 
insults at him: “Espèce de mauvaise race de chabin! Espèce de chabin aux poils suris! 
Chabin au visage tacheté comme un coq d'Inde! Chabin tiqueté comme une banane 
mûre!”248 These invectives trigger in him an epiphany that recalls Fanon's reaction upon 
being called a “nègre”: 
Le mot te pétrifie pour la première fois de ton existence: chabin! D'ordinaire, il est 
prononcé avec gentillesse par ceux qui t'entourent encore qu'il t'est arrivé de 
t'étonner qu'on te désigne toujours par ce vocable tandis qu'on ne dit jamais 'noir' 
ou 'mulâtre' à tout propos aux gens de cette complexion. Tu sens confusément que 
le chabin est un être à part. Nègre et pas nègre, blanc et pas blanc à la fois.249  
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Man Cia's remarks lead to a series of linguistic revelations. For the first time, the word 
chabin appears in a variety of forms and uses that Confiant had never suspected before. 
First, as a contronym, a term with two opposite meanings that underscore the challenges 
of racial self-identification (to be a chabin is to be simultaneously black and white). 
Second, as a metonym, that is, a form of address that reduces, in essentialist fashion, 
Confiant's identity to his phenotype. Third, and perhaps most importantly, as an insult, 
the word acquiring in Man Cia's mouth an aggressive charge that leaves the young boy 
baffled. Similar insults appear throughout Le Cahier de romances. While Confiant's 
classmates at the lycée Schoelcher often call him a “Chaben! Chaben prel si! (Chabin! 
Chabin aux poils suris!),”250 his sworn enemy of Grande-Anse, Étienne, nicknamed him 
“Djôl zanndoli (Gueule de lézard-annolis)” due to the “rousseur crépue” of his hair, his 
“lèvres trop minces” and the “pâleur de christophine mûrie” of his complexion.251 These 
insults are symptomatic of how chabins have been perceived in the collective imaginary 
of the Caribbean. They are often referred to as evil and inauspicious, their whiteness is 
seen as disturbingly unnatural, and they are known for their raw sensitivity and bellicose 
disposition, which explains why Confiant's grandmother, Man Yise, is so disconcerted by 
her grandson's calm demeanor: 
‘[U]n chabin mol? Mais c’est impossible! IMPOSSIBLE! Un chabin, ça 
crie, ça trépigne, ça frappe, ça injurie, ça menace. Jamais ça ne mollit, mon 
vieux!’ 
De ce jour naît ta férocité. […] 
Tu te rassures en ton for intérieur dès que le plus petit doute menace de 
t’assaillir: ‘Je suis un chabin. Un chabin, c’est raide! C’est fort! C’est méchant! 
Le monde entier craint les chabins. Nous sommes une race de mâles-bougres.’ 
Mais, certains soirs, sur ton oreiller, quand il ne sert plus à rien de bravacher 
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devant tes pairs, tu laisses des larmes tièdes sinuer sur les pommes de ta figure. 
Au matin, tu contemples ton tiquetage de coq d’Inde, autrement dit tes taches de 
rousseur, devant le miroir de la salle de bains. Tu as beau les presser, les purger 
de toutes tes forces, rien n’y fait: tu demeures la pire espèce de vieux chabin 
laid.252 
 
Man Yise acts as a physiognomist when she interprets Confiant's métissage as the sign of 
his angry personality. According to her, there are expectations of how chabins should 
behave; her initial surprise originates from his failure to fulfil them (“Un chabin mol? 
Mais c’est impossible!”). In order for Confiant to find his place in society, he must 
comply with the injunction to aggressiveness that his difference entails (“De ce jour naît 
ta férocité”), but doing so proves challenging because he does not feel a natural 
inclination to act that way. On the contrary, the young boy is often overwhelmed to the 
point of tears and wishes he were different. What Man Yise takes to be a natural 
disposition of chabins is disclosed as a performance, a social demand with which 
Confiant feels very much at odds. The persona he is compelled to adopt has, indeed, no 
common measure with what he believes himself to be. In front of the bathroom mirror, 
the young boy experiences his “tiquetage de coq d'Inde” as a stigma in the sense that 
Erving Goffman gave to the word, that is to say, a discrediting attribute or “language of 
relationships” which “constitutes a special discrepancy between virtual and actual social 
identity.”253 By “virtual social identity,” Goffman means the set of expectations and 
anticipated attributes that we assign to strangers when we first come into their presence. 
Stigmatization originates when the attributes someone is “proved to possess” fail to 
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conform to our notion of what they ought to be: “He is thus reduced in our minds from a 
whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.”254 This definition implicitly builds 
on a model of intersubjective recognition that was already at work in Fanon's account of 
racialization. The psychological doubling he experiences on the train stems from a gap 
between his own perception of himself and the white boy's. It is the same gap that 
Confiant becomes aware of upon looking at himself—one that finds an echo in the use of 
the second-person narration. Indeed, the narrator of Ravines and Le Cahier, that is, the 
“I” that speaks—in other words, Raphaël Confiant in the present of writing—addresses 
his younger self, the “tu” that is spoken about—the Raphaël Confiant who has yet to 
come to terms with his chabinité. 
Yet a crucial feature of Fanon's thought, namely his notion of “epidermal racial 
schema,” renders it inapt for explanation of Confiant's chabinité. One of the reasons is 
that unlike the black subject who becomes racialized upon entrance into the “white 
world,” it is in Caribbean society that the chabin is marginalized. One might object that 
color prejudice affects all segments of the population, with the exception of békés.255 
While, indeed, the experience of discrimination is often a shared one, this is not to say 
that it plays out in the same way for those targeted. As we know, chabins have fallen 
victim to a number of specific myths and superstitions. Another reason that Fanon’s 
schema falls short of addressing the embodied experience of chabinité is that it posits 
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racialization as a process of categorization through which one is perceived as black. The 
consequence is to leave aside those who simultaneously identify as “nègre et pas nègre, 
blanc et pas blanc à la fois.”256 In Le Cahier de romances, Confiant underscores the limits 
of this “epidermal racial schema” in a way that rehabilitates his métissage. Reminiscing 
about his days as a student at the Lycée Schoelcher, he writes: 
Tu n’avais osé contredire ton professeur de français le jour où, dans une 
envolée pleine d’indignation, il s’était insurgé contre le fait que l’Europe 
colonisatrice ait divisé le monde entre Blancs et gens de couleur. 
“Qu’est-ce qu’une telle dichotomie signifie? s’était-il exclamé. Que la 
couleur blanche n’est pas une couleur? Que le blanc est l’étalon de mesure de 
toutes les autres couleurs, hein? Pff! Quelle monstrueuse prétention!”257  
 
The teacher’s vision of a “monde entre Blancs et gens de couleur” implicitly draws on 
Fanon’s definition of the colonial world as a compartmentalized battleground opposing 
whites and blacks—a dichotomy that ignores Confiant's positionality: 
Il [ton professeur de français] avait pourtant tort à tes yeux! Il ne pouvait plus, lui 
qui avait un teint de cacao mûr, comprendre que les gens qui avaient la peau 
blanche, ou presque blanche, s’imaginassent dur comme fer que, si on leur grattait 
la peau, on ne trouverait rien en dessous hormis des veines et de la chair. 
Absolument rien! Tandis que si l’on procédait à la même opération pour 
quelqu’un qui avait la peau noire, brune, jaune ou rouge, forcément on buterait sur 
de l’épiderme incolore. 258 
 
Confiant challenges colonial epistemologies and the way they have forced bodies into 
systems of categorization that rely on black and white as two opposite markers of race. 
He does so by re-ordering the terms of this mapping. According to him, the difference 
between whiteness and blackness is not one of kind but of degree. If one were to scratch 
off black skin, “on buterait sur de l'épiderme incolore,” while one would only find veins 
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and flesh when conducting the same experiment on white skin, which means that 
“L’incolore, le pâle et donc le blanc étaient donc premiers.”259 Positing the primacy of 
whiteness without endorsing its superiority over other skin tones allows Confiant to 
complicate the polarized understanding of race described in Peau noire and problematize 
what it means to be white, or rather to claim blackness when one has white skin—a 
necessary step in initiating a discussion on chabinité as a mode of subjectivity that cannot 
be understood in the terms of Fanon's Manichaean analysis. To be sure, Ravines describes 
epidermalization in terms similar to those used in Peau noire, which is to say, as a 
process of skinning. But unlike Fanon for whom this skinning or “arrachement” produced 
a feeling of alienation, it is lived as form of empowerment by Confiant. His use of the 
adjective “incolore” deploys a new understanding of whiteness. In redirecting attention to 
the lack (“in/colore”) at its core, he empties the word of all ideological connotations. This 
operation speaks in significant ways to his literary project. It is as if Confiant's whiteness 
became a blank slate, a canvas for rethinking the materiality of the chabin's body once his 
skin is no longer perceived as a signifier of colonial privilege. Or better yet, a white page 
on which to write new narratives of embodiment. 
I suggest calling such narratives, dermographies. The term is not a new one. 
Anyone with some level of expertise in the field of medicine probably knows that 
dermographia—from the Greek derma, “skin,” and graphein, “to write”—designates a 
form of urticaria that causes the skin to be inflamed when touched, scratched, rubbed or 
hit. In a 2001 collective volume entitled Thinking Through the Skin, Sara Ahmed and 
                                                          




Jackie Stacey took up the word to enrich it with cultural studies inflections. If they agree 
with the original definition that dermographia is a form of skin writing, they also suggest 
that “the substance of the skin is itself dependent on regimes of writing that mark the skin 
in different ways or that produce the skin as marked.”260 In Barthesian terms, skin is “a 
writerly effect,” which means that to write is to skin because “what we write causes 
ripples and flows that 'skin us' into being.”261 Invoking Derrida's notion of writing as a 
repeatable process that can be “'cut off' from its context of utterance,” Ahmed and Stacey 
argue that skin is similarly versatile in the way it can be “cut off” and reshaped into new 
sets of meanings.262 I use the term as a tool of narrative analysis to show how, in 
Confiant, rewriting white skin provides an occasion for meta-literary commentary: 
Ravines, Eau de café, and Le Cahier de romances open up a textual space in which the 
chabin arrives at a form of self-reflective knowledge that allows him to distance himself 
from mythologies of chabinité and become a critical “I”—a process that requires him to 
gain authorship of his own life. Writing on the white page and rewriting white skin 
become part of a literary project of self-fashioning in which the chabin's agency is 
restored.  
Among the plethora of works that Confiant has published, Eau de café is the one 
that best exemplifies the challenges of dermographia. The novel recounts the narrator's 
return to his native town of Grande-Anse shortly after the death of his godmother’s 
adoptive daughter, and his attempt to reintegrate into Martinican society with the help of 
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his mentor, a communist carpenter named Thimoléon. As he launches his investigation, 
the young chabin documents his thoughts and experiences, interspersing them with local 
anecdotes, gossip, and legends told by family members, old friends, and acquaintances. 
Through a process of mise en abyme, the notebooks he uses to do so eventually become 
the very novel we are reading.263 One night, as he goes back to his room at the Oceanic-
Hôtel, he notices that they are missing. The maid stole them on the ground that 
“Monsieur est un chabin. Tous les chabins sont mauvais. Tous les chabins sont 
méchants,” and that they all bring misfortune.264 The narrator ultimately retrieves his 
notebooks but decides to get rid of them in the final pages: “M'assurant de n'être épié par 
personne, je jette mes cahiers […] dans un dalot où une eau nauséeuse s'écoule avec 
paresse.”265 Regretting his gesture, he immediately saves them. While no explanation is 
given for this volte-face, one could venture that the “eau nauséeuse” in which they are 
soaked acted as a reminder of the existential nausea that fills his account. Preserving his 
story, making it public, and thereby drawing attention to his experiences, affects, and 
emotions, is a therapeutic gesture that allows him to come to terms with his métissage 
and relieve the kind of nausea associated with it. The erratic circulation of the text, which 
was first stolen, then carelessly thrown away to be saved at the last minute does not 
simply serve to dramatize its conditions of possibility; it also brings to light, in meta-
literary fashion, the challenges faced by Confiant himself in writing both about chabinité 
and as a chabin. 
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Uprooting Chabinité: The Curse of Apollinaire 
Aside from Confiant whose work has monopolized much of the critics' attention, 
Max Élisée is one of few other authors who have written about chabinité. Born in 1947, 
he left his hometown of Macouba at age thirteen to study in Paris where he pursued a 
career in film production. His first novel, Mémoires d'un chabin (1998), was initially 
written as a screenplay. Impressed with the overall quality of the piece, Claude Chabrol 
agreed to direct it but due to financial hardship the movie never saw the light of day.266 
Published in 1998, seven years after Eau de café, Mémoires offers a glimpse into the life 
of Frédéric Edgar, a young teacher whose life circumstances strikingly recall Confiant's. 
Referred to as “nègre blanc,”267 “faux blanc,”268 “le blanc de sa race,”269 “bâtard,”270 
“chabinos,”271 or quite simply “petit chabin,”272 Frédéric is faced with the challenge of 
navigating through Martinican society—a task that proves all the more difficult in a 
context where his appearance is viewed as peculiar at best and horrifying at worst: 
J'étais chabin, et le seul chabin de cette bourgade. J'étais donc depuis ma 
naissance, un objet de curiosité, un fétiche: j'étais roux, j'avais les yeux marron et 
mon corps maculé d'éphélides aurait pu me loger dans la pléïade des roux qui 
peuplent la planète, si mes cheveux très crépus–“tête grin'” comme on définissait 
en créole cette particularité–, mon nez très épaté et mes lèvres épaisses n'avaient 
pas trahi mon appartenance à la race noire. Avoir tous les traits d'un Noir mais 
être blanc de peau, cela était encore inexplicable aux yeux des gens du début du 
siècle.273  
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The chabin’s face is introduced in terms of a visual enigma. Although Élisée strives to 
convey the contrasts that mar his appearance through the use of absolute superlatives 
(“très”) and dichotomies, his attempt issues in a confusion of categories. Frédéric is 
simultaneously black and white, ginger but not quite. This rhetoric of antithesis fails to 
provide the reader with an adequate visual model, resulting in a description that only 
underscores its own failure to represent. In a society ruled by rigid color hierarchies, 
Frédéric’s métissage is problematic. Tormented by his brother Jean for being white-
skinned and despised by the local békés for having black blood, he experiences his 
condition as one of subjection, exclusion, and abuse. The constant flow of insults he 
endures from his father who once went as far as calling him “'chabin pouèle si'”274 causes 
him to wonder: “Suis-je donc vraiment une erreur de la nature?”275 As a self-proclaimed 
“opprimé du destin,” he feels particular empathy for the marginalized, including “ceux 
qui sont nés pauvres, esclaves, ou infirmes.”276 An opportunity to take control of his 
destiny occurs when he finds out, through prophetic visions, that a curse was placed on 
his family generations ago and how to lift it off. In order to do so, he embarks on an eye-
opening journey to Senegal, the land of his ancestors. 
Mémoires owes much to the tradition of the Bildungsroman in the sense that it 
contains many of the themes and devices that the genre typically gravitates to: a conflict 
between the main protagonist and the values of a society in which s/he cannot function, a 
quest for self-development through which s/he gains experience of the world, and a 
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positive denouement occasionally tempered by the irruption of nostalgia or resignation. 
Mémoires is also—and this is where its distinctive contribution lies—one of few 
Caribbean novels to describe a physical return to Africa; an original approach that 
reframes the personal history of the chabin within a broader transatlantic context. 
Frédéric's journey to Africa marks a pivotal moment in his quest to destroy the curse that 
has plagued his family. In the early nineteenth century, his great-great grandfather 
Apollinaire, the headman of a small village in Senegal, worked in close collaboration 
with European colonists, regularly providing them with Manding slaves until one day the 
supplies ran out. To overcome this human shortage, Apollinaire decided to hand over his 
own subjects but, in an act of rebellion, the village sorcerer killed him, buried his head 
under a tree, and cursed his descendants. As the novel unfolds, Frédéric learns that the 
only way to cancel this malediction is to make his way to Africa and uproot his ancestor's 
head. 
Apollinaire's story offers striking resemblances to a widely commented, yet 
enigmatic episode of Genesis in which Noah's son, Ham, saw his father naked in his tent 
shortly after the flood. Following the incident, the latter broke into a series of 
imprecations: “Cursed be Canaan, a slave of slaves shall he be to his brothers. […] 
Blessed by the lord my god be Shem; and let Canaan be his slave. God enlarge Japheth, 
and let him dwell in the tents of Shem; and let Canaan be his slave.”277 What came to be 
known, albeit incorrectly, as the curse of Ham (in reality Canaan is the sole recipient of 
Noah's wrath) has sparked many a debate among biblical scholars and philologists. A 
                                                          





number of incongruities have been pointed out, including the fact that Ham's son, 
Canaan, was punished for his father's behavior.278 
It is by way of the first missionaries that the myth of Ham infiltrated Caribbean 
lore. Du Tertre and Labat invoked it to explain the sinful nature of black Africans and 
justify their enslavement. Similarly, Maurile de Saint-Michel observed upon his arrival in 
the islands that “[c]ette nation porte sur le visage une malédiction temporelle, et est 
héritière de Cham, dont elle est descendue; ainsi elle est née à l’esclavage de père en fils, 
et à la servitude éternelle.”279 Centuries later, Chamoiseau reclaimed this biblical ancestry 
by rebranding himself as “Oiseau de Cham” and “Ti-Cham.” He saw in the curse of Ham 
a way to understand his own status as a Caribbean writer, doomed to think and write in a 
language that was imposed by colonization. In Mémoires, Élisée offers his own take on 
the matter, re-appropriating the myth as a heuristic device to equate chabinité with a 
cursed form of embodiment. 
Two mentions of Ham are found in his novel. The first one occurs as Frédéric is 
overcome by one of his visions and makes contact with what he believes to a sorcerer: “je 
t'aiderai à sortir de la malédiction de Cham...” he tells the young chabin, “Tu ne devras 
plus être sous cette influence.”280 Like Canaan who is doomed to slavery because of his 
father's crime, Frédéric falls victim to a curse due to his ancestor's doing. Moreover, he 
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repeatedly describes his existence as that of a slave. His phenotype makes him the target 
of constant attack, persecution, stereotyping, and degrading treatment, and he believes 
that putting an end to his family's curse will allow him to disrupt the forces that have 
brought his life to misery. In doing so, he hopes to initiate a process of reinvention, a shift 
in self-image from passive victim to active protagonist. The second occurrence is found 
four pages later. As Frédéric engages in conversation with his sister Marthe, asking her 
how familiar she is with the curse of Ham, he is met with silence and confusion: 
“Comment pouvait-elle comprendre que ce chabin qu'elle avait pour frère et qui n'avait 
souvent été qu'une descente de lit pouvait à tout moment prendre les rênes.”281 As he 
makes his way to Senegal in search of Apollinaire's head, Frédéric's hope is to finally free 
himself from the curse of his ancestor and become, like Confiant, the author of his own 
life. 
While it might be tempting to end the comparison here, something else hints at a 
deeper kinship between the two curses. Both may deal with slavery but what they are 
primarily concerned with is “originary anxieties and racial (il)legitimacy.”282 At stake in 
the myth of Ham is the thorny question of where black people came from. Many 
commentators have used Noah's story as an attempt to explain the origin of human races, 
arguing that his eldest son Shem was the father of the ancient Near East nations (Asia); 
Japheth, the founder of Caucasian nations (Europe); and Ham, the primal black man 
based on the (false) assumption that his name meant “dark,” “blackened,” or “sunburnt.” 
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Yet his racial affiliation is perhaps less obvious than what critics would have us believe. 
The eighth-century Muslim Wahb Ibn Munabbih claimed that Ham was originally white 
but that he became black as a result of Noah's curse. This opinion was not isolated; in the 
seventh-century, someone like Ka'b Al-Ahbar had already ventured a similar 
hypothesis.283 It is also found in Tanhuma, a medieval collection of homilies and rabbinic 
exegeses which describes Ham's transformation as a result of Noah's curse: “[His] eyes 
turned red, since he looked at his father's nakedness; his lips became crooked, since he 
spoke with his mouth; the hair of his head and beard became singed, since he turned his 
face around; and since he did not cover [his father's] nakedness, he went naked and his 
foreskin was extended.”284 Although no mention is made of any change in skin color, 
features such as curled hair, pursed lips, and red eyes were traditionally associated with 
the African physiognomy in medieval rabbinic literature, thus suggesting it is indeed into 
a black man that Ham turned. Yet, in 1867, American clergyman Buckner Payne argued 
in his essay The Negro: What is His Ethnological Status? that Ham and his offspring 
“were at [the time of the flood], and after the flood, and continue to be, to this day, of the 
white race,” a race which he believed to include the following traits: “long, straight hair, 
high foreheads, high noses and thin lips.”285 
Spanning over centuries of exegetical dispute, the discussion of Ham's appearance 
foregrounds a kind of ontological trouble with which Élisée's reader is all too familiar. 
The question of what Ham looked like remains unanswered despite the corpus of 
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hermeneutical works it has generated. Commentators alternatively referred to his lips as 
thick and thin, to his hair as curly and straight, and to his complexion as white and dark. 
The impossibility to map racial difference onto his face recalls Frédéric's perception of 
his own body. While Élisée believes his race to be “la noire, bien sûr,” the chabin's trials 
and tribulations suggest that the question of affiliation is more complex.286 When asked to 
identify as black or white, he answers with a hint of uncertainty, “Je suis noir...”287 This 
brief hesitation is immediately broken by his interlocutor who retorts in a tone of 
reproach: “Tu viens de me mentir […] ! Tu n'as jamais su de quel côté te ranger !” 
Shortly after this exchange, Frédéric erupts in self-deprecatory ruminations: “Je n'étais 
rien. Je n'avais jamais rien été. Ni Blanc, ni Noir, rien !”288 The sense of despair and self-
hatred that permeates these lines is echoed in the repetition of negative terms (“n' […] 
rien,” “n' […] jamais,” “rien,” “Ni[...], ni […], rien”), as if to highlight the lack of stable 
referents when it comes to describing Frédéric's body. Élisée's rhetoric is governed by a 
neither/nor logic that exceeds the predicative function of language. Under his pen, the 
opposition of black and white breaks down, leading the discussion of Frédéric's identity 
into contradiction and aporia. His face becomes a liminal site where the parameters of 
racial discourse are systematically blurred. Ultimately one could see in the chabin, 
“partagé entre [s]a moitié noire et l'autre, la blanche,” a modern avatar of Ham, the primal 
“negro” that some believed was white.289 If Élisée’s appropriation of the biblical figure 
makes it possible to frame Frédéric’s condition as a curse—one in which he cannot 
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reconcile being white and black—it is also an antidote to it. Indeed, the chabin is perhaps 
more of a nègre than anyone else given that his physiognomy straddles the color line in 
the same way that Ham’s—the “primal negro”—does.  
Interestingly enough, it is in Africa that Frédéric overcomes the challenges posed 
by his métissage. As the story develops, his quest to cast off the curse of Apollinaire turns 
into an investigation of “les causes de son malheur dans [s]on passé ancestral.”290 His 
decision to leave Martinique addresses a need to free himself from a double alienation. 
The course of his life has been determined both by his ancestor's misdeeds and by 
cultural attitudes towards his chabinité. His journey to Africa is thus framed as a project 
of introspection and self-knowledge. Lifting the curse is not merely about preserving his 
lineage from extinction, it is also an opportunity for personal growth. What Frédéric 
uncovers there is a new sense of self, freed from the burden of cultural assumptions. 
Indeed, the notion of chabinité, which holds a singular place in the Caribbean imaginary, 
bears little significance in Africa where the history of colonization has produced a 
different ideology of race and skin color. Because Frédéric is no longer profiled as a 
chabin, that is to say, forced into the role of “être faible,”291 “agneau fragile,”292 “porte-
drapeau du Malheur,”293 or “demon,”294 he can finally become the “homme fort, de 
décision”295 he has always aspired to be—a first step in his mission to find Apollinaire's 
head, uproot it, and confound the forces of destiny. The second requirement is that he 
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must remain in Senegal until his death. Ironically enough, for Apollinaire's uprooting to 
occur Frédéric must not simply migrate to a new country but take root in it, so to speak; 
which he does by settling down in “La Ruche,” the plantation where his ancestors lived, 
with Rosy, a Senegalese woman with whom he falls in love and ends up spending the rest 
of his life. 
His itinerary offers a counterpoint to the many “retours au pays natal” that have 
become commonplace in Caribbean literature since the publication of Césaire's Cahier. 
By reframing his personal trajectory within the larger context of African history, Élisée 
rewrites a hackneyed narrative, that of the chabin as an emblem of Caribbean métissage. 
In this respect, the most striking example of uprooting found in Mémoires is the one 
performed by the novel itself. Unlike Confiant who has worked toward “caribbeanizing” 
chabinité, Élisée extracts it from its embeddedness in the social and cultural fabric of 
Martinique. This removal allows Frédéric to cast off the existential burden of having to 
articulate his subjectivity within the framework of specific racial constructs. As his story 
shows, identifying as black in Senegal becomes less of a conundrum than in Martinique 
where the system of ethno-class hierarchies produced in him a crisis of identification. 
Evidence of his successful transformation occurs in the closing chapter where the 
last of his portraits reads as follows: “chacun voyait mon visage actuel, un visage marqué 
par l'âge, bien sûr, mais reposé, paisible et très différent de ce qu'il avait pu être 
auparavant.”296 As the novel draws to an end, his face is no longer reduced to a mosaic of 
traits that language would fail to express. Emphasis is redirected to the nuances of his 
                                                          




expression. Élisée shows him in a different light, relaxed and at peace. In doing so, he 
stages a new gaze, in which the chabin appears liberated from all the mystifications and 
cultural assignations that previously marked his body as “freakish.” It is the same face 
that Élisée had described in a proleptic passage: “Pataugeant dans l'eau, je pus traîner mes 
pas jusqu'au vieux miroir fêlé qui couvrait depuis des années la porte de l'armoire. Mon 
image encore disloquée apparut comme les éléments désordonnés d'un puzzle que mon 
imagination avait tant de fois reconstitué à sa guise.”297 Confronted with his reflection, 
Frédéric momentarily assumes the position of reader. In latin, the verb legere originally 
meant “to pick up,” “to collect,” “to gather.” By metaphorical extension, it came to 
designate a process of reviewing, that is, of picking up with one’s eyes. The way Frédéric 
strives to pick up and arrange the fragments of his face echoes our own efforts to collect, 
review, and put together the textual pieces provided by Élisée in an attempt to visualize 
his character’s appearance and solve the puzzle of his face. Yet, the aforementioned 
passage is voluntarily ambiguous. Is Frédéric’s shattered reflection the result of his 
cracked mirror or of chabinité itself—an uprooted signifier, whose meaning is 
determined in relation to other signifiers (“black,” “white,” “ginger,” etc.) and thus 
endlessly delayed in a free play of associations? 
Efforts to establish his visual identity might after all be useless. In what sense is 
his “visage actuel,” “marqué par l'âge,” “reposé,” and “paisible” that of a chabin? Élisée's 
description could very well apply to anyone. And what to make of this “image [...] 
disloquée”? In other words, how to interpret the chabin's appearance when race no longer 
                                                          




provides the template to read it? In this sense Mémoires hints at a peculiar paradox. 
While chabinité is a form of métissage that precludes any racial identification, it cannot 
be understood without reference to race. As a phenotype that challenges the notion of 
“racial grouping,” it also relies on this notion, if only to position itself as a rejection of it. 
In other words, chabinité can only become operative as a concept if it acknowledges the 
validity of the very racial divisions that it calls into question. Dismissing race as a 
biological construct might be experienced as a liberation in both Confiant and Élisée, yet 
it runs the risk of relegating the chabin's idiosyncrasies to a dangerous form of 
anonymity—the same one that both authors precisely wrote against. 
  
Conclusion 
 This chapter focused on the figure of the chabin as a means to nuance the 
postmodern understanding of métissage. I used his face—a metonym for his physical 
difference—as a point of departure to analyze the way he has been perceived both in 
nineteenth-century Paris and more recently in Martinique and Senegal. The first popular 
chabin was Alexandre Privat d’Anglemont. I argued that framing him as a dandy rather 
than a bohemian helps to account for the way he self-consciously turned his chabinité 
into a mark of distinction. While Parisian society perceived his appearance as a sign of 
exotic beauty and even unbridled sexual energy, chabinité has been considered as both 
ugly and indicative of a bellicose personality in Martinique. 
 I examined how Confiant and Elisée set out to debunk these physiognomic 
discourses. What I proposed is a perspective that views their discussion of chabinité as a 




“poster-faces for a harmonious multicultural society,”298 the chabin's physiognomy tells a 
different story, one in which métissage is experienced as existential angst. Confiant and 
Elisée’s texts cultivate, with varying degrees of self-awareness, a “poeticist style of self-
reflection.”299 Through engagement not just with the literary form but with the act of 
writing itself, they open a discursive space for the chabin to negotiate the challenges of 
being both white and nègre. The former’s solution to this drama of identification is to 
replace Fanon's “epidermal racial schema” with what I called a “dermographic schema” 
in order to articulate narratives of embodiment that divorce race from skin color and 
rehabilitate the chabin’s own brand of métissage. Élisée’s approach is similar in the way 
he uses narrative to interrogate chabinité and, conversely, exploits chabinité to 
interrogate narrative as a mode of self-representation. Where Mémoires d’un chabin 
breaks new ground, however, is in the way it draws attention to some of the limitations 
inherent in Confiant’s discourse, questioning for example the extent to which race and 
chabinité can be dissociated. Élisée’s use of Africa as an alternative space from which to 
see through and question perceptions of the chabin in Caribbean societies also forces us 
to reconsider the ways in which Confiant re-appropriated the figure. To some extent, 
Élisée invites his reader to emulate Frédéric’s posture and “uproot” the discourses 
responsible for reifying the chabin’s subjectivity—not only those that describe him as a 
pariah but perhaps, and most importantly, those that consecrate him as an icon of 
Caribbean métissage. 
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The next and last chapter is a move away from this chapter’s exclusive focus on a 
male figure—the chabin—as I turn to recent debates on Islamic full-face veils in France 
and the ways they have impacted the perception of Muslim women. It is also a move 
away from physiognomy as a pseudo-science toward a broader understanding of 
physiognomy as one’s general appearance. I will analyze acts of public unveiling, of 
showing one’s face as a “ressac” of colonial memory.300 France’s recent ban on the niqab 
and the burqa reactivates the discourse of surveillance in which nineteenth-century 
physiognomy was embedded. Yet, this last chapter identifies a continuation between how 
Privat was racialized as an exotic, sexual other and France’s politics of unveiling as a 









   CHAPTER FOUR 
From Colonial-Era Évoluées to Contemporary Secular Muslims: Uncovering France's 
Politics of the “Open Face” 
 
                                                          




 “Hugo disait: 'La France, la nation, c'est un passé pour se tourner vers l'avenir.' 
L'identité nationale, c'est exactement la même chose.”301 Such are the words in which 
Éric Besson, former Minister of Immigration, justified his decision to launch, in October 
2009, a national debate on French identity. Numerous discussions followed, punctuated 
with disputes and controversies of all kinds. What was to be a three-month series of state-
sponsored talks and seminars became for many a political embarrassment.302 The debate 
served as an occasion to unleash a barrage of xenophobic abuse, often equating France's 
Muslim community with a horde of welfare-hungry immigrant “thugs.” This was perhaps 
most obvious in many of the comments left on the website debatidentitenationale.fr/. 
Launched by the government in November 2009, its role was to provide a public forum 
for the exchange of ideas, but in the context of high tension that surrounded the debate, it 
quickly turned into an outlet for the expression of white racist anxieties.   
 Hugo, as it turns out, never uttered those words. While critics like Claude Millet 
and Guy Rosa were unable to locate the quote in their perusal of his political writings, 
they suggest that if he ever said something similar, it was with a different intention in 
mind. Indeed, Hugo very much believed that France's national destiny was to found a 
universal community in which borders and nation-states would become increasingly 
irrelevant until disappearing—a stance contrary to Besson's nationalistic agenda as he 
launched the 2009 debate. The misappropriation of Hugo's name and legacy was 
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representative of the whole debate, which emerged and took place under the banner of 
usurpation. That it was supervised by the Ministry of Immigration as opposed to, say, the 
Ministry of Culture, caused the conversation to shift away from a consideration of what 
Frenchness meant to a discussion of what it was not. Questions were raised about the role 
of French Muslims within the framework of secularism and how to make Islam 
compatible with the values of French Republicanism.303 The assumption was that in a 
nation with a long tradition of Christian faith, Islam was an imported religion and, as 
such, naturally suspect in its intent and practices. 
 The conflation of national identity and immigration made veiled Muslim women 
targets of public concern. As weeks went by, Besson’s debate shifted to a reflection on 
their place in French society. More and more perceived them as a threat to the nation's 
endorsement of secularism—a fundamental pillar of French Republicanism. The veil in 
its various forms—hijab, niqab, burqa, chadri, haïk, etc.—turned into a locus for the 
struggle between Islam and the West. As discussions drew to a close in January 2010, 
many were left with the feeling that wearing a face veil should be banned, and indeed, 
nine months later, in October 2010, a law making it illegal to conceal one's face in public 
was voted upon. It came into effect six months later, in April 2011. During this 
transitional period, the French government, under the supervision of then-Prime Minister 
François Fillon, launched a pedagogical campaign to provide an overview of what the 
law concretely entailed. Informational brochures were handed out and ads were released, 
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explaining that “la République se vit à visage découvert” (the Republic must be lived 
with an open face).304  
In what follows, I interrogate this notion of “open face,” meaning an unveiled 
face that is completely exposed and visible to anyone. I wonder what the political 
unveiling of French Muslims owes to the discourse of surveillance in which nineteenth-
century physiognomy was embedded (see Chapter one). Based on the assumption that the 
human gaze, that we often take for granted as universal, is in fact historically variant, I 
argue that “facial nudity” does not constitute a degree zero of perception, but an ideal that 
is always already coded, clothed in layers of cultural and political meaning, covered in 
symbolic veils.  
Besson's debate was not the first of its kind to imbricate Islam, secularism, 
immigration and the role of women in French society. A series of previous “headscarf 
affairs” had already set the tone, starting with the 1989 Creil incident.305 From 1989 to 
2010, the terms of the debate on veil-wearing have considerably evolved. The succession 
of affairs that have arisen over this time span have never just been about the veil, but 
intertwined with larger social and political agendas. In 1989, French law addressed the 
question in a way that avoided partisan politics. The main preoccupation was not so much 
the veil itself as how to best deal with case-by-case scenarios in which its wearing was 
deemed contentious. This casuistic approach acknowledged the variety of meanings that 
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the veil had crystallized for Muslim women. Indeed, a whole range of situational factors 
were taken into account before rulings were made. As philosopher Sidi Mohammed 
Barkat has argued, this interpretive dimension is what allowed the veil to penetrate “le 
champ de l'expérience humaine, [l'arrachant] à la conception qui l'investit d'une 
signification absolue ou essentielle, toujours unilatéralement établie.”306 This situation 
changed in 2004 when a more systematic, rigid approach to law was adopted in 
addressing headscarves incidents. The question of Islamic veiling became a catalyst for 
feminist organizing. While some like Christine Delphy, Rokhaya Diallo, founder of Les 
Indivisibles, and Houria Bouteldja, spokesperson of Les Indigènes de la République, saw 
support for unveiling as a denial of women's right to self-determination, the majority of 
French feminists viewed the veil as a tool of patriarchal domination—a narrative that was 
largely taken up by public media and emulated by mainstrean politicians. In the name of 
women's rights, they felt compelled to liberate veiled Muslims from the shackles of 
Islamic oppression. Those include politicians, historians, philosophers, and intellectuals 
such as Elisabeth Badinter, Anne Zelensky, Caroline Fourest, and Chahdorrt Djavann 
who explains in Bas les voiles! (2003) that “ [le] hijabe, c’est le dogme islamique le plus 
barbare qui s’inscrit sur le corps féminin et s’en empare.”307 
 The polarization between tolérants and intransigeants often ignores more 
nuanced positions, including those of Muslim feminists like Fatima Mernissi (1940-
2015), a Moroccan writer and sociologist who earned a reputation as an Islamic feminist 
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upon the publication of her first essay, Sexe, idéologie, Islam.308 In it, she argues, against 
a tradition of Judeo-Christian thought, that the concept of civilization in Muslim culture 
entails the fulfilment of female sexuality, which she describes as an active one. Le Harem 
politique: Le Prophète et les femmes takes an even more radical turn by portraying the 
prophet Muhammad as a proto-feminist figure.309 Drawing on hadiths, the Sunnah, and 
the Sira—a collection of documents that narrate the prophet's life—Mernissi explains that 
Muhammad established the constitution of Medina to protect women from the dangers of 
living under pre-Islamic Arabian rule. She blames some of his closest acquaintances like 
Abu Bakra, Abu Huraira, and Umar I for distorting his teachings.  
Most importantly, Le Harem politique includes an original discussion of the veil. 
The hijab, she notes, was initially used to separate two men, Muhammad who had just 
gotten married to his cousin Zynab, and Anas, an unexpected visitor. The decision to have 
women wear it as an instrument of sexual control was made by Umar I, “porte-parole de 
la résistance masculine aux revendications des femmes.”310 According to Mernissi, this 
decision undermines Muhammad's true conception of Islam, one that sought to enforce an 
egalitarian system in which women's agency played a major role. This version of Islam is 
based on an understanding of the individual as the “siège d'une volonté sacrée, qui [rend] 
illégitime la violence et superflue la surveillance.”311 In other words, construing the hijab 
as means of protection against sexual attacks denies faith in the self-regulating capacities 
of human reason—a pillar of Muhammad's Islam. Mernissi's feminist approach reframes 
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debates on the veil in a way that expands the alternative between intransigeants and 
tolerants. While she refuses to demonize Islam, a religion that she believes to be one of 
fundamental respect and care for women, she also objects to the ways in which the hijab 
has been manipulated and refashioned into a tool of oppression in the service of male 
dominance.  
 Bruno Nassim Aboudrar’s essay Comment le voile est devenu musulman offers a 
new perspective on the question. Refusing to see in the endorsement/rejection of the 
Islamic veil only a feminist issue, he argues that the reason the veil has crystallized public 
anxieties and triggered so many conversations may owe less to the restrictions it places 
on women than to the way it undermines the visual regime upon which Western culture 
was founded. 312 According to him, this regime is one that celebrates clarity, brightness, 
and perceptibility, and considers the act of gazing as the most noble in the hierarchy of 
senses. By contrast, Islam traditionally rejects these values in favor of a visual economy 
that privileges opacity and secrecy. In the Quran, gazing is dismissed on two accounts, 
because it may lead to idolatry—hence Islam’s suspicion of images—and because it may 
arouse sexual desire when directed at the female body. The veil directly participates in 
this economy by concealing women to preserve their awra—their modesty—and protect 
men from their concupiscent appetites. In doing so, it negates a core principle of Western 
thought and practice: “[R]ien ne doit résister à la vue. On prête aux qualités physiques qui 
la servent des vertus morales parmi celles que nous estimons le plus: cette fameuse clarté 
où Boileau reconnaît déjà une expression de l’intelligence et, plus récemment, la 
                                                          




transparence, érigée en exigence politique.”313 Aboudrar suggests that at the center of this 
visual system lies the human face due to its central role as both object and subject of the 
gaze. In the West, the veiled face has been perceived as a threat because it marks a blind 
spot in a system that has elevated the act of gazing to an organizing principle of social 
life.  
 In this chapter, I want to put into dialogue Mernissi’s postcolonial/feminist 
approach and Aboudrar’s perspective as an art historian and visual studies scholar. I start 
by examining Marc Garanger's portraits of unveiled Algerian women in his monograph 
Femmes algériennes 1960314 in relation to Leïla Sebbar's novel Shérazade: 17 ans, brune, 
frisée, les yeux verts315 and her short story “La Photo d'identité,”316 both of which contain 
metafictional references to Garanger's work. I continue with a discussion of Assia 
Djebar's Ombre sultane,317 an autobiographical novel in which the narrator Isma tells of 
Hajila's attempt to unveil and escape from the constraints of a violent husband that was 
once her own. Finally, I move on to an analysis of the photographic exhibit “Mariannes 
d'aujourd'hui,” which I view as a prefiguration of the 2010 French ban on face-
covering.318 This corpus of texts and pictures provides three instances of what Aboudrar 
has called “dramaturgies du dévoilement”319—in colonial Algeria (Garanger), in post-
colonial Algeria (Djebar), and in post-colonial France (“Mariannes d'aujourd'hui”). 
The word “dramaturgie” encompasses a variety of definitions. From the ancient 
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Greek dramatourgos, which is itself made up of the root drama, “a play,” and ourgia, 
“work,” it first designates the art of dramatic composition, that is, the set of rules and 
principles needed to write a play. More broadly, dramaturgy refers to the act of adapting a 
particular work, story, or narrative into a form that can be performed on stage. By 
metonymic extension, it has become synonymous with the representation itself. These 
definitions have in common to conjure up notions of manipulation, re-construction, 
distortion, theatricality, and spectacle, all of which have been instrumental in (re)shaping 
perceptions of the veil in the Franco-Algerian context that interests us here.  
I would particularly like to uncover the ways in which the haïk, the niqab and the 
burqa have been fashioned into one-dimensional screens in the service of female 
oppression. This narrative finds its roots in colonial history and was instrumental in 
establishing “facial nudity” as a core principle of French Republicanism. Ironically 
enough, Besson was probably right in saying that “La France, la nation, c'est un passé 
pour se tourner vers l'avenir.” The 2010 nation-wide ban on niqabs and burqas 
underscores the persistence of a colonial logic in the way it re-activates memories of the 
1958 ceremonies of unveiling that took place in Algiers. I do not mean to suggest that the 
secular Muslims of today are the évoluées of yesterday, that the “Mariannes 
d'aujourd'hui” are all deep down “Femmes algériennes,” but rather that they epitomize 
two figures whose bodies, whose faces, have been instrumentalized to tell a story—of 
modern liberation, political integration—for a dramaturgy that unfolds in ways often 
beyond their control.  




French secularism, and the hijab/burqa.320 Yet, for all their insistence on the 
instrumentalization of veils (and their removal) very few have drawn attention to what 
lies underneath, that is, the face. To put it somewhat ironically perhaps, it is as if 
postcolonial and feminist criticisms had served as a veil in the way they have disregarded 
the importance that a notion like the body, and a fortiori the face, plays in any discussion 
of unveiling in a French context. What is this face that needs to be shown? What happens 
when, hidden out of modesty, it suddenly enters the realm of the visible? And what does 
it mean for a nation to impose an ideal of facial legibility that runs counter to its 
Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom? What about those who cannot comply with 
this demand? This chapter reframes the debate on Islam, national identity, and secularism 
within a framework that emphasizes the modalities of their inscription on the female 
body.  
 As the recent proliferation of debates and controversies have shown, the veil is a 
ubiquitous concept that cannot be limited to its sartorial aesthetics321; many critics have 
discussed its polysemy. Jennifer Heath has perhaps best summarized the range of 
meanings it has been come to encapsulate over time: 
As much as the veil is fabric or an article of clothing, it is also a concept. It can be 
illusion, vanity, artifice, deception, liberation, imprisonment, euphemism, 
divination, concealment, hallucination, depression, eloquent silence, holiness, the 
ethers beyond consciousness, the hidden hundredth name of God, the final 
passage into death, even the biblical apocalypse, the lifting of God's veil, 
signaling so-called end times. When veiling is forced—then enforced—it is 
repression. Yet, as we see increasingly today, the veil is also a symbol of 
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resistance—against ethnic and religious discrimination. When the veil is forcibly 
stripped from its wearer, that too, is subjugation, not emancipation.322   
 
The veil has something quite sacred about it and wearing one usually implies a religious 
mystique. It is also somewhat profane in the way it emphasizes what it intends to keep 
hidden: the body's carnality. Would Salomé be the erotic figure that we know today if it 
were not for her seven veils? Fanon showed in his essay L'An V de la révolution 
algérienne that the veil was also a powerful instrument of camouflage in the service of 
urban guerilla.323 In our post 9/11 context of pervasive Islamophobia, many see in it a 
tool of cultural backwardness, if not an instrument of terrorism. Some critics, like 
Aboudrar and Mernissi, have argued that before being a mechanism of sexual regulation 
meant to protect women from male harassment, the veil denoted social rank and upward 
class mobility in Arabic cultures. Others like Winter have remarked that it can also be a 
means of empowerment granting women greater freedom of movement by allowing them 
to circulate in public space and see without being seen. These various conceptions 
ultimately show that the veil might very well be in the eye of the beholder. 
 The unveiled face has been invested with a similar range of significations. In 
contrast to critics' emphasis on the recent politicization of the veil in France, this chapter 
is concerned with what we could call a French “politics of the face.” We will examine 
representations of colonial-era évoluées and contemporary secular Muslims—two figures 
that have permeated France's collective imaginary—and pay particular attention to the 
visual regimes at work in colonial and postcolonial “dramaturgies” of unveiling in order 
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to explain 1) the emergence of “facial nudity” as a cultural and political norm of 
Frenchness, and 2) how this ideal served to recast veiled women as unassimilable bodies 
and relegate them to the margins of state citizenship. Despite the political nature of this 
discussion, I am not interested in arguing whether wearing an Islamic veil, regardless of 
its shape or form, should be banned. What I am concerned with is how the recent 
discourse promoted to legalize unveiling posits a notion of faciality that remains haunted 
by the specter of colonial history. 
 
Marc Garanger's Femmes algériennes 1960 through the lens of Sebbar's fiction 
 Hardly anywhere was women's participation in a conflict as crucial as in the 
Algerian war of independence (1954-1962).324 Whether they operated as nurses, cooks, or 
fighters among the FLN troops, they embodied a threat to colonial power that the Islamic 
veil only amplified. Indeed, the war quickly turned into what Fanon called a “bataille du 
voile” and the haïk became a tool of gender oppression that needed to be removed.325 An 
unveiling ceremony was organized on May 13th, 1958 in Algiers by the wives of generals 
Massu and Salan in order to promote Franco-Algerian fraternization and civilize 
“indigenous” women, that is, transform them into évoluées. Assembled in the forum of 
Algiers, a group of veiled women were encouraged by a cohort of European “sisters” to 
take off their veils and burn them in dramatic fashion. In the following days, similar 
ceremonies were held in Oran and Philippeville but they produced little impact overall. A 
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second unveiling campaign was launched two years later, but by this time the haïk had 
acquired a new dimension. It had become a tool of resistance preventing easy 
identification and thus undermining the regime of visual transparency imposed by the 
French authorities. Unveiling was no longer a social question but a military one. It is in 
this context that French photographer Garanger shot what remains to date his most 
famous collection of portraits, Femmes algériennes 1960. 
 In March 1960, as the Algerian war drew to an end, Garanger, then a 25-year-old 
draftee, left his native Normandy for the small village of Aïn Terzine in Kabylia. First 
enlisted as an administrative coordinator, he gradually worked his way into becoming a 
regiment photographer—a position he occupied until his return to France in February 
1962. Out of all the pictures that were produced over the course of his appointment 
(about 20.000), Garanger's portraits of Algerian women, which he was commissioned to 
photograph following a decree that all local civilians must carry proof of identity, remain 
the most memorable to date: 
When I arrived for the sittings, there would be a detachment of armed men with 
machine guns across their shoulders, an interpreter, and the commander. The 
women would be lining up. Each in turn would sit on a stool outdoors, in front of 
the whitewashed wall of the house—the mechta. I would come to within three feet 
of them. They would be unveiled. […] They had no choice in the matter. Their 
only way of protesting was through their look.326 
 
These pictures were produced for policing purposes at a rate of two hundred a day, for ten 
days. Six of them were immediately published in L'Illustré suisse. In 1982, fifty others 
were compiled in Femmes Algériennes 1960—a monograph that received such critical 
                                                          
326 Naggar, Carole. “The Unveiled: Algerian Women.” Illuminations: Women Writing on Photography 
from the 1850s to the Present. Liz Heron and Val Williams, eds. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 




acclaim it was reedited in 1989 and 2002. Since then, Garanger's portraits have been 
exhibited all over France and abroad. In 2012, Femmes Algériennes 1960 received further 
media attention. Interviews of Garanger appeared on several websites and newspapers as 
Algeria commemorated the 50th anniversary of its independence. 
 His portraits have also generated a vast body of scholarship. In Images of the 
World and the Inscription of War,327 German filmmaker Harun Farocki uses Garanger's 
identity photographs as a springboard for articulating a reflection on the representational 
logic of the camera and the way it relates to our field of vision, insisting on the 
disjunction of gaze and eye/look—a reflection further developed by Kaja Silverman in 
her essay The Threshold of the Visible World.328 More recently, Francophone critics have 
dwelt at length on the relationship between Femmes Algériennes 1960 and French 
Orientalism with a view to interrogating the sexual and racial politics that inform colonial 
iconographies of the (un)veiled woman.329 
Twenty-two years later, Garanger’s portraits also served as inspiration for Franco-
Algerian writer Leïla Sebbar. Born in 1941 from a French mother and an Algerian father, 
Sebbar left her Algerian hometown at nineteen to study in Paris. After defending her 
dissertation, she became a professor of French literature and started a career as a writer. 
Her oeuvre, which includes novels, short stories, essays, travelogues, epistolary 
exchanges, and photographic albums, focuses on the experience of migration, exile, and 
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her own status as a Franco-Algerian métisse. It is also concerned with visual arts and 
provides a feminist critique of the male gaze through an examination of what it means to 
look at women, “especially women of non-French extraction.”330 Such concerns 
profoundly affected her reception of Femmes Algériennes 1960. 
Sebbar’s re-appropriation of Garanger’s work is very reminiscent of the way 
Assia Djebar engaged with Delacroix’s paintings. In her famous short story Femmes 
d’Alger dans leur appartement,331 she entered into a dialogue with his homonymous 
painting (1834) which stages a familiar Western fantasy by portraying three unveiled 
women on the floor of a lavishly decorated room. By giving a voice to these women, 
Djebar’s story offered a counterpoint to Delacroix’s depiction of “the colonial harem”332 
as a space of desire and sexual depravity intended for a white male audience. The way 
she revised Delacroix’s perspective offers an example of intertextual relationship in 
which the Algerian woman, long represented as voiceless, finally responds to the French 
man.  
Sebbar adopts a similar approach in her novel Shérazade, 17 ans, brune, frisée, 
les yeux verts and her short story “La Photo d'identité,” both of which include explicit 
references to Garanger’s Femmes algériennes 1960. Shérazade is the first in a series of 
three novels to chronicle the life of a seventeen-year-old “beurette” who left her family 
home to set out for Algeria, and wanders the streets of Paris with her new friends, a group 
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of outcasts, as she waits for her forged papers to be completed. While in the capital, she 
develops a romance with Julien Desrosiers, a “pied noir” dilettante with an interest in 
Orientalist painting who becomes obsessed with filming and photographing her body. “La 
Photo d'identité” is also set in Paris; it follows Yacine, a French boy of Algerian descent, 
as he stumbles upon one of Garanger's portraits in a bookstore. This discovery allows him 
to piece together a Franco-Algerian past that his parents have always been secretive 
about. In front of the bookstore, he meets a stranger who, we find out, plans to kill 
Garanger on the ground that his mother, the subject of the photograph that grabbed 
Yacine's attention, went mad after she had her portrait taken. 
 Both Shérazade and “La Photo d'identité” tell stories about pictures. To be more 
specific, not only are they conditioned by pictures, they also address a range of questions 
about the relationship between literature and visual culture. Examining the incorporation 
of references to Garanger's portraits within these narratives is interesting. On the one 
hand, Sebbar uses photography as a means to elaborate on Marianne Hirsch’s notion of 
“postmemory.”333 The act of looking at Garanger’s photographs is described as a violent 
and undesirable, yet necessary experience because it marks the first step in re-membering 
a colonial past to which post-colonial generations have only had partial access. On the 
other hand, Sebbar's reading of Femmes algériennes 1960 initiated a trend of anti-
pictorialism that has largely and uncritically been taken up by much of recent 
postcolonial and feminist discourse, regardless of the problematic implications it poses. 
 As Jarrod Hayes explains, Shérazade embodies female resistance to the 
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“ethnographic gaze that tries to bind her to the idées reçues of Oriental femininity.”334 
Her refusal to cater to male scopophilia is a recurring motif of the novel. Attending a chic 
Parisian party with her friends France and Zouzou, she is photographed without her 
consent. Her reaction is immediate: “Elle lança l'appareil au sol à plusieurs mètres d'elle 
et partit avec Zouzou sans prendre garde à la crise qu'elle allait provoquer.”335 This 
impulsive gesture conveys the rage with which she rebels against the way her “exotic” 
beauty has made her the target of constant scrutiny. On multiple occasions, she refuses to 
comply with Julien's directions as he attempts to fix her into a cliché of the Oriental 
harem, objecting: “Je ne suis pas une odalisque.”336 This violent mise-en-scène of the 
photographic image reaches its most powerful expression when Shérazade is confronted 
with a volume of Femmes algériennes: “[Elle] feuilletait l'album photographique et les 
larmes coulaient, malgré elle.”337 In describing Garanger's subjects as women who 
“subissent l'arbitraire,” yet who find the strength to resist in front of the “objectif-
mitrailleur,”338 Sebbar invites us to consider the fetishistic appropriation of Sherazade's 
image as a (neo)colonial politics of representation, one that symbolically binds her to 
Garanger's subjects. 
 A similar fascination with and distrust of pictures permeates “La Photo 
d'identité.” While Shérazade affiliates Femmes algériennes with a tradition of colonial 
imagery, one that includes the likes of Delacroix, Matisse, and Loti; “La Photo d'identité” 
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only deals with Garanger. The way his work is introduced within the narrative could be 
described as a kind of literary close-up in at least three respects. First, the constraints of 
the short story, a genre that entails a great economy of means, allows for an exclusive and 
narrow focus on Femmes algériennes. Second, it is through a complex process of mise-
en-abyme that the famous “photo d'identité” is disclosed to the reader. Yacine looks at it 
through a small hole created by the mist that has gathered on the bookstore window, a 
hole that the narrator describes as “l'oeil d'une caméra.”339 It is as if Yacine temporarily 
replaced Garanger—a position that makes him aware of the violence inherent in the 
photographic act. Third, the whole scene is told using internal focalization despite the 
heterodiegetic narration. The scope of perception is entirely defined by Yacine's eye even 
though the story is told in the third person. 
 The 1960’s photographs emanate an unsettling aura. Yacine initially finds one of 
the portraits, to be “étrange”340 and much more poignant than the flow of graphic war 
images he usually sees on television.341 His surprise turns into great discomfort as he 
walks into the bookstore: “Vous êtes malade? Vous avez un malaise? Vous êtes tout 
pâle…,”342 the employee asks. The stranger experiences a similar sense of discomfort. 
The prospect of holding Garanger's book in his hands fills him with a fear that borders on 
panick: “Il est peut-être fou,”343 the narrator suggests. This madness recalls Shérazade's 
paroxysm of crying as she leafs through Femmes algériennes for the first time. In front of 
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Julien and his friend, she weeps “comme une femme folle, doucement, sans bruit et sans 
interruption.”344 
 In staging these affective responses, Sebbar throws new light on the reception of 
Femmes algériennes 1960. Garanger has always insisted that his portraits should be read 
as a testimony to the violence of a colonial war in which he reluctantly participated: “One 
day, the camp major decreed that the inhabitants of the villages must all have identity 
cards. Either I refused and went to prison, or I accepted. I understood my luck: it was to 
be a witness, to make pictures of what I saw that mirrored my opposition to the war”345—
a stance re-iterated in his foreword to Femmes Algériennes: “j'ai reçu leur regard à bout 
portant, premier témoin de leur protestation muette, violente. Je veux leur rendre 
témoignage.”346 Shérazade and “La Photo d'identité” provide a counter-narrative to 
Garanger's account of photography as a redemptive testimonial practice. Sebbar's 
treatment of post-war trauma and her insistence on the experience of looking at Femmes 
algériennes, which she describes as a fundamentally painful one, offer a new lens through 
which to consider his ID pictures. Like Garanger, Sebbar denounces a politics of 
representation that required women to remove their haïks. Like Garanger, she portrays 
these women as embodying resistance to the conventions of colonial picture-making in 
the way they display on their bared faces open disapproval. However, Sebbar's fiction 
operates a paradigmatic shift in terms of how the photographic act takes place. Unlike 
Garanger, she does not stage a male gaze (Garanger looking at his models) but the 
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(ex-)colonized male gaze (Yacine and the stranger looking at Garanger's models). The 
French photographer described women's gaze as “à bout portant,”347 an expression that 
yields a variety of meanings. On the one hand, “à bout portant” signals the close 
proximity between he and his sitters.348 On the other hand, it denotes the violence of the 
photographic act. If Garanger used the expression to insist on the intensity with which his 
sitters looked at him, as if “at pointblank,” Sebbar uses it differently. In “La Photo 
d'identité,” she describes his camera as an “objectif mitrailleur,” thus comparing the 
process of picture-making with a form of murder. It is no longer the women's gaze that is 
“à bout portant” but Garanger's. To take a close-up required him to shoot at pointblank. 
This comparison is further hinted at by the way Sebbar repeatedly calls him a “soldat-
photographe.”349 
    In his reading of the short story, Andy Stafford argues that “The photograph 
always invites another discourse, is never pure, is constantly surrounded by language 
(narrative, commentary, caption).”350 Sebbar's Shérazade and “La Photo d'identité” are 
attempts to construct a story around Garanger's photographs that integrates the (post-
colonial) perspective of the descendants in any appreciation of the Algerian conflict—a 
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gesture that is all the more crucial as “La Photo d’identité” insists on the silence that 
surrounds it. Photography is used as a “vector of memorial transmission”351 whereby 
Sebbar does not just interrogate what is to be remembered or forgotten but how it should 
be remembered. In doing so, she fosters a memory of the war that acknowledges, in 
inaugural fashion, the experience of France's post-colonial populations. I suggest 
considering Shérazade and “La Photo d'identité” as a series of captions that rewrite 
Garanger's preface to Femmes algériennes 1960 by inviting us to consider the violence it 
depicts from a different standpoint. 
 Ironically perhaps, Sebbar's attempt to break away from Garanger's narrative of 
redemption effects a fundamental violence. In order to articulate a new discourse on 
Femmes algériennes, she needs to “kill” him. As Barthes famously argued, “la naissance 
du lecteur doit se payer de la mort de l'auteur.”352 In “La Mort de l'auteur,” he argues 
against a Lansonian approach to literature that derives a text's meaning from its author's 
intentions, opinions, experiences or life circumstances. As the “destruction de toute 
voix,”353 writing cannot be limited to a single interpretive grid. Rather, it allows for a 
constellation of readings that destabilize univocal modes of narration. This death of the 
author is evoked in “La Photo d'identité” by the stranger who seeks to avenge his mother; 
she became mad as a result of having her picture taken by Garanger: “Ce photographe 
français, je le cherche depuis des années. […] Cet homme, s'il n'est pas mort, je le tue. Je 
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le cherche pour le tuer...”354 The violence of this act is somewhat assuaged by the fact 
that it ends up falling back on the portrait of his mother. Indeed, the short story ends with 
the protagonist destroying the famous “photo d'identité” as he was not able to locate 
Garanger: “Il arrache la page soigneusement. Il regarde la femme une dernière fois, il plie 
la page en deux, quatre, seize... et déchire le portrait, suivant les pliures jusqu'au plus 
petit carré. […] 'Voilà, c'est fini. J'ai tué le soldat photographe et ma mère me reconnaîtra 
quand j'arriverai chez elle, au village.”355 While this last gesture literally fails, 
photography being, as Walter Benjamin taught us, a means of technology that has the 
potential to be infinitely reproduced, it symbolically succeeds as it provides the 
conditions for a new narrative on Garanger's work to arise, one that questions his account 
of photography as a redemptive practice. While Sebbar condemns the violence that his 
portraits depict, she also insists that we should make a point of remembering it to 
articulate a post-colonial memory of the Algerian war. Her short story opens up a space in 
which two narratives on Femmes algériennes confront each other: Garanger's account of 
photography as testimonial and Sebbar's as inherently violent. The unveiled face becomes 
a ubiquitous site where diverging interpretations of the photographic act converge, where 
two sides meet—the colonial and the post-colonial, Sebbar and Garanger, the photograph 
as indexical and affective, as cold document and emotional vehicle; it should not surprise 
anyone that the library where Yacine sees the portrait should be named “Les deux rives.” 
 In short, Shérazade and “La Photo d'identité” are iconoclastic texts. Both vilify 
the image in a variety of ways. While Shérazade breaks a camera—in a symbolic gesture 
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to destruct the Orientalist clichés that sexualize her body—, Yacine's companion tears up 
his mother's portrait in an attempt to wreak his revenge against Garanger. Even Sebbar's 
decision to name her short story “La Photo d'identité” as opposed to, say, “Le Portrait” 
suggests that she denies Garanger's work any aesthetic value. I argue that this sometimes 
subtle, sometimes overt, but always pervading iconophobia has informed subsequent 
postcolonial and feminist criticism of Femmes algériennes 1960. 
 That Marc Garanger's portraits stage female rebellion against the violence of 
French occupation has been aptly argued by scholars. In her essay Picturing the Maghreb: 
Literature, Photography, (Re)Presentation, scholar Mary Vogl insists that “[t]he returned 
gaze of these women work against any nostalgic or complacent view of colonialism in 
Algeria,”356 and that their revolt precludes any possibility of viewing them as weak victims. 
Carole Naggar further elaborates on the type of violence they were subjected to, calling it 
“a kind of rape” for two reasons. 357 The first one, according to her, has to do with the act 
of unveiling. While the veil is most often worn by Muslim women as a symbol of modesty, 
French colonial authorities saw it as an instrument of oppression that had to be removed to 
emancipate Algerian women, that is, to have them abide by Western standards of 
femininity: “For an Algerian woman, the veil is inseparable from the face. It may be taken 
off within the secrecy of the walls among women or between husband and wife, but never 
publicly in front of a stranger […]. The veil is like a second skin, and the unveiling does 
more than lay the face bare: it flays it.”358 As a sort of screen, the veil challenged colonial 
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practices of surveillance that sought to make female bodies more legible. Garanger's 
identity photographs thus marked an attempt to inscribe such bodies into an economy of 
visibility—a process that Fanon denounced as feeding the systemic violence of French 
Imperialism. The second type of rape, Naggar claims, is photography's. Islam is generally 
understood to be an iconophobic religion that forbids representation: “A portrait is hasuma, 
shameful,”359 which Sebbar confirms in “La Photo d'identité”: “L'image, le prophète a 
interdit l'image, il faut aimer Dieu, pas son image, tu comprends. Si on veut te 
photographier, tu dis non.[...] Si tu voles l'image, tu détruis la personne, ils te tueront, pas 
avec le fusil, avec la caméra.”360 To photograph is to break Islam's taboo on pictorial 
representation. 
 It is reasonable to assume that Garanger's subjects had never shown their faces to 
complete strangers until they had their pictures taken. The moment of unveiling was most 
likely experienced as a traumatic humiliation. In the face of such violence, these women 
reacted in a variety of ways. In an attempt to preserve some semblance of modesty, many 
of them used their clothing to cover their bosom while others simply placed their arms on 
their thighs. The vast majority of them confronted the camera, looking at it either upward 
or downward from an elevated position. A few of them avoided eye contact, directing their 
gaze outside of the photographic frame, as if to signal their refusal to collaborate. While 
many critics, like Karine Eileraas, agree that “[t]he women in Garanger's images […] 
communicate a mix of indifference, curiosity, indictment, and hostility with their eyes,”361 
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they remain largely concerned with those pictures in which expressions of hostility, 
contempt and resistance prevail. Similarly, Carole Naggar writes that “the women's faces 
tell us about the difficulties of their lives, but they also tell us that they will not yield. Their 
angry look is the 'evil eye' that they cast to protect themselves and to curse their enemies. 
These defiant looks tell us of France's coming defeat and shame”362—a sentiment shared 
by Eileraas who claims that “[t]he women photographed by Garanger most strikingly 
communicate resistance with their eyes and facial expressions,”363 and that “[c]ollectively, 
[their] looks assume an aggressive, hostile, even scathing quality […]. Especially, they 
destabilize colonial positions of mastery and domination vis-à-vis the image. […] The 
defiant postures and expressions that haunt Garanger's imagery locate possibilities for 
subversive rupture within the processes of photographic composition and 
interpretation.”364 In her novel Shérazade, Sebbar also singles out the most angry-looking 
portraits: 
These faces had the hardness and the violence of those who are subject to despotic 
rule, knowing that they will find in themselves the force of resistance. These 
Algerian women all faced the machine gun of the lens, with the same intense, 
savage stare, a fierceness that the picture could only file for posterity without ever 
mastering or dominating.365  
 
Likewise, “La Photo d'identité” chooses as its central theme the portrait of a woman whose 
aggressive gaze intrigues Yacine and the stranger. Focusing exclusively on these defiant 
faces has allowed critics to argue that Garanger's portraits open up a space in which female 
agency is reclaimed. What these women show, beyond angry looks, is a refusal to 
                                                          
362 Naggar, op. cit., p. 426.  
363 Eileeras, op. cit., p. 817.  
364 Ibid., p. 827.  




participate in a colonial regime of representation—a posture that Shérazade emulates in 
her own way—, a willingness to resist the objectifying gaze of the camera and to authorize 
Garanger's pictures on their own terms. 
 One could invoke Deleuze's and Guattari's notion of “faciality” (visagéité) to 
support this reading of Femmes algériennes. In their 1980 essay Mille plateaux, they 
formulate an anti-levinassian stance that posits the face as a site of fundamental 
misrecognition: “C'est une erreur de faire comme si le visage ne devenait inhumain qu'à 
partir d'un certain seuil: gros plan, grossissement exagéré, expression insolite, etc. 
Inhumain dans l'homme, le visage l'est dès le début, il est par nature gros plan, avec ses 
surfaces blanches inanimées, ses trous noirs brillants, son vide et son ennui.”366 As 
discussed in Chapter One, Levinas described our sense of the face as a pre-discursive, 
universal given and a token of our humanity. Unlike him, Deleuze and Guattari consider it 
a historical by-product. Equating the birth of Western imperialism with that of Christianity, 
they argue that Jesus—the archetypal white male—became the ontological norm of 
faciality. In other words, the injunction to assume a face, while historically dated, was 
imposed as a universal one by white Europeans who used Christ's appearance as their 
exemplar: “Le visage est donc une idée tout à fait particulière dans sa nature, ce qui ne 
l'empêche pas d'avoir acquis et d'exercer la fonction la plus générale.”367 Deleuze and 
Guattari go on to argue that faces are created after this original by an abstract machine, a 
white wall/black hole system set in motion by certain assemblages of power or social 
formations that determine the relationship of hole (subjectivity) to wall (significance): “les 
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visages concrets individués,” they contend, “se produisent et se transforment autour de ces 
unités, de ces combinaisons d'unités.”368 
 Although their demonstration is couched in metaphorical language, it adds a 
productive angle of interpretation to previous discussions of Femmes algériennes. The 
process of facialization described by Deleuze and Guattari is both staged and 
problematized in Garanger's portraits. In Sebbar, ekphrastic accounts of Femmes 
algériennes all insist on the white wall/black hole complex that underpins the production 
of faces. For example, in “La Photo d'identité,” the portrait that piqued Yacine's curiosity 
depicts “une femme [...] assise contre un mur blanc, elle regarde le photographe par en 
dessous, un oeil noir, méchant.”369 One page later, the narrator mentions the same portrait, 
calling it “la photographie de la femme berbère assise devant un mur blanc”370—a woman 
who, we later find out, happens to be the stranger's mother. She told him that on the day 
the picture was taken, “les soldats l'ont trouvée, ils ne l'ont pas battue, mais ils l'ont traînée 
jusqu'au banc contre le mur blanc.”371 It is the same white wall that attracts Yacine's 
attention as he leafs through Garanger's collection: “il voit une autre femme, plus jeune, 
assise contre le mur blanc.”372  
In his postface to Femmes algériennes 1960, Garanger claimed that his friend Pierre 
Gassman offered to help him put together a portfolio to be submitted as part of his 
application for the Niépce prize, convincing him to scale up the portraits and increase the 
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whiteness of the background to enhance the dramatic aura of the scene. Applying a 
Deleuzian framework, one could argue that this “white wall of significance” is part of a 
photographic apparatus that was meant to facialize Garanger's sitters, that is, to turn them 
into Western-like colonial-era évoluées.  
As an adjective, “évolué” designates the state of having undergone a gradual 
change. This transformation is usually defined as a positive one. To evolve is, as the 
CNRTL website suggests, to reach “un certain degré de développement, de 
perfectionnement.” As a noun, it refers to any individual free from “notions traditionnelles 
religieuses ou morales.”373 In colonial times, the “évolué” became an avatar of the civilized 
other. However, the word did not simply denote an enlightened mind; it also implied a 
certain mise-en-scène of the body, a way of presenting oneself to the world. For men, this 
meant wearing Western-style dress, exchanging their pagnes for trousers, or as Fanon 
wrote, donning metaphorical “white masks.” For some women, this meant removing the 
veils that concealed them from sight in order to look presentable. This disciplining of the 
body is emblematic of the Western visual economy of transparency, one in which facial 
nudity occupies a central role.  
However, Garanger’s photographs suggest that facial nudity is not a pre-condition 
of visibility but a product of it. In other words, the bare face is not a blank canvas; it is not 
what makes it possible to see/read someone, but that which is always already seen/read 
through the lens of French imperialism. Indeed, the faces of Garanger’s sitters serve as 
symbols of Western progress. Despite their wishes, these women became emblems of a 
                                                          




new, modern femininity whose standards were fundamentally incompatible with the 
imposition of the veil.          
As discussed, critics have consensually insisted on the defiant looks that these 
women cast in a gesture of resistance. This “oeil noir” that strikes Yacine is also one that 
grabs Shérazade’s attention: “Ces Algériennes avaient toutes devant l'objectif-mitrailleur, 
le même regard intense, farouche, d'une sauvagerie que l'image ne saurait qu'archiver, sans 
jamais la maîtriser ni la dominer.”374 What their expressions make explicit is a refusal to 
partake in an enterprise of colonial subjugation. Photography captures the powerful threat 
that their gaze metonymizes. As Deleuze and Guattari argue: 
Si le visage est bien le Christ, c'est-à-dire l'Homme blanc moyen quelconque, les 
premieres déviances, les premiers écarts-types sont raciaux: homme jaune, homme 
noir, hommes de deuxième ou troisième catégorie. […] Ils doivent être 
christianisés, c'est-a-dire visagéifiés. […] Le racisme procède par détermination des 
écarts de déviance, en fonction du visage Homme blanc qui prétend intégrer dans 
des ondes de plus en plus excentriques et retardées les traits qui ne sont pas 
conformes, tantôt pour les tolérer à telle place et dans telles conditions, dans tel 
ghetto, tantôt pour les effacer sur le mur qui ne supporte jamais l'altérité.375 
 
One could analyze Garanger's portraits as instances in which the black holes of subjectivity 
(represented by the sitters' gaze) rebel against the white wall of significance (that of the 
mechta, and the conventional white background of ID pictures) that was meant to neutralize 
them. The purpose of this wall is to re-facialize Algerian women by integrating their 
features into a visual economy that is supposed to bring them closer to the facial standard 
of “l'Homme blanc.” Their subjectivity radiates through their gaze, pierces the white 
surface of the wall and jams the imperial machine of faciality that coordinates how holes 
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and wall should interact. In Garanger's portraits, faces become not just sites of articulation 
upon and through which female subjectivity is negotiated; they are not just the sites of an 
excess that the camera cannot quite capture but an occasion for meta-critical commentary 
on the origin of authorship and the process of authorizing a picture. Through a series of 
interventions—sorting, editing, emphasizing details, enlarging, and paratextual glossing—
Garanger asserts his agency as a war photographer; yet this process is contested by the 
visual rhetoric that his portraits deploy since his sitters reject the codes of colonial 
portraiture and attempt to authorize the pictures on their own terms. 
 Encouraged by Sebbar, the narrative of resistance that has prevailed in discussions 
of Femmes algériennes 1960 is one that needs nuancing. Many of the portraits that 
Garanger compiled have been overlooked by critics. Those generally represent vulnerable 
women. Probably impressed by the detachment of armed men supervising the scene, or 
perhaps scared by the ritual of the camera that they do not understand, they protect 
themselves, covering their chest in an attempt to maintain some semblance of dignity. They 
are docile bodies—bodies subjected to power, enclosed, classified, controlled with the sole 
purpose of law enforcement. Far from resisting the camera, these faces show fear, 
compliance and submission to the violence perpetrated upon them.  
Garanger's portraits stage a variety of affects that prevent us from privileging a 
specific reading of Femmes Algériennes 1960. This is perhaps best illustrated by Harun 
Farocki in his 1988 film Images of the World and the Inscription of War. In one of the 
final sequences, Farocki uses his hand to partially re-veil the face of one sitter, first 
concealing her chin, mouth and nose, then her eyes and forehead. As he does so, the voice 




be accustomed to being looked at.”376 In partially hiding her face the way he does, 
Farocki draws attention to the facial micro-movements that criticism has often neglected 
to take into account. Indeed, while her eyes display a rather neutral expression, a pout of 
discomfort slightly alters her mouth, thus offering a counterpoint to analyses that 
systematically insist on the prevalence of defiant gazes. In this pout lies an expression of 
pure corporeality, an instinctive response to the photographer’s gaze, an impulse that 
escapes the control of reason. The sitter is not just making a face (“une grimace”); she is 
making a new face—a face that does not comply with the conventions of Western 
photographs, in which smiling is traditionally used to denote the tacit agreement that 
binds the photographer to her/his subject. The woman’s distorted mouth is a re-assertion 
of her subjectivity in the face of a colonial initiative meant to produce standardized faces 
for the purpose of identification and surveillance.  
Karina Eileraas wrote that “none of these women opt to smile for the camera. This 
is important to note in a cross-cultural encounter in which the smile would typically serve 
a mitigating function to mute the potentially disruptive or confrontational role of the other's 
gaze.”377 While this statement applies to many photographs, including the one on which 
Farocki focused, it is not entirely true. As surprising as it may seem, Femmes Algériennes 
1960 includes at least two photographs of smiling women. If we accept Eileraas's 
assumption that smiling is an act of collaboration, then such photographs compel us to 
reconsider the feminist discourse that has elevated Garanger’s sitters to a position of 
resistance and authority. Is it really so, however? Does the smile always signal a desire to 
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negotiate or compromise? Could it not also be interpreted as an ironic sign of mockery, in 
which case it would still preserve its disruptive potential? Far from being complicit in the 
violence imposed on them, these two women would be laughing at it.  
 Much of postcolonial/feminist criticism on Femmes algériennes has portrayed 
Garanger's sitters as rebellious subjects with defiant gazes. This reading was encouraged 
by Sebbar's own take on the volume. In “La Photo d'identité,” she posits Garanger's 
(symbolic) death—a postcolonial re-enactment of Roland Barthes's “la mort de l'auteur”—
as the pre-condition for a new narrative that rehabilitates female agency. While this reading 
has largely prevailed, I argue that it is entangled in two contradictions. First, in producing 
her counter-narrative, Sebbar dismisses Garanger's intentions as irrelevant. The women's 
aggressive looks, she claims, constitute an attempt to resist the objectifying power of the 
camera—a problematic position given how much effort Garanger focused on post-treating 
such photographs. Yet, as Andy Stafford showed, portraying these women as defiant-
looking precisely suggests that Garanger “had intended things in this way”378; he wanted 
to testify and convey the violence done to these women. In other words, while Sebbar's 
reading of Garanger is predicated upon the notion that his motives should play no role in 
defining the meaning of his work, her very interpretation of it subtly reintegrates him as 
author, if we follow Stafford’s argument. Second, and perhaps most importantly, her 
reading of Femmes algériennes is problematic in the way it overlooks a range of ambiguous 
portraits that seem to call into question the narrative of resistance she articulates in her 
fiction. The way Garanger's pictures have been read as solely staging revolt has contributed 
                                                          




to the reification of the sitters’ subjectivity—a posture that they precisely sought to avoid. 
 More broadly, Garanger’s collection of portraits and their treatment in Sebbar’s 
fiction underscore the tensions at work in the notion of “facial nudity.” In the context of 
the Algerian war, the naked face was never a pure potentiality, a blank slate waiting to be 
given meaning or value, but an ideological construct. Indeed, baring one’s face became a 
sign of female emancipation, an embrace of Western rules of conduct, a symbol of social 
progress and civilization. If Sebbar has drawn attention to these tensions, her re-
appropriation of Femmes Algériennes 1960 appears just as problematic. In describing 
Garanger’s sitters as figures of colonial resistance, she paradoxically gives in to a similar 
kind of objectification. 
 
Metonymy or Hypallage? Assia Djebar's Poetics of the Face 
 Femmes algériennes 1960 and the corpus of literary/critical texts it has generated 
has drawn attention to the face as a locus where the parameters of female subjectivity are 
endlessly negotiated. In what follows, I examine Djebar's novel Ombre sultane as a 
corrective to Sebbar's fiction, which played a crucial role in reifying unveiled women. To 
what extent does Djebar's novel re-configures the relationship between female interiority 
and its inscription on the body—the face—in ways that avoid reducing the unveiled 
woman to a monolithic figure? 
 Assia Djebar's work is concerned with the various forms of oppression that 




“woman-writer,” a label that always made her uncomfortable,379 she drew attention to the 
plight of her silenced, disenfranchised “sisters” during French colonization, the war of 
independence, and in post-colonial Algeria where patriarchy has remained prevalent. 
Very much like Sebbar, her project is “to set free the 'odalisques.'”380 Such 
preoccupations permeate her “Algerian Quartet,” an autobiographical project that was left 
unfinished after her passing in February 2015. Out of the four projected volumes, three 
were published before her death: L'Amour, la fantasia (1985), Ombre sultane (1987), and 
Vaste est la prison (1995). Combining personal experience with collective memory, 
colonial archives, and myth, these texts perform what Mortimer has called a “narrative 
'unveiling.'”381 “Dans mes premiers livres,” Djebar explained, “j'avançais voilée. Dans le 
quatuor, je me montre.”382  
   Ombre sultane takes up this notion of “unveiling” to treat it both literally and in 
figurative fashion. Isma, a learned, emancipated woman and fictional avatar of Djebar, 
tells the story of the young, uneducated Hajila, chronicling her effort to escape from a 
violent husband that was once her own. The two women are indeed co-wives, yet they are 
not rivals. They develop a strong feminine bond that ultimately allows Hajila to throw off 
the shackles of her unhappy marriage. This process of liberation is a gradual one. Hajila 
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starts by taking advantage of her husband's repeated absences to leave the confines of her 
apartment and venture into the streets of Algiers where she discards her veil and enjoys 
“les frémissements du dehors.”383 A further step is taken when Isma provides her with a 
key to the apartment, a symbolic act of transmission whereby Hajila becomes free to 
move as she pleases and take control of her destiny. Unlike the kind of unveiling that the 
Femmes Algériennes 1960 collection depicts, the one Djebar describes is voluntary and 
actively pursued. It does not take place in colonial Kabylia but post-colonial Algiers. It 
might be tempting to consider Hajila as a figure of resistance similar to Sebbar's 
interpretation of Garanger's sitters. Yet, as I will argue, Djebar's portrayal of Hajila avoids 
reproducing the pitfalls of reification that have plagued appreciation of Garanger's 
portraits. 
 Ombre sultane was published in 1987, two years prior to the first French 
“headscarf affair” in which unveiling became a major point of contention, and three years 
after the enactment of the Algerian Family code—a set of conservative laws based on the 
Sharia which profoundly re-defined marriage, imposing more restrictions on women. 
Djebar's narrative of emancipation offers a timely critique of this code and the brand of 
Islamic revivalism that made it possible. Hajila's unveiling, the disclosure of her “naked” 
face to unknown passers-by and readers transgresses men's right to control her body. This 
celebration of female “nudity” is all the more subversive as it takes place in a typically 
masculine space—that of the street. 
                                                          




 The experience of female embodiment has largely been commented upon.384 
Critics have drawn attention to Ombre sultane's scenes of unveiling, explaining the ways 
in which Hajila re-discovers her body upon discarding her haïk. In what follows, I argue 
that Hajila's empowerment is a function of removing her veil. Only when she is “naked” 
and fully exposed to the gaze of others does she develop a sense of the face—a process 
that ultimately allows her to enter the realm of subjectivity.  
 A brief lexical inventory suffices to show the importance of faciality in the novel. 
Out of the 173 pages that my edition comprises, the French word “face” appears eighteen 
times, the word “tête” thirty-eight times, and the word “visage” sixty-five times, not to 
mention compounds like “dévisager,” or “envisager.” Faces are omnipresent, whether 
they look impenetrable385 or lifeless,386 pale387 or covered in make-up,388 worried389 or 
joyful,390 tense391 or calm,392expressionless393 or in tears.394 They can also give rise to 
autoscopic experiences: I can see my face in someone else's,395 but I can also not 
recognize my own face when I see it,396 or worse, feel like I do not possess one at all.397  
 The variety of ways in which faces are described in Ombre sultane seems to 
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emphasize their role as natural markers of subjectivity. Yet Hajila's experience tells a 
different story. From the moment she struggles to recognize her reflection in the mirror at 
the beginning of the novel until her features blend into Isma's in the final pages, she goes 
through a series of transformations that establish her face as a locus where female 
subjectivity is never taken for granted. The inscription of Hajila's body—of her face—not 
just in the narrative economy of Ombre Sultane but in Djebar's own language offers a 
form of feminine self-expression that challenges any specific notion of “womanhood”, 
presenting the female experience as endlessly changing and difficult to pin down. 
Djebar’s attempt to develop a voice that successfully accounts for the range of positions 
from which women articulate their own visions and sensibilities is echoed in her prose 
style which celebrates female solidarity while emphasizing individuality, variability, and 
freedom of self-determination. In Ombre sultane, portraits of Hajila alternate between 
hypallage and metonymy, and in doing so, lay the basis for a poetics of the face that 
precludes any essentializing mode of identification. This poetics, I argue, can be read as a 
response and corrective to Sebbar's objectifying account of Garanger's portraits. 
 Hypallage is commonly understood as a figure of speech in which the syntactic 
relation between two words, usually a noun and an adjective, is reversed and each of 
them assumes the construction which would have been assigned to the other. In De Arte 
Dicendi (1556) Sanctius, who was the first to consider hypallage a proper trope, claims 
that it consists in “remplacer un accident par un autre accident, et cela de diverses 




ne restitue pas chaque épithète à son sujet.”398 While grammatically sound, this 
replacement or substitution creates semantic confusion. When Djebar describes the 
effects of aging on Isma's face, she explains that her “visage anxieusement se mire par 
secondes griffées.”399 While following the rules of agreement, the final combination of 
“secondes” and “griffées” undermines traditional expectations. One would presume the 
adjective “griffées” to qualify “visage,” as a “scratched face” is more apt to convey the 
passing of time and its consequences on Isma than the more poetic but certainly less 
logical “scratched seconds.” This “accident,” to borrow Sanctius's terminology, defies 
common linguistic practices and cultural assumptions. Likewise, when Hajila's husband 
is described as having a “face à la paleur de cire, qui s'effrite dans un brouillard,”400 one 
cannot say with absolute certainty whether the wax (literal interpretation) or the face 
itself (figurative interpretation) is crumbling. 
 By bringing together two seemingly unrelated realities, hypallage creates a sense 
of undecidability that unhinges discourse and resists conceptual resolution. The most 
emblematic example is perhaps to be found in the opening pages of Ombre sultane. 
Hajila is absorbed in domestic chores, clearing the table after breakfast and doing dishes, 
when she is suddenly overcome with distress and sorrow: “Une tasse, sous tes doigts 
soudain fébriles, se fêle contre la faïence de l'évier.”401 Confined within the limits of her 
apartment by her husband, she daydreams of the outdoors and what city life must be like. 
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Her inability to venture into the world results in a fit of crying: “Des larmes coulent sur 
ton visage fin et brun; […] Tes larmes reprennent, s'égouttent sur l'évier, sur le sol 
étincelant. Tu te penches ('ramasser mon visage en miettes, vomir mon âme!.. O Sidi 
Abderahmane aux deux tombeaux!')”402 Hajila's nervous breakdown finds a striking 
parallel in the way her body disintegrates. Her physical dislocation is further hinted at as 
she goes on to make the bed: “Mouvement cassé de tes bras.”403 The ambiguity of 
“cassé,” which qualifies “mouvement,” could also and perhaps more logically apply to 
“bras.” Indeed in French, the phrase “bras cassé” does not simply denote a broken arm; it 
also designates in slang someone who is unable to perform even the slightest task 
properly, a good-for-nothing. Hajila's tired movements and the sense of extreme 
weariness she feels are reinforced by the broken syntax of the sentence (“Mouvement 
cassé de tes bras”) whose verb has been amputated. Hajila's body functions as if it were 
as a continuation of her environment. Djebar's use of hypallage establishes a relation of 
contiguity between her character and the milieu she inhabits. Indeed Hajila becomes so 
absorbed in her daily duties that her very body starts to blend into her surroundings: Like 
the cup she breaks against the sink, her face is “en miettes” and her gestures “cassés.” 
 Djebar employs another rhetorical figure of substitution—metonymy—to 
represent Hajila. As a result of her nervous breakdown, her “visage en miettes” becomes 
a “'Face de la douleur.'”404 This is immediately followed by a portrait that provides the 
first visual description of her appearance: “Tu palpes tes traits, tes pommettes saillantes, 
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tes yeux enfoncés, ton front un peu bombé qui atténue ton regard—quel regard de quelle 
inconnue?”405 Hajila's face is broken down into a series of individual features that 
undermine its overall integrity, recalling what Isma had described one page earlier as a 
“visage en miettes.”  
 Metonymy has often been compared to, and sometimes confused with, 
hypallage.406 Both are figures of substitution, but while metonymy depends on the 
substitution of one thing by another one that is either part of it or closely associated with 
it, hypallage consists in replacing one thing with an unfamiliar or foreign one. As a result, 
they usually fulfill different, if not opposite, aesthetic functions: where metonymy 
figures, hypallage disfigures; where metonymy juxtaposes, hypallage destroys; where the 
former reveals, the latter negates. 
 This tension structures Ombre sultane's scenes of unveiling. In one such scene, 
Hajila discards her haïk and realizes that she will be seen by strangers for the first time in 
her adult life—a prospect that fills her with a combination of dread and excitement. One 
day, she is approached in a square: “Quelqu'un que tu n'as pas vu venir s'est penché pour 
te parler. Un vieux ou un jeune, un étranger, tu ne sais: un effroi t'a saisie, tu n'as rien 
entendu! Tu as compris qu'une question t'était posée par ce visage aux yeux verdâtres. 
Une verrue avec un poil est posée au bout du sourcil de l'homme.”407 This scene is 
ambiguous for it reads, on the one hand, as a failed face-to-face encounter. The unveiled 
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woman struggles to identify her interlocutor's age but notices two distinctive traits, his 
green eyes and a wart on his eyebrow, thus recalling Levinas’s famous claim: “C’est 
lorsque vous voyez un nez, des yeux un front, un menton, et que vous pouvez les décrire, 
que vous tournez vers autrui comme vers un objet. La meilleure façon de rencontrer 
autrui, c’est de ne pas même remarquer la couleur de ses yeux!”408 Yet the mere fact that 
this man addresses and expects a response from Hajila underscores how the process of 
unveiling affords her public visibility. The level of anonymity provided by her veil gives 
way to exposure and vulnerability. She can be seen by strangers; her body has become a 
target for the other's gaze—giving her the novel and still uncomfortable sense of having a 
face.409  
 Unveiling oneself, here, does not merely attract gazes; it grants the right to see. As 
Hajila gains confidence strolling around the streets of Algiers, she becomes an active 
observer. By recasting the act of gazing in public as one that is not solely performed by 
men, Hajila challenges patriarchal norms. Nancy Arenberg has seen in her an avatar of 
the postcolonial flâneuse.410 Unlike the nineteenth-century Baudelairian flâneur, Djebar's 
flâneuse is “constructed on a broader postmodern identification of the urban female 
stroller which manifests itself in the twentieth century, a time when women were more 
likely to explore public spaces.”411 Quoting Sarah Clement, Arenberg adds that Hajila's 
transformation from submissive wife to independent stroller requires her to “change roles 
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from the observed to the observer. In doing this she rejects certain gender roles and 
makes herself into the other.”412 As Hajila discards her veil, her sole preoccupation is to 
take in all the sights that the outdoors has to offer, to the point that her face is reduced to 
“un regard qui dévore.”413 Her exploration of the world takes the form of a symbolic 
rebirth, in which she sees through new eyes and emerges as a free woman: “Une fois 
dehors, l'après-midi, tu découvres d'autres façades, d'autres visages,”414 Isma explains. 
“Tandis que tu marches au hasard, hésitante, enfin les yeux libres, tu regardes.”415 Her 
“free eyes” function as a metonymy for her whole body. Once her haïk is removed, Hajila 
navigates the urban space in a state of heightened awareness, abandoning herself to the 
flow of light and sensations that pass through her: “Yeux ouverts, corps à la dérive.”416 
Yet the euphoric rush of gazing is dismissed by her husband as a “distraction vorace.”417 
Interestingly enough, his first reaction upon finding out that Hajila has been sneaking out 
of the apartment without her veil is a desire to blind her with a broken bottle, as if to 
revoke her privilege and re-inscribe her in a patriarchal economy where visual 
transgression is no longer possible.  
 Numerous women writers who traveled to the French Maghreb during 
colonization, or lived there—Hubertine Auclert, Isabelle Eberhardt, Raymonde Machard, 
Henriette Célarié, Marie Bugéja, etc.—provided very similar accounts of their “sisters.” 
The way Djebar reduces Hajila's face to a pair of scrutinizing eyes is perhaps best 
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understood as an attempt to rewrite a topos of early twentieth-century travel literature: 
that of the veiled body. “Qu'avons-nous vu des femmes musulmanes? Un oeil,” 
Raymonde Machard wrote.418 Her portrayal of “fantômes aux voix furibondes mais 
assourdies qui brillent de colère par un oeil”419 echoes Marie Bugéja's description: “un 
paquet blanc déambule sous les voiles serrés. Un oeil, un petit bout d'oeil, inquisiteur et 
curieux, nous lorgne.”420 Fascinated with this “voile [qui] s'écarte à peine sur un œil,”421 
Bugéja noted that “De nombreuses 'adeptes de Moïse' sortent voilées. Un oeil, seul, est 
visible, et si peu!”422 Unsurprisingly, she also called them “gros ballots ou un petit trou, à 
la place d'un oeil, est le seul moyen d'y voir pour se conduire.”423 In Ombre sultane 
Djebar re-defines this prying eye, once a vector of exotic fascination, into an organ of 
female empowerment that breaks the circuit of male gazing. It is no longer an eye seen by 
(white) women writers but one that sees and, in this very seeing, threatens male 
hegemony. 
 Djebar's novel presents us with a tension. While unveiling gives the new sensation 
of having a face, it is one to which the reader is never completely granted access. Indeed, 
her face is caught up in two conflicting regimes of representation—metonymy and 
hypallage—which conceal as much as they reveal. This oscillation opens a liminal space 
for the inscription of female subjectivity while avoiding any risk of reification; it allows 
women to speak without requiring them to adopt a fixed subject position.  
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Recalling that metonymy provides shape and visual cues, while hypallage distorts 
and undermines them, the latter is used to express how Hajila's face initially crumbles 
and is defaced through a form of domestic alienation, while the former is employed to 
describe her subsequent re-appropriation of her body and affirmation of her subjectivity, 
as she becomes both a subject and object of gaze—of representation—upon discarding 
her veil. However, this distinction is not as clear-cut as one might think. The use of 
metonymy often reduces Hajila's face to a collection of atomized parts, making it difficult 
to visualize what she looks like. It breaks down the whole of the face, turning it into a 
strange, unfamiliar object that the gaze cannot grasp or envisage in its entirety. 
 The alternating use of metonymy and hypallage preserves the enigma of Hajila's 
face, or in Isma's words, its “secret.”424 In one of the final scenes of the novel, the two 
women meet at a local hammam where Hajila receives a key to her own apartment, 
allowing her to circulate as she pleases. Many critics have described this hammam as a 
space of nurturing, a “lieu de renaissance”425 reminiscent of a “maternal cocoon, an 
image reinforced by the continuous flow of water gently cleansing the nude bodies of the 
bathers.”426 It is also a space of solidarity where women can share their stories, take care 
of each other, and create bonds that transcend class differences; a space where “la fluidité 
de toute reconnaissance”427 prevails, thus allowing the poor and uneducated Hajila to see 
in the successful, learned Isma a powerful ally; a space where “ne plus dire 'tu,' ni 
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'moi'”428 becomes the only possible form of relationship.  
And indeed, as the two women meet, an instinctive connection is formed between 
them: “Dans cette pose de baigneuse un peu gauche,” Isma notes, “ton visage habité 
d'une hésitation enfantine, je perçois enfin ta grâce de femme; ton secret. (Et je me 
rappelle que, dans mon dialecte arabe, au-dessus de la beauté qu'on peut célébrer chez 
une femme, c'est le 'secret' qu'on loue, la trace insaisissable qu'il laisse transparaître sur 
une face.)”429 Hajila is desexualized; as a clumsy “baigneuse,” she departs from the 
canons of Orientalist figuration. Her body is not a vector of eroticism, but the locus of an 
ethical encounter. Her relationship with Isma reaches a new level when the latter is able 
to decipher the almost oxymoric “trace insaisissable” on her face. In the intimate space of 
the hammam, the two women stand together, bound by a spirit of complicity and 
solidarity that reappears in the final pages. 
Overwhelmed by a pregnancy that she did not want after being raped by her 
husband, Hajila throws herself in front of a car in the hope of aborting. As she is lying on 
the ground, Isma remarks: “Moi, j'ai regardé ton visage pâle. J'ai vu le mien, que je 
n'avais jamais pu voir, à ce même instant où l'aile de la mort vous caresse, ou son sourire 
imperceptible semble vous dire 'pas maintenant, ce n'est point l'heure!' Mon visage que je 
n'ai pas trouvé.”430 While Isma is usually portrayed in the role of an auxiliary, this scene 
brings her relationship with Hajila to a new, more egalitarian level. As she contemplated 
Hajila’s face at the hammam, Isma noticed her secret grace (“je perçois enfin ta grace de 
                                                          
428 Ibid., p. 158. 
429 Ibid., pp. 163-164.  




femme; ton secret”); in this final scene, she also recognizes in it a reflection of her own 
subjectivity (“j'ai regardé ton visage pâle. J'ai vu le mien”). In other words, not only does 
Hajila's face show the impact of Isma's mentorship, it works as a mirror reflecting Isma's 
own continuing struggle for emancipation against systems of oppression. As Mortimer 
argues, “in the process of speaking for Hajila, Isma articulates her own story. As she 
recalls memories of her own struggle against social proscriptions that confine woman's 
body, restrict her physical presence in public space, and support the patriarch's refusal of 
any other masculine gaze, she now identifies with her traditional sister.”431  
The only other mirror scene of the novel occurs in the opening pages where 
Hajila, beaten down by her life of drudgery and abuse, fails to recognize her reflection: 
“tu te tapotes les joues; ton visage serait-il celui d'une autre?”432 Her sense of 
estrangement is reinforced by the use of second-person narration. Indeed, her body is 
seen through the eyes of Isma, who, at this point in the story, is still a complete stranger 
to her. The answer to her question (“ton visage serait-il celui d’une autre?”) is found in 
the final scene that we discussed, where Isma sees her own face in her co-wife’s. 
Djebar’s novel is framed by two mirror scenes that emblematize Hajila’s trajectory from 
alienation to independence. She becomes empowered through her relationship with Isma 
who models an attitude of care and support. Her transformation into an emancipated 
woman is reflected in the physical resemblance that she symbolically shares with Isma at 
the end of the novel.  
Djebar’s writing embraces the multiple, inchoate states of female embodiment 
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and, in so doing, allows for the play of identification and distanciation on which Ombre 
sultane is based. Hajila's face is embroiled in a regime of representation that alternates 
between metonymy and hypallage in order to account for the range of experiences her 
body goes through (alienation/liberation, solitude/togetherness, numbness/euphoria, etc.) 
while undermining claims for any specific notion of what it means to live as a woman. 
Djebar's feminism is one that encourages female solidarity, yet also questions whether 
“woman” is a meaningful position from which to speak. This tension is encapsulated by 
the way she portrays Hajila's relationship to her body in terms that simultaneously allow 
her to relate to Isma's plight and retain her individuality. To a larger extent, one could 
argue that Djebar’s autobiographical novel provides a counterpoint to Sebbar's 
description of Garanger's portraits. Where Sebbar assumed all of Garanger's sitters to be 
defiant women, Djebar suggests that female subjectivity is not monolithic and should 
never be taken for granted. Her novel lays the basis for a poetics of the face that opens up 
a liminal space for oppressed women to articulate a broad range of lived experiences. 
 
Figuring (Out) French Citizenship: “Mariannes d'aujourd'hui”  
 
“Le niqab ou la burqa […] est un crime qui 
assassine la face”433 
—Abdelwahab Meddeb 
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 Ombre sultane was initially published to address the rise of fundamentalism in 
Algerian society, but by an ironic twist of fate the novel also came out at a time of 
growing concern over the veil and its relation to secularism in French society. Originally 
meant as a critique of Algerian Islamism, Djebar's novel became a spearhead of French 
secularism when in 1989 what came to be known as the first “headscarf affair” erupted. 
The story of Hajila met with critical acclaim among the supporters of laïcité and became 
part of a literary corpus that participated in the redefinition of the veil as a tool of female 
oppression fundamentally at odds with the values of French republicanism. In this last 
part, I focus on one last “dramaturgy” of unveiling, this time in France: the 2003 
photographic exhibition “Mariannes d’aujourd’hui.” I show how the elevation of “facial 
nudity” to a Republican value relies on a discourse that simultaneously borrows from and 
re-works the tropes of racial/sexual difference at work in colonial representations of 
unveiled Muslims, including Garanger’s portraits.  
 The 2010 ban on face-covering was enforced after months of public discussions in 
which the main point of contention was not so much whether full-face veils should be 
forbidden in public spaces as which reasons could be invoked to do so legally. 
Secularism, which came up frequently in the debates that preceded France's 
criminalization of the veil, was not deemed a valid reason to prevent Muslim practitioners 
from wearing it. Indeed, secularism is by no means anti-religious; on the contrary, it 
guarantees freedom of thought and religion by making sure that the State does not get 
involved in religious affairs and conversely, that religious authorities do not meddle in 




Church and State. In addition, the notion of secularism applies to the Republic and its 
institutions, but does not extend to French citizens. As legal expert Guy Carcassonne 
explains in a government report from January 2010: 
La laïcité n'est pas un fondement imaginable: […] La République peut se fixer des 
règles, procédant de la notion de neutralité, mais elle ne peut y soumettre les 
consciences. Sur le plan pratique, une loi d'interdiction fondée sur la laïcité 
ouvrirait une brèche: tous les signes extérieurs d'appartenance religieuse seraient 
prohibés, sauf à introduire des discriminations injustifiables.434 
 
Equally surprising is the dismissal of women's rights advocacy as a justification for the 
ban given how full-face veils have been accused of hindering female dignity. The current 
Constitution does not make it possible to frame the wearing of a niqab or a burqa as a 
mysogynist act. Indeed legal expert Bertrand Mathieu notes in the same report that “Au 
sens de 1946, la dignité associe égalité et liberté, et attribue le plus grand rôle au libre 
arbitre: chacun a le même libre arbitre, le même droit que son voisin de gouverner son 
propre corps et son comportement dans la cité.”435 Dignity as it is conceived of within the 
framework of French law gives individuals the freedom to behave as they choose so long 
as they do not interfere with the freedom of others or cause them harm. Prohibiting full-
face veils would therefore require proving that donning them constitutes a threat to social 
order. 
 This argument was ultimately the one lawmakers retained to justify the ban. 
According to Guy Carcassonne, one of the legacies of the 1789 French Revolution was to 
establish a social consensus or “code social”436 comprised of implicit values, one of 
                                                          






which is to bare one's face as a sign of civility when addressing someone. In line with 
Carcassonne, philosopher Abdennour Bidar and public intellectual Abdelwahab Meddeb 
conjured up Levinas's thought on ethics to demonstrate that the other's face is first and 
foremost one that speaks to me and hiding it negates the demand for communication that 
the very nature of public space entails. According to them, the veil functions as a 
Machiavellian mask that creates duplicity, insincerity, and deprives the human of its 
infinite openness to others: 
 Le voilement du visage [...] dessaisit l’humain de la franchise qu’exigent aussi  
 bien le politique que l’esthétique, l’éthique ou la métaphysique. C’est un masque  
 qui annule le visage, qui l’abolit, nous cachant les intensités témoignant de  
 l’altérité qu’Emmanuel Levinas a saisie et dont nous recueillons les précoces  
 rudiments chez de nombreux penseurs de la millénaire tradition islamique, qui ont 
 médité le franc face-à-face entre eux et leur Seigneur éprouvant leur singularité  
 dans l’esseulement du retrait.437 
 
Coming to the conclusion that the full-face veil constitutes a refusal to engage with others 
or to acknowledge their existence, as well as a blatant form of rejection and withdrawal 
that contradicts the oldest Islamic tradition, it was decided that the wearing of niqabs and 
burqas constituted a violation of the implicit “social code” to which Carcassonne 
referred. Banning them became a crucial step in the promotion of a Republican “vivre-
ensemble” (living-together) that ensured national cohesion in the face of 
“communautarisme.”438 
 Yet, this ban ushers in a number of tensions and contradictions. Section four 
addresses situations in which face-covering is forced and as such “le fait pour toute 
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personne d'imposer à une ou plusieurs autres personnes de dissimuler leur visage par 
menace, violence, contrainte, abus d'autorité ou abus de pouvoir, en raison de leur sexe, 
est puni d'un an d'emprisonnement et de 30 000 € d'amende.”439 Sanctions increase when 
minors are targeted and can reach up to two years' imprisonment and a 60.000 euro fine. 
While this section, like the six others that make up the law, is couched in vague rhetoric, 
it constitutes a clear indictment of Islamic full-face veils. Overall the ban produces a 
narrative that insists on the government's “mission” to save Muslim women from the 
oppression that binds them to don full-face veils. Yet, according to Section One of the 
ban, they can also be fined for covering their faces. One might, therefore, wonder: what 
to make of a law that criminalizes the very individuals it also defines as victims? Why 
punish veiled Muslims when public discourse has kept defining them as helpless, docile, 
and vulnerable?   
 The 2010 ban re-cast the female body as a site where the limits of French law are 
interrogated, and conversely, it re-defined French law as a site for questioning the 
boundaries of female corporeality. Its goal is to make explicit a tacit value of French 
Republicanism: “facial nudity” and the notion of sociality that it entails. First, legislating 
on the niqab and the burqa reintroduces specific moral and cultural values into the canon 
of French law, thus betraying its primary mission to promote universal rights. Second, to 
what extent does the ban constitute an attempt to clarify unstated values, like “facial 
nudity,” as opposed to creating them? The line between the two is a tenuous one and the 
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extremely vague, roundabout language in which the law was drafted does little to 
dissipate this ambiguity. To the point where one can legitimately wonder: does the 
conflation of “facial nudity” with Republican civility not serve as an ideological cover to 
pursue a veiled anti-Islamic agenda?  
Even more problematic is the way Levinas was used to provide a theoretical 
justification for the ban. Some like Abdennour Bidar and Abdelwahab Meddeb saw in the 
Islamic veil a threat that undermines the experience of face-to-face interaction, so central 
to France’s conception of sociality in public—and therefore secular—spaces. Yet “Dans 
l'accès au visage,” Levinas argued, “il y a certainement aussi un accès à l'idée de 
Dieu.”440 According to him, the idea of God is revealed as a trace through the face of the 
human other, calling me to responsibility. This experience brings me in contact with a 
transcendent form of alterity, one that I cannot fully apprehend and to which I can only 
surrender. It puts me under a moral necessity, an obligation to take care of it. Quoting 
Levinas to argue in favor of the 2010 ban is somewhat surprising. His work on ethics and 
communication relies heavily on scriptural references, and has often been described as a 
call for a biblical theology. Using a thinker whose whole oeuvre is rooted in Judeo-
Christian morality to justify a law that promotes secular “vivre-ensemble” and equality of 
all citizens, whatever their religion, highlights the contradictions of French 
Republicanism.  
 The 2010 ban also interrogates the perception of the female body. While this ban 
was among the first to define and problematize the concept of “public space,” it also 
                                                          




introduced a notion that has largely been ignored by commentators: facial recognizability. 
Section one of the law states that “nul ne peut, dans l'espace public, porter une tenue 
destinée à dissimuler son visage.”441 In a subsequent circular dated March 2nd, 2011, this 
section was developed: “Les tenues destinées à dissimuler le visage sont celles qui 
rendent impossible l'identification de la personne. Il n'est pas nécessaire, à cet effet, que 
le visage soit intégralement dissimulé.”442 This clarification might come as a surprise 
given the way debates have systematically targeted full-face veils. It is not necessary that 
one's face be completely hidden to fall under the law so long as it cannot be identified. 
Thus, the issue at stake is to determine when a face can be recognized and when it 
cannot. At what point does it become discernible? Past what threshold? Recognizability 
depends for the most part on the degree of familiarity that binds me to someone. Even 
when partially concealed, a face might be recognized by close relatives but not by distant 
ones, let alone complete strangers. In addition, it is not required that one's face be hidden 
to be unidentifiable. I might, for example, fail to recognize a close friend from a distance 
or even up close because they are wearing sunglasses, hats, or make-up. As it turns out, 
unveiling does not necessarily make one's body less opaque.    
 This discussion of the 2010 ban is crucial to fully understand the stakes of the 
2003 photographic exhibition “Mariannes d’aujourd’hui”—an exhibition that anticipated 
recent concerns with deciphering the opaque, menacing body of veiled Muslims, and re-
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inscribing it within the visual economy of French Republicanism. Inaugurated by Jean-
Louis Debré, then right-wing president of the Assembly, on July 14th, “Mariannes 
d'aujourd'hui” marked the culmination of a five-week march—“la marche des femmes 
des quartiers contre les ghettos et pour l’égalité”—across hexagonal France to protest the 
conditions to which women of immigrant-origin were subjected in the banlieues 
following the murder of Sohane Benziane, a young woman who was burned alive in 
Vitry-sur-Seine. Hanging in somewhat grandiloquent fashion over the facade of the Palais 
Bourbon, fourteen color photographs of young women who participated in the march 
were displayed to the general public. Each one of them is proudly wearing symbols of the 
French Republic: a Phrygian cap or Marianne's emblematic cocarde. One is even holding 
a rooster. 
 The exhibition opened at a time when the national debate on headscarves in 
public schools resurfaced. Participants in the march, under the guidance of the newly 
created feminist organization “Ni Putes Ni Soumises,” took advantage of the momentum 
to advocate for a ban—a solution that its founder Fadela Amara had already suggested in 
her autobiography the same year.443 In covering a key site of French political life with 
large portraits of unveiled “immigrant-origin” women posing as Mariannes, the 
government sought to reconquer the “banlieues,” stigmatized by mainstream media as no-
go zones where women are set on fire when they are not forced to don the veil. Saving 
these “lost territories of the Republic” meant liberating the women who lived there by 
showing them what they were to gain if they embraced the secular values that make up 
                                                          




French citizenship.444 It is this transformative, paternalistic logic that “Mariannes 
d’aujourd’hui” celebrates.  
The fourteen portraits deploy a visual rhetoric that transfigures the “femmes des 
quartiers”445 into icons of the good Republican. What does this rhetoric owe to the 
tradition of colonial picture-making to which Garanger’s work belongs? The “Mariannes 
d’aujourd’hui” exhibition performs a third type of “dramaturgy,” in which the concept of 
“facial nudity,” long a mantra of colonial progress, is reworked into a symbol of 
Republican integration. Using Ariella Azoulay’s concept of “the citizenry of 
photography”446 and her assumption that photography cannot achieve semantic authority 
due to its multivalent nature, I propose to view “Mariannes d’aujourd’hui” as the opposite 
of what it claims to be, namely a celebration of the impaired citizenship of “immigrant-
origin” women and, by extension, that of all French individuals. 
 The exhibition is an exercise in clarification. The photographed women assume an 
exemplary posture that is meant to be emulated by all. As such, it anticipates the 2010 
ban—and its famous slogan that “the Republic must be lived with an open face”—in its 
attempt to make “facial nudity” explicit as a Republican value.447 Each photograph is a 
close-up portrait of a young woman who is either facing the camera directly, in a three-
quarter profile or profile position. On the bottom is a caption in which the sitter shares 
                                                          
444 According to Jean-Louis Debré, the goal of the exhibition is to “donner un visage féminin […] à la 
réalité de l'intégration.” Debré, Jean-Louis. “L’Assemblée Nationale, Ultime Étape De La Marche Des 
Femmes Des  
Quartiers Contre Les Ghettos Et Pour l’Égalité.” Assemblée Nationale-Marche Des Femmes Des Quartiers, 
12 July 2003, www.assembleenationale.fr/evenements/mariannes.asp.  
445 Ibid.  
446 Azoulay, Ariella. The Civil Contract of Photography. New York: Zone Books, 2008.   




her vision of the modern “Marianne.” According to Samira, “c'est une insoumise ouvrant 
le chemin,”while for Sihem she expresses “l'alliance du courage, de l'énergie et de la 
volonté.”448 Dressed in “cocardes,” caps, and clothes in the colors of the French flag, 
each of these fourteen women appears as a modern allegory of the nation; they are the 
new faces of French Republicanism.  
The emancipatory discourse that surrounds “Mariannes d'aujourd'hui” shares a 
number of commonalities with Garanger's description of his experience in Algeria. To be 
sure, some differences distinguish his 1960 collection from the 2003 exhibition, starting 
with the general context in which the women were photographed. Yet in both cases, the 
photographic act was framed by a similar politics of unveiling in which baring one's face 
represents a symbolic gesture through which “emancipation” is effected and allegiance to 
the French Republic declared. While Garanger's photographs were originally intended as 
ID pictures, the “Mariannes d'aujoud'hui” portraits are not. However, they model what 
exemplary Frenchness ought to look like. In other words, Garanger's photographs are 
merely indexical or descriptive—they record facial features for the purpose of 
identification—whereas the “Mariannes d'aujourd'hui” portraits are prescriptive; they 
mobilize a visual discourse that marks the “Arab” or the “black” female body as 
Republican and, in the process, sets up the norms of what viable citizenship looks like. As 
such, the 2003 exhibition fulfils a clear pedagogical purpose. It teaches us how to become 
perfect subjects of the nation: “Français, encore un effort si vous voulez être 
                                                          





 The type of unveiling that “Mariannes d'aujourd'hui” portrays is nothing short of 
spectacular. The exhibition is a dramatic mise-en-scène of the symbols that 
conventionally define Frenchness, from the day and location chosen for the opening 
(July, 14th at the French assembly), to the number of portraits (fourteen), the props 
(Phrygian caps, “cocardes,” rooster), and the dominant colors (blue, white, and red). As 
mentioned, each portrait is accompanied by a small caption that lists the sitter’s name, her 
age and place of residence, thus offering an alternative take on Garanger’s ID pictures. 
The implicit message is one that the 2010 ban took up years later: we know who these 
women are because we can see their faces. In other words, wearing a veil prevents easy 
identification in a way that Republican attire does not. This discourse of transparency 
frames “Mariannes d'aujourd'hui” as a postcolonial parade in which “immigrant-origin” 
women are ostensibly emancipated by state secularism.  
Unlike veiled Muslims who have often been described as oppressed and voiceless, 
the “Mariannes d'aujourd'hui” speak. Under each portrait, a caption allows them to 
explain who they think the modern “Marianne” is. According to Gladys from Montreuil, 
she is “rassurante et douce,” and not “dans le rapport de force” (fig. 10), while Alice 
believes her to be “une mère protectrice tournée vers l'avenir.” Linda describes her as 
“Une femme de coeur qui regarde l'autre avec un a priori positif et chaleureux.”450 
“Marianne”’s characterization as a caring, pleasant, welcoming, and protective mother 
                                                          
449 Sade, Donatien Alphonse François (Marquis) de. La Philosophie dans le boudoir. 1795. Paris: 
Gallimard, 1976. 




underscores the paradox of women’s integration in France. This series of adjectives 
deploys an understanding of womanhood inspired by a corpus of representations in which 
France is traditionally personified as the “mère-patrie.” This understanding draws upon 
and reinforces a socio-cultural order in which gender differences are considered natural. 
Paradoxically enough, the “Mariannes d’aujourd’hui” must abide by the very clichés of 
femininity that encourage gender discrimination in order to become emancipated women 
in the eyes of the Republic. Becoming an exemplary citizen imposes on the female body 
a set of hetero-normative demands that historian Joan Scott subsumed under the 
neologism “sexularism.”451 While “facial nudity” has been introduced as a cornerstone of 
female liberation and empowerment, it creates a form of embodiment that reproduces 
gender discrimination—a phenomenon that women's unveiling was paradoxically meant 
to prevent in the first place. 
 “Mariannes d'aujourd'hui” shows how ordinary “femmes des cités” can become 
exemplary Republicans by saturating our visual field. However, this hyperbolic regime of 
representation is highly problematic. The way each of the sitters is made to perform her 
Frenchness is almost too conspicuous and theatrical to be taken seriously at all. In 
attending to this parodic dimension, I will examine how each portrait can be framed as 
the opposite of what it claims to be. Indeed, the act of claiming Republican citizenship in 
such bombastic fashion is highly suspicious and counter-productive as it suggests that 
this was not self-evident in the first place. If the sitters’ Frenchness were so obvious, no 
one would feel the need to flaunt it the way the exhibition does. Unlike the official 
                                                          




characterization of the exhibition as a celebration of Republican integration, I propose to 
view “Mariannes d’aujourd’hui” as a dismissal of these women’s status as full-fledged 
citizens of the Republic.  
 In her essay, The Civil Contract of Photography, Ariella Azoulay suggests a new 
approach to examining photography, one that elaborates on Sontag's theorization of the 
medium in the way it rehabilitates the gaze of the photographed subject, which is 
completely absent from an essay like Regarding the Pain of Others. Azoulay's is an 
attempt to move beyond the “psychological framework of empathy”452 that informs 
Sontag's reflection by viewing photography through the lens of civic duty. Every 
photograph opens up a space of political relations in which none of its participants—
photographers, photographed subjects, and spectators—can claim ownership or 
monopoly of what it shows. In other words, the photograph is a locus of unpredictability 
where meaning of what appears is constantly negotiated because it can never be entirely 
imposed by any of the participants. Photographs leave “involuntary traces,” they are 
“products of the multiplicity of elements that enter into the frame, whether in keeping 
with the photographer's intentions, or despite these intentions, or unrelated to them.”453 
From this ensues the impossibility to establish and impose a single meaning of 
photography.  
As such, photography provides the model for a political community in which 
egalitarian partnership and solidarity lay the basis for a civil contract of photography. 
This contract assumes that “the governed possess a certain power to suspend the gesture 
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of the sovereign power seeking to totally dominate the relations between us, dividing us 
as governed into citizens and non-citizens thus making disappear the violation of our 
citizenship.”454 Because photography does not privilege one actor over another, it creates 
a platform through which civilian grievances can be heard and acknowledged, and a new 
form of citizenship—open, borderless, non-discriminatory, not limited to national status, 
and non-mediated by the ruling power of the State—can be enacted.   
 Since it partakes in “the right to enact photography free of governmental power 
and even against it,”455 critical commentary appears as a direct means to participate in the 
civil contract of photography. By adding my own voice to the relatively small cohort of 
critics who have discussed “Mariannes d'aujourd'hui,” I am positioning myself as a 
member in the “citizenry of photography” that Azoulay's contract enables. All the more 
so that my discussion of the exhibit as a parodic re-telling of Frenchness challenges the 
way “the sovereign power”—French authorities—has celebrated “Mariannes”'s portraits 
as emblematic of “la force et la pérennité de la devise de la République: 'Liberté, Égalité, 
Fraternité.'”456 In underscoring the gap between the stated aims of “Mariannes 
d'aujourd'hui” and what seems to actually be happening in the encounter between 
photographer, photographed and camera, I momentarily assume the role of what Azoulay 
calls “the ethical spectator.”457 This role requires not to take for granted photography's 
classic definition as a referential representation of what “was there”, “a closed unit of 
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visual information,”458 but to assume that what appears in the photograph may also not be 
immediately manifest. Framing the exhibition in terms of how it speaks to the citizenship 
of those it portrays allows to see how each of the fourteen portraits inflicts an “injury” on 
these women, that is, how they hint at their status as flawed subjects and, by the same 
token, ours. As Azoulay contends, “being governed along with and beside individuals 
who are not citizens causes damage to the seemingly whole, unimpaired citizenship of the 
citizens who are recognized as such.”459 
Azoulay's contention that photography is not a mere index of reality but the 
product of an intersubjective encounter between photographer, photographed subject, 
camera, and spectator makes it possible to requalify the exhibition as a parodic mise-en-
scène of French Republicanism. The French model of citizenship is predicated on the 
idea that individuals cannot live free and equal lives unless they bracket off their racial, 
ethnic, and gender differences. In order to become full-fledged citizens of the Republic, 
they must overlook their particularisms and disregard their lived experiences. Yet, some 
of the fourteen Mariannes were never given the opportunity to do so. After the opening of 
the exhibition in July 2003, media coverage consensually described them as 
representatives of a black-blanc-beur France all the while insisting on their status as 
“filles des cités.” This persistent racialization, while already problematic in itself, 
becomes even more so when one realizes that it occurred at the same time as they were 
celebrated as abstract citizens of the nation. This points to a conundrum of Republican 
integration for immigrant-origin populations, torn between particular and universal 
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modes of identification. Despite their efforts to comply with the demands of Republican 
citizenship, the “Mariannes d’aujourd’hui” are systematically reduced to their 
racial/ethnic background, as if it were a non-erasable difference. They must integrate, yet 
they are never completely allowed to do so. 
All things considered, the visual rhetoric of “Mariannes d’aujourd’hui” is not so 
much hyperbolic as paraleptic. While each portrait can be seen as an exaggerated 
performance of Frenchness, they can also be read as a proclamation of the sitters’ 
impaired citizenship. From the ancient Greek para-, “beside,” and leipein, “to leave,” 
paralepsis is the rhetorical strategy of bringing up or emphasizing a point by seeming to 
pass over it or take no notice of it. One of the most famous examples of paralepsis can be 
found in the first book of Notre-Dame de Paris, where Victor Hugo describes Quasimodo 
as follows: “Nous n’essaierons pas de donner au lecteur une idée de ce nez tétraèdre, de 
cette bouche en fer à cheval, de ce petit œil gauche obstrué, d’un sourcil roux en 
broussailles, tandis que l'œil droit disparaissait entièrement sous une énorme verrue...”460 
This list of facial features and adjectives give a vivid description of Quasimodo’s 
appearance, bringing the reader’s attention to every detail of his physiognomy, and 
therefore defeating the original purpose of the sentence which was to spare us the sight of 
his face. 
“Mariannes d’aujourd’hui” operates on a similar logic. Portraying the sitters’ 
transformation into exemplary Republicans requires the knowledge of what has been 
changed; otherwise one would be hard-pressed to grasp the full scope of their 
                                                          




transformation. Paradoxically enough, representing this transformation means showing 
remnants of what has been erased—remnants which should not be there to begin with had 
the transformation been successful. In other words, the process of erasing particularisms 
must leave a trace in order to prove that it did occur, and to suggest that the 
transformation was successful. According to Fernando, “the universal citizenship that [the 
Mariannes d'aujourd'hui] represent depends on the concurrent production, erasure, and 
reproduction of commensurable forms of difference, since it is precisely the existence of 
such a difference that makes its erasure meaningful.”461 From this, she concludes that the 
“Mariannes d'aujourd'hui” are both “full of promise but also of menace”462 because the 
reproduction of their Muslim immigrant/racial difference and the impossibility to erase it 
reveals the contingent nature of France's Republican model and its claim to universality. 
By showing the traces of what successful integration is supposed to erase, yet by passing 
over them, the exhibition paradoxically draws attention to their presence and suggests 
that full integration can never be achieved. In other words, downplaying the importance 
of such traces only highlights their irreducibility and, by extension, the impossibility of 
embodying the ideal citizenship that each woman is meant to exemplify.  
  
Conclusion 
2016 witnessed a number of controversies that revived previous debates on the 
veil not just in France but across Europe. In January of that year, Italian fashion house 
Dolce and Gabbana launched its “Abaya Collection,” a line of hijabs and loose over-
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garments that contributed to the popularization of Islamic fashion. Reactions were mixed 
and many, like Pierre Bergé, resented the collusion of the fashion industry with “cette 
dictature qui impose cette chose abominable qui fait qu'on cache les femmes, qu'on leur 
fait vivre une vie dissimulée.” 463 Similar reactions were observed seven months later, in 
August, in support of a decree issued by the Mayor of Nice to ban the wearing of 
burkinis. That same year, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls suggested creating a law 
that would extend the 2004 ban on Islamic veils in public primary and secondary schools 
to public universities—yet another political strategy to stop the rise of Islamism in the 
wake of the 2015 Paris terror attacks and after the Senate failed to agree on a bill that 
would strip French citizenship from convicted terrorists.464 These recent controversies 
underscore the existence of a collective fixation on the veil that France's repressive 
legislation has failed to dissipate. They also continue to highlight France’s inability to 
address its colonial heritage as well as the flaws inherent in its model of integration.  
As this chapter underscored, the veil has been instrumentalized to bolster the 
construction of a multifaceted other, both threatening and vulnerable—the veiled 
Muslim—and implement a “politics of facial nudity” to neutralize her presence in public 
spaces. This politics imposes a normative visibility and seeks to do away with the threat 
of facelessness embodied by veiled women. Unveiling the Muslim woman has been 
described as a liberation ritual, a spectacular transition from the “république des cousins” 
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to the “république des citoyens,”465 or as Nassim Aboudrar has claimed, a “dramaturgie” 
that mobilizes a variety of visual discourses, from Sebbar’s description of Algerian 
women as symbols of resistance to Djebar’s use of metonymy and hypallage to portray 
Hajila’s face, and “Mariannes d’aujourd’hui”’s rhetoric of hyperbole/paralepsis. Diverse 
in its scope and register, this corpus highlights the role of French authorities in assuming 
the production and regulation of acceptable forms of Muslim subjectivity/corporeality. 
The 2010 ban was the result of a slow process to unveil Muslim women that started in 
colonial Algeria where baring one’s face in public became a symbol of civilization and 
progress. Focusing on the history of this process allowed me to highlight the tensions and 
contradictions at work in France’s recent promotion of “facial nudity.” 
While “face” is commonly understood as an individual body part that reflects 
one’s subjectivity, feelings, and thoughts, this chapter showed that it is above all a 
product of governing practices. “Facial nudity” is not a kind of “zeroness” of perception; 
it is not the precondition for perception to take place, but its overturning. Treatments of 
the veil debate since 1958 show that having a face is not a universal given, but a 
politically coded mode of embodiment meant to make women’s bodies legible. Indeed 
the regime of visibility that has informed France’s socio-cultural practices is one that 
celebrates transparency, clarity, and the omnipotence of gazing. In this scopic regime, the 
“open face” is semiotically marked as a staple of laïcité, Republicanism, and viable 
citizenship. The series of laws and bans to regulate the wearing of face veils is part of a 
politics to establish the face as a known and governed space. Ultimately, this politics does 
                                                          




not just problematize how the female Muslim body is or should be seen in public spaces; 
it also draws attention to the inherent contradictions of French Republicanism and its 

















This study took as its starting point the ubiquitous presence of faces in 
Francophone literature and visual culture, and as its guiding thread an analysis of the 
discursive frameworks through which these faces have appeared, or rather, through which 




human gaze is always embedded in experience, mediated by a range of social and cultural 
“screens.” In chapter one, I showed that one such screen, and arguably the most 
influential one when it comes to facial perception, was physiognomy. Lavater intended 
the discipline as a promotion of knowledge and love of mankind, but the rise of the 
second French colonial empire and progress in physical anthropology transformed it into 
just the opposite: a tool for classifying racial types on a scale of differential worth.  
Nineteenth-century physiognomy played such a major role in the intellectual 
debate on race that subsequent discourses on the face mainly focused on endorsing or 
rejecting its claims. It is in the latter that Levinas engaged. His essay Totalité et Infini 
provides an alternative model for thinking about the face—one that dismisses 
racialization and, by extension, any form of portraiture as an act of caricature, if not 
disfigurement. As a living presence that encapsulates the idea of infinity, the face cannot 
be reduced to its perceivable traits, its phenomenality. While it has become common to 
frame Levinas’s abstract metaphorization of the face as a direct critique of physiognomy, 
I argued that the drive to scienticize physiognomy was also characterized by a tendency 
to treat the face as a decontextualized entity, theorized apart from its lived experience, 
from its “flesh.” In this way, I produced a reading of Levinas that does not frame his 
thought as a refuge against physiognomy but as its unsuspected ally. 
Chapters two, three, and four examined the various ways in which Francophone 
authors and artists have positioned themselves within this legacy and complicated the 
seeming—but not inherent—opposition between physiognomic discourse and Levinas’s 
ethical response to it. I examined the way these francophone authors have “looked back” 




constructing humanity and reenchanting the face. Is there a way to represent faces that 
acknowledges their embodied finitude without reducing them to it?  
Throughout this dissertation, we looked at popular ads and caricatures, and like 
Sebbar’s Shérazade, we leafed through Garanger’s photographs. We made our way to 
Rwanda where we noticed, beyond calls for national unity, the lingering presence of 
ethnic divisions. We strolled through the Camp Saint-Maur in Vincennes before making 
our way to the National Assembly where larger than life portraits of “Mariannes” greeted 
us. Finally, we visited the Martinican countryside and strolled through the streets of 
Algiers. Over the course of these peregrinations, we encountered Tutsis, chabins, and 
unveiled Muslims. We looked at them and we listened to their stories.  
In the works of Mukagasana and Diop, the face is described as a site of opacity 
that straddles the racial divide between Hutu and Tutsi, thus shattering the physiognomic 
grids created by European explorers and re-appropriated by Hutu propaganda. Djebar 
adopts a similar posture to describe the unveiled Muslim. Her alternate use of hypallage 
and metonymy preserves the enigmatic aura of the face and prevents its reification into a 
political symbol of emancipation. By contrast, Révérien Rurangwa sought to make it 
legible after it was disfigured by his Hutu neighbor. His testimony is best understood as a 
text about his face that tells us how to read his face as a text. The scars inscribed in his 
flesh provide a metafictional analogy and a justification for the act of writing. Ultimately, 
I showed how describing the details of his appearance becomes a way to bear witness to 
the violence of genocide. The same metafictional musings are found in Confiant’s works. 
Like Rurangwa, he is concerned with trying to make sense of the face—in his case, the 




of confusion. I read Ravines du devant-jour, Eau de café, and Le Cahier de romances as 
dermographies or attempts to rewrite and rehabilitate the chabin’s white skin, 
traditionally perceived as a sign of his evil nature—a process that made possible 
Confiant’s emergence as a chabin writer.  
Despite their variety, these tactics and strategies have in common to complicate 
the decontextualized environment in which most discussions of the face tend to take 
place. Mukagasana, Diop, and Djebar disrupt the language of physiognomy by turning 
the face into a locus of hermeneutic instability—one might say, to quote Deleuze and 
Guattari, by “deterritorializing” it. On the contrary, Confiant, Rurangwa, and the 
“Marianes d’aujourd’hui” exhibition establish a new system of physiognomic 
equivalences. While Confiant celebrates the chabin’s face as an emblem of Caribbean 
hybridity, Rurangwa invites his reader to see in his disfigured appearance a symbol of 
Tutsi resilience, and “Mariannes d’aujourd’hui” portrays unveiled Muslims as examples 
of perfect Republicans. In doing so, all argue against Levinas that the act of 
representation can be a redemptive practice.  
One might see in the web of Western discourses on the face and in the range of 
Afro-Caribbean responses to them a Manichaean opposition. This is not entirely true. 
While physiognomy played a major role in the construction of race and racism as 
scientific categories, it was never inherently racist. Second, racist physiognomy, while it 
originated in Europe, was not an exclusively Western prerogative. As Chapter two and 
three underscored, its discourses and methods were taken up by Hutu extremists to 
legitimize the Tutsi genocide and by Martinicans to discriminate against chabins. But 




challenges. For example, Chapter three showed how Max Élisée’s novel underscores the 
paradox inherent in Confiant’s rehabilitation of the chabin. Praising his métissage as a 
Caribbean by-product reified his subjectivity the same way physiognomic discourse did 
when portraying him as angry and untrustworthy. Similarly, Chapter four laid out some 
of the contradictions that emerged from Sebbar’s reading of Garanger’s Femmes 
Algériennes 1960. In describing unveiled women as figures of resistance, she trapped 
them into a restricted mode of being—a posture they precisely sought to avoid. 
Ironically, these authors engaged in the same practice of physiognomic typification that 
they set out to subvert in the first place.  
Their “failures” have us wonder: was Levinas right after all? Are faces inherently 
ungraspable? Are they meant to escape the representational realm? Or can they truly be 
portrayed in a way that acknowledges their radiating openness? In a way that does not 
shape them into frozen, lifeless images, but that embraces them as panim? A way that can 
account for their plasticity without reducing them to it? This dissertation has suggested 
two answers to these questions. Description, or descriptive writing, has been commonly 
defined as “the depiction of objects or people in stasis” (whereas narration is “the 
depiction of objects and people in movement.”)466 As such, it is concerned with the 
representation of fixed forms; it suspends time. Yet, when we use words to depict a face, 
we organize them in a sequential order. First comes a description of the hair, then the 
forehead, possibly followed by a comment on the eyes, the nose and the chin. Because 
language is linear, every written portrait necessarily breaks down the face into its 
                                                          




different parts. One solution has been to find in this process of “metonymization” a 
source of empowerment. Confiant and Rurangwa’s detailed self-portraits are perfect 
illustrations. Another solution has been to deploy rhetorical strategies that partially 
interrupt this process. For example, Assia Djebar’s description of the unveiled face, while 
still relying on metonymy, also involves the use of hypallage as a counterbalancing 
device. The combination of the two opens up a liminal space in which the unveiled face 
can be glimpsed at without being petrifying into an atomized mess.  
This research does not claim to be exhaustive or definitive. My hope is that it will 
open new avenues of inquiry. Indeed, other faces would deserve just as much “scrutiny.” 
For example, more needs to be said about the use of blackface. Many studies have been 
conducted on the subject in American film, but surprisingly enough, none in French 
cinema.467 Yet movies that feature white actors in the role of black characters are 
numerous. Among them are Arletty in Les Perles de la couronne (1937), Fernandel in 
Monsieur Hector (1940), Pierre Brasseur in Les Enfants du paradis (1945), and more 
recently, Valérie Lemercier in Agathe Cléry (2008). A comparative study of the ways in 
which blackface movies have been received in both countries would be interesting. For 
example, how has the Republican ideology of color-blindedness informed viewers’ 
experience of and response to these films in a way that the U.S. model of the “melting 
pot” has not? Likewise, the use of digital blackface in reaction GIFs has recently given 
rise to passionate debates about the use of racial images to perform the emotional labor of 
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white social media users or simply to entertain them.468 Also worthy of consideration is 
the issue of “délit de faciès.” The reason physiognomy gained so much currency in the 
nineteenth century was its capacity to adapt to a variety of uses and contexts. With this in 
mind, could we not see in modern techniques of profiling the latest avatar of 
physiognomic practice? Or, on the contrary, did the discredit into which physiognomy 
fell at the close of the nineteenth century not cause the means of bodily control and 
authentification to shift from the face to other parts, like fingerprints? In other words, 
have faces become obsolete?  
A series of recent controversies seem to testify to the opposite. In October 2016, 
the U.S. equivalent of an Amber Alert was issued in France after four-month-old Djenah 
was abducted by her father, Steeve Beni Y. Saad, who was described as an “individu de 
race noire.”469 Above the description was a picture of him and his daughter. In a tweet 
following the incident, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Justice tried to defuse the 
situation by blaming what he described as a poor choice of words on the necessity to act 
quickly. This controversy took place a few months after the French government was 
condemned by the regional court of Paris for racial profiling. In March 2016, Mediapart 
published an official memo in which the state judicial officer justified “contrôles au 
faciès” on the ground that Blacks and Arabs are more likely to be foreigners and 
therefore undocumented.470 Finally, during the parliamentary elections that took place in 
                                                          
468 See, for example, Jackson, Lauren Michele. “We Need to Talk About Digital Blackface in Reaction 
GIFs.” Teen Vogue, 2 Aug. 2017, http://www.teenvogue.com/story/digital-blackface-reaction-gifs  
469 See, for example, “‘Individu De Race Noire’: L'alerte Enlèvement Tourne à La Polémique.” L’Express, 
19 Oct. 2016, www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/individu-de-race-noire-l-alerte-enlevement-tourne-a-la-
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Algeria in May 2017, several parties, such as the “Parti de l’équité de la proclamation,” 
the “Front des forces socialistes,” and the “Parti algérien vert pour le développement” put 
up campaign posters in which female candidates appeared faceless, unlike their male 
counterparts.471 Some parties apologized in the wake of the incident, but others like the 
“Parti de l’équité de la proclamation” justified this erasure as an attempt to preserve the 
stability of these women’s families.  
While seemingly different, these controversies suggest the enduring force of 
physiognomy as a technology of state surveillance and marginalization. The perpetuation 
of a physiognomic mentality more than a century after its methods were dismissed seems 
quite surprising, unless we forget that the disappearance of the discipline did not 
necessarily entail the end of the facial imaginaries that underpinned its practice. These 
controversies also encapsulate, each in its own way, the overarching issues that this 
dissertation has sought to unpack: the modalities through which racial and gender 
differences are assigned and inscribed on the face, the construction and dissemination of 
“black” or “brown” images as stock visuals and their role in redefining the boundaries of 
human subjectivity, and more generally, the conditions under which faces become 
(in)visible and (il)legible. This question of readability gestures toward the face not just as 
a literary or visual trope but as a heuristic device to encourage investigation and 
questioning of francophone literature and visual culture. By appearing, as I have showed 
throughout these pages, as self-conscious sites of rewriting, refashioning, and re-creation, 
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sites that endlessly problematize their own deciphering, faces compel us to interrogate, in 
meta-critical fashion, our own practices and assumptions as literary critics—as 
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